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From Divergence to Convergence: Re-evaluating the 
History Behind China’s Economic Boom1 
 
By Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas G. Rawski2 
 
Abstract 
 
China’s long-term economic dynamics pose a formidable challenge to economic 
historians.  The Qing Empire (1644-1911), the world’s largest national economy prior to 
the 19th century, experienced a tripling of population during the 17th and 18th 
centuries with no signs of diminishing per capita income. In some regions, the standard 
of living may have matched levels recorded in advanced regions of Western Europe.  
However, with the Industrial Revolution a vast gap emerged between newly rich 
industrial nations and China’s lagging economy.  Only with an unprecedented growth 
spurt beginning in the late 1970s has the gap separating China from the global leaders 
been substantially diminished, and China regained its former standing among the 
world’s largest economies. This essay develops an integrated framework for 
understanding this entire history, including both the long period of divergence and the 
more recent convergent trend.  The analysis sets out to explain how deeply embedded 
political and economic institutions that had contributed to a long process of extensive 
growth subsequently prevented China from capturing the benefits associated with new 
technologies and information arising from the Industrial Revolution.  During the 20th 
century, the gradual erosion of these historic constraints and of new obstacles created 
by socialist planning eventually opened the door to China’s current boom.  Our analysis 
links China’s recent economic development to important elements of its past, while 
using the success of the last three decades to provide fresh perspectives on the critical 
obstacles undermining earlier modernization efforts, and their removal over the last 
century and a half.  
                                                      
1 In preparing this draft, we have received valuable advice from many colleagues, including Timothy 
Brook, James Cassing, Peter Lindert, LIU Pei, LONG Denggao, Deirdre McCloskey, Kenneth Pomeranz, 
Evelyn Rawski, Roger Sahs, Richard Smethurst, Werner Troesken, Rubie Watson, and participants in the 
May 2010 Asian Historical Economics Conference held at Tsinghua University in Beijing.  The usual 
disclaimer applies.  We welcome suggestions that will help us to improve this review.    
2 Brandt, University of Toronto, brandt@chass.utoronto.ca; Ma, London School of Economics, 
d.ma1@lse.ac.uk; Rawski, University of Pittsburgh, tgrawski@pitt.edu.  
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1. Introduction3 
China’s enormous boom, now well into its fourth decade, invites inquiry into the 
historical antecedents of an unprecedented surge of productivity and prosperity that 
lifted hundreds of millions from dire poverty, pushed the People’s Republic to the 
forefront of global manufacturing and trade, and unleashed sweeping transformations 
of employment, education, urbanization, consumption, inequality, ownership, and 
many other dimensions of economic life in the world’s most populous nation.   
Earlier growth spurts in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea encouraged efforts to probe 
the domestic origins of recent dynamism in those economies.4  China’s sudden and 
unexpected rush toward higher incomes invites similar questions.  What circumstances 
enabled the hesitant reforms of the late 1970s5 which restored no more than a small 
fraction of the market arrangements stifled by socialist policies during the previous 
three decades, to launch the economy on a steep and durable growth path?  How 
could several hundred million Chinese villagers escape from “absolute poverty” within 
10-15 years following the onset of economic reform during the late 1970s with, if 
anything, declining external support as former collective institutions withered away?   
How did the number of so-called “township-village” (TVE) enterprises jump from 1.5 
million to nearly 20 million, including many with substantial overseas sales, between 
1978 and 1990 without encountering a shortage of capable managers and 
accountants?  How did millions of firms conduct business, often on a large scale, 
without well-developed systems of commercial law or property rights?   
While developments that arose from China’s planned economy, including the 
expansion of human capital and the latent competition inherent in the emergence of 
relatively complete sets of manufacturing industries in most of China’s 31 provinces, 
surely contributed to reform-era growth, this essay is written in the conviction that 
                                                      
3 Names of authors working in North America and Europe and publishing in English are presented 
Western style (e.g. Debin Ma).  Names of Chinese and Japanese authors based in Asia and writing 
primarily in Asian languages appear in the East Asian fashion, surname first, with the surname capitalized 
for clarity (e.g. WU Chengming). 
4 For Japan, see Thomas Smith (1959, 1988), Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky (1973), Kozo 
Yamamura (1997), and Akira Hayami, Osamu Saitō and Ronald Toby (2004); for Taiwan, see Limin Hsueh 
et al (2001); for Korea, see Dong-se Cha et al (1997). 
5 Studies of China’s economy during the reform era include Carl Riskin (1987), Chris Bramall (2000), 
Gregory Chow (2002), Justin Lin, Fang Cai and Zhou Li  (2003), Barry Naughton (2007), and Brandt and 
Rawski (2008).   
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historical legacies rooted in the decades and centuries prior to the establishment of the 
People’s Republic in 1949 continue to exert powerful influence upon the evolution of 
China’s economy.  
Prior to the industrial revolution, China led the world in both economic size and in 
many dimensions of technology.   Writing before the onset of China’s current boom, 
earlier generations of scholars (Marion J. Levy 1953, Albert Feuerwerker 1958) 
attributed China’s subsequent reversal of fortune to the prevalence of nepotism, 
corruption, and other elements of Chinese social structure and behavior that prevented 
a vibrant response to European expansion of the sort attained during Japan’s Meiji era 
(1868-1912).  Subsequent events have overtaken these views; indeed, some observers 
now promote the opposite approach, attributing recent Asian prosperity to the very 
“Confucian values” formerly thought to have obstructed economic dynamism (see Wei-
ming Tu 1996).  
More recently, new work by James Lee, LI Bozhong, Kenneth Pomeranz, R. Bin 
Wong and others - often identified as the “California school” — has reshaped 
perspectives on the dynamism and development of the mid-Qing (1644-1911) economy.  
Their key argument, most clearly articulated in Pomeranz’ influential book on The Great 
Divergence (2000), is that there was little difference in economic structure or per capita 
income between the most commercialized regions of China and Europe prior to the 
British industrial revolution.  Furthermore, these regions shared an increasingly binding 
development constraint: land. Pomeranz attributes Britain’s head start in 
industrialization to cheap coal and superior access through its colonies to land-intensive 
goods rather to any advantage linked to political, legal, or other institutional factors.  
These bold claims have kindled intense controversy among historians of both Asia and 
Europe, sparked efforts to expand empirical comparisons spanning Europe and Asia, 
and catapulted Chinese economic history from a narrowly specialized field to a central 
concern of newly emerging global historical studies.6    
                                                      
6 The breadth and intensity of the debate on the historical comparison of economic growth between 
China and the West is evident from the Economic History Net forum ‘Rethinking 18th Century China’ 
http://eh.net/forums/ChinaSum.html and in a debate between Andre Gunder Frank and David Landes at 
http://www.worldhistorycenter.org/whc/seminar/pastyears/frank-landes/Frank-Landes_01.htm  
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The present review7 seeks to illuminate the historical antecedents of recent 
Chinese dynamism, to specify the constraints that hindered the realization of China’s 
latent potential prior to the start of the current growth spurt, and to track the gradual 
relaxation of these constraints during the course of the 20th century.  Our analysis of 
China’s current boom, as well as the modest advances of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, helps to illuminate the nature and impact of these earlier constraints.  In this 
way, we believe that recent developments can deepen our insight into historical realities 
and vice-versa.   
Several specific questions will help to unify much of what follows:  
Why was China unable to capitalize on its earlier economic and technological 
leadership?  Why did China become a laggard among major global economies by the 
19th century, if not before? 
Once the Industrial Revolution was well underway, a succession of countries in 
Europe, Asia and the Americas followed England’s lead.  Why was China slow to take 
advantage of economic opportunities linked to the dissemination of new technology 
and information?   
How do we explain the post-1978 breakthrough?  What distinguishes China’s 
post-1978 economic success from its earlier efforts, including those in the late 19th-early 
and early 20th centuries as well as during the early PRC decades? 
The first of these questions is the most difficult.  We are more optimistic about 
tackling the second and the third.   We anticipate – and here we differ with the views 
of the California school – that institutions will figure prominently in explaining both the 
long delay in the onset of rapid growth and the nature of China’s recent growth spurt.   
China’s engagement with the world economy after 1978, an integral part of 
almost all narratives on China’s success, is not the first time that the Middle Kingdom 
became linked to the international economy.  When European explorers first arrived in 
Asian waters, they encountered well-established networks of water-borne trade 
connecting Chinese merchants and vessels with the rest of Asia (Andre Gunder Frank 
                                                      
7 Previous surveys include Albert Feuerwerker (1961, 1992), Frank H. H. King (1969) and Kent Deng 
(2000). 
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1998).  Although cross-national silver flows strongly affected China’s monetary system 
from the 16th century onward, the impact of international trade on domestic prices, 
incomes, organization and production appears smaller in this early period than in the 
late 19th and especially during the late 20th century.  Indeed, overseas connections 
figure prominently in controversial work arguing that modern economic growth began 
during the early decades of the 20th century.  In principle, similar linkages after the 
Opium Wars should have helped to relax constraints identified by Pomeranz and others 
as crucial in the context of the great divergence.  
We begin this essay with a survey of the long-term evolution of China’s economy.  
Since our review points to institutions as a crucial but neglected factor that can 
contribute to understanding both the failures and the triumphs of China’s economy 
during the past two centuries, we then turn to an analysis of China’s modern history 
from the perspective of political economy.  Beginning with a summary of the more 
robust stylized facts of the imperial Chinese economy, we lay out a broad analytic 
framework for studying the political economy of China’s pre-modern system that has 
links to China’s post-1949 system both before and after the onset of the economic 
reform initiatives that began during the late 1970s. Finally, we briefly examine the 
growth spurt following China’s post-1978 reforms with an eye to continuities as well as 
departures from historic patterns.  An appendix reviews the quantitative materials that 
underpin research on Chinese economic history, highlighting the strengths as well as 
limitations of past research. 
 
2. Long-Term Evolution Of China’s Economy 
China’s economic history covers several millennia.  Although certain features of 
the economic, political and social system span much longer periods, we will concentrate 
on the period since the mid-14th century encompassing the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing 
(1644-1912) dynasties and the ensuing Republican period (1912-1949), which ended 
with the defeat and exile of the Nationalist government led by CHIANG Kai-shek (JIANG 
Jieshi) and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.   
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Map 1 indicates the territories controlled by the Ming and the far larger 
dominions of the Qing emperors.8  The territory of today’s People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) approximates that of the Qing, except for the border changes in what are labeled 
“Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria” in Map 1 (See Appendix). 
 
2.1 Song as the Peak?   
Scholars often view Ming-Qing economic history in light of the Song era (960-
1279), jumping over the short-lived Yuan or Mongol reign (1279-1368).  The Song, and 
its predecessor, the Tang (618-907), were times of sweeping change in China’s 
economy and society, known to historians as the “Tang-Song Transformation” (Tang 
Song biange).   This period brings the formation of institutions and structures that 
evolved into foundations of what contemporary historians think of as “traditional” or 
“pre-modern” China: the consolidation of a tax system based on registration and 
assessment of privately-held land; the regularization of a merit-based civil service staffed 
by commoners rather than aristocrats; and the use of written examinations to select 
candidates for official appointments.  These political changes were accompanied by 
deep and long-lasting structural transformations in the economy: a shift from large 
landholdings to an agricultural regime based on small-holder ownership and tenancy, 
relaxation of restrictions and regulations on urban dwellers, the growing importance of 
markets for both goods and factors of production along with the penetration of money 
in commercial exchange, and the extensive development of private mercantile activity.9  
The late Joseph Needham’s massive volumes on Science and Civilization in China 
[summarized in Needham and Colin Ronan 1978] document the extraordinary spurt of 
innovation associated with the Tang-Song period, including breakthroughs in such 
diverse fields as gunpowder, the magnetic compass, movable type, paper, and 
shipbuilding. The significance of these innovations was widely recognized: 
                                                      
8 Although the map locates Taiwan outside the Qing borders, the Qing exercised effective control over 
the island between 1683 and 1895, when it passed into the hands of Japan. 
9 Modern scholarship in this area begins with pre-war studies by Japanese scholars like NAITO Kōnan and 
KATŌ Shigeshi.  Richard von Glahn’s review of recent monetary studies (2004) cites an array of relevant 
work by Chinese, Japanese, and western researchers. 
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Printing, gunpowder and the compass: These three have changed the face and state of 
things throughout the world; first in literature, the second in warfare, the third in navigation; 
whence have followed innumerable changes, in so much that no empire, no sect, no star seems 
to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical 
discoveries” (Francis Bacon, New Instrument, 1620). 
Needham’s works establish China as the global leader in many fields of scientific 
and technological endeavor until perhaps the 14th century.  The question of why this 
technological superiority did not lead to an industrial revolution has become widely 
known as the “Needham puzzle” (Justin Yifu Lin 1995; Kent Deng 2003). 
The combination of deep institutional change and technological progress (which 
may in fact be linked – see Francesca Bray (1994)) is seen as driving both quantitative 
and qualitative extension of economic activity.  Some scholars, most notably, Eric Jones 
(1988), view the Song, particularly the era of Southern Song (1127-1289), as an early 
and remarkable episode of “intensive” growth – meaning increases in urbanization, 
marketed agricultural surplus, and per capita income.  Kang Chao (1986, p. 56) asserts 
that urban residents accounted for more than one-fifth of the Southern Song 
population.  A number of scholars see Song China as achieving a peak of economic 
achievement unmatched by subsequent dynasties.   
The Song peak thesis is reflected in Angus Maddison’s compilation of material on 
global economic aggregates, which we summarize in Table 1.  Maddison portrays 
China’s per capita GDP as flat or declining for the entire period from 400 to 1870 with 
the sole exception of the years from 1000-1500, to which he assigns an increase of 33 
percent.  European per capita GDP decreases between 400 and 1000, presumably 
reflecting the fall of Rome, but rises monotonically thereafter, overtaking China 
between 1000 and 1500. 
While the Song peak perspective continues to receive scholarly support, most 
recently from William Guanglin Liu (2005),10 the quantitative underpinning of key 
elements of the Song success story remains fragile.  Robert Hartwell’s widely cited 
estimate of Song iron production rests on a single speculation-filled footnote (1962, pp. 
                                                      
10 Within Chinese academia, the greatest advocate of the Song peak thesis is Professor QI Xia and his 
group of students based largely in Hebei University;  See QI Xia (1999, 2009).  
 
10 
 
154-155).  Critics challenge the notion that the Song attained major agricultural 
progress, arguing that available documents do not give a clear picture of the extent of 
irrigated rice cultivation, the level of crop yields, or the size of the agricultural surplus.  
In a series of publications focusing on the area adjoining the lower reaches of the 
Yangzi River, China’s most economically advanced region, during the Ming (1368-1644) 
and Qing (1644-1911) periods, LI Bozhong contests claims that advanced farming 
methods and high yields during Southern Song surpassed achievements in the 
subsequent Ming and Qing eras.   In LI’s view, key factors hailed as constituting the 
essence of the Song economic revolution – including the cultivation of the Champa rice 
variety, the diffusion of new agricultural tools and practices, and the intensification of 
agricultural production – may have appeared in the Song period but diffused only 
during the Ming and Qing.11  ŌSAWA Masaaki offers further scepticism about what he 
calls the the “false image” conveyed by widely cited research on Song agriculture (1996, 
esp. pp. 236-240).  Substantial urbanization presupposes high yields and large 
marketed surpluses.  Without convincing refutation of critics like ŌSAWA and LI, claims 
of extensive Song urbanization, which have drawn a skeptical response (Albert 
Feuerwerker 1988, Yeh-chien Wang 1990), remain highly suspect.  
 
2.2 Ming-Qing: Stagnation or Growth? 
Despite ongoing concern that the Song peak thesis may arise from an erroneous 
conflation of qualitative and quantitative change, there is a vast literature that purports 
to explain China’s fall from the heights of the Song, usually in the context of the 
prodigious demographic expansion that pushed population from under 100 million at 
the start of Ming (1368) to 400 million by the late 18th century.   China’s economy 
expanded alongside population, but output growth was mostly confined to the 
extensive margin, with only modest support from technical change.  With no clear 
evidence of rising per capita incomes, the growth that did occur is often described as 
“Smithian” in nature, because of its link to increasing specialization and division of 
labor. 
                                                      
11 For the critique of Song peak claims, see Li (2002, chaps. 5 and 6).  Li (1998) lays out the author’s 
analysis of Ming-Qing agricultural developments in the Lower Yangzi region.  
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Dwight H. Perkins’ (1969) careful analysis of agriculture, which represented the 
bulk of the economy and absorbed a majority of the labor force, provides the strongest 
empirical support for this perspective.  China’s agricultural economy consisted of 
millions of small family farms, with average farm size by the 18th century less than 5 
acres.12  Focusing on grain production, which occupied upwards of 80 percent of total 
acreage, Perkins attributes long-term growth in agricultural output during Ming and 
Qing in roughly equal amounts to increases in acreage and higher yields, i.e. the 
extensive and intensive margins.  Rising yields, among the world’s highest at that time, 
in turn, arise from growing intensification of tillage enabled by an increase in labor 
supply per unit of land.  This dynamic reflects the views of Ester Boserup (1965) in that 
population growth drives economic expansion by opening the door to increased 
cultivation of labor-intensive crops and greater use of multiple cropping and other 
labor-using techniques.  While existing techniques spread across China’s landscape, 
Perkins finds little evidence of technical change in Ming-Qing agriculture aside from the 
importation of new food crops (maize, Irish and sweet potatoes) and a modest 
expansion in irrigated area.  
Subsequent studies of different regions, especially the prosperous, highly 
commercialized Lower Yangzi area near present-day Shanghai, have built on Perkins’ 
picture of an economy that responds to slow increases in population density by creating 
new layers of specialization and division of labor that maintain living standards in the 
face of a declining man-land ratio.   Exploiting the unique richness of historical materials 
pertaining to this part of China, LI Bozhong’s (2000, 2010) study of the early 
industrialization of Jiangnan (referring to the southern portion of Jiangsu province, 
which occupies the heart of the Yangzi delta), for example, systematically reviews 
production growth in cotton textiles, food processing, apparel, tobacco, papermaking, 
printing, toolmaking, construction and shipbuilding in the Lower Yangzi during 1550-
1850.   
 
 
                                                      
12 Farm size was smaller in the south, reflecting the south’s warmer climate, longer growing season, 
greater availability of water, and higher multiple cropping ratios. Land rental was also more common in 
the south, with estimates suggesting in upwards of a third of land rented (John L.  Buck 1930, 1937). 
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2.2.1 Commercialization, domestic trade, market integration 
Whether or not subsequent research upholds Kenneth Pomeranz’ (2000) 
controversial view that pre-industrial living standards in China’s Lower Yangzi region 
resembled those observed in leading segments of western Europe,13 historians have 
documented substantial economic and commercial advances which enabled the Qing 
empire to absorb massive population increases in excess of 150 million during the 18th 
century alone (Table 1).    
Building on the considerable expansion of markets and commerce recorded under 
the Song (960-1279), some of which declined during the Mongol (Yuan) interregnum 
(1279-1368), the Ming-Qing era witnessed renewed expansion of commerce and 
growing commercialization of agriculture.  Although much of this trade was local, 
especially for agricultural commodities, inter-regional trade likely expanded. Renovation 
of the Grand Canal in early Ming facilitated the northward shipment of tribute grain to 
the capital, provided a new channel for north-south trade.14  The sea route from the 
Lower Yangzi northward around the Shandong peninsula to Tianjin, “virtually 
abandoned” under the Ming, was revived during the Qing period and extended 
northward to connect with commodity flows along the Liao River in Manchuria (XU 
Dixin and WU Chengming eds., 2000, p. 166). The growth of what became the large 
middle-Yangzi river port of Hankou (now known as Wuhan) from “a desolate 
sandbank” during the Ming era to the “hub of a trade network linking Sichuan and 
Shaanxi [provinces] to central and south-eastern China” by 1813 reflects “the 
development of trade along the Yangzi” River during the Qing era (XU and WU 2000, p. 
165; William T. Rowe, 1984).   
Multiple studies trace the Qing trend toward deepening domestic commercial 
networks (for example Evelyn Rawski 1972, Gilbert Rozman 1974), which influential 
work by the late G.W. Skinner (1964) showed to consist of nested hierarchies of 
marketplaces, differentiated according to the periodicity of market sessions, the scale of 
                                                      
13 Robert Allen, Jean-Pascal Bassino, Debin Ma, Christine Moll-Murata, and Jan Luiten van Zanden 2011 
dispute the claim of comparable living standards between Asia and Western Europe using real wages of 
unskilled workers in major urban centers.  Pomeranz counters that in China, unlike Europe, the urban 
wages were below the incomes of (more numerous) owner-farmers.  The controversy continues. 
14 The Grand Canal was initially constructed during the Sui Dynasty (AD 589-616) and became a main 
inland artery that helped to forge the unification of the subsequent Tang and Song empires (QUAN 
Hansheng, 1990). 
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activity and the array of products and services transacted, that extended from the 
largest cities to distant and humble villages.  Increases in the number of towns and 
markets were particularly evident in the densely populated delta regions surrounding 
modern-day Shanghai and Guangzhou (WU Chengming 2002, p. 186).    
The observation by Han-sheng Ch’üan and Richard Kraus that Qing “official 
shipments of several hundred thousand shih over distances above a thousand miles 
could be planned, executed, and completed in a matter of weeks without putting an 
appreciable strain on the existing transport facilities of even … comparatively 
backward” provinces demonstrates the scale and geographic extent of market 
operations.15   
The analysis of price data for food grains, which local governments reported to 
central officials on a monthly basis, demonstrates the presence of substantial price 
integration of Qing grain markets, most notably in localities linked by low-cost water 
transport.  Yeh-chien Wang, who initiated the collection and study of these materials, 
concludes that “early eighteenth-century China was, on the whole, comparable with 
Europe in terms of market integration”; subsequent analysis by Carol Shiue and 
Wolfgang Keller confirms this observation, and shows that the Lower Yangzi area 
achieved greater price integration than continental Europe, while England displayed the 
greatest development of grain price integration on the eve of the Industrial Revolution  
(Yeh-chien Wang 1992, p. 53; Carol H. Shiue and Wolfgang Keller 2007).16  
 
 
2.2.2. International exchange before 1800. 
Although the bulk of demand and sales involved purely domestic transactions, 
there was a small but significant international trade.  Largely confined to China’s coastal 
                                                      
15 Ch’üan and Kraus (1975,  pp. 58-59).  1 imperial shih of milled rice weighed approximately 185 pounds 
(ibid., 98), so that 300,000 shih was equivalent to  over 25,000 metric tons. 
16  Empirical studies of grain market integration rely on grain price reports collected by the Qing 
government, which used standardized units of weight and measure to record quantities of grain and 
silver values. In reality, currencies, weights and measures were not uniform, but varied substantially across 
regions and occupations.  The absence of detailed information about the conversion of local market 
transactions into standard units adds an element of uncertainty to this entire strand of inquiry.  Frank H. 
H. King (1965) discusses the issue of currency variation.  
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and border regions, and periodically restricted by the state, most of this trade was intra-
Asian, with China shipping manufactures (porcelain, silk) by sea to Southeast Asia and 
tea overland to Central Asia, while importing timber, spices, and monetary metals by 
sea and horses from Central Asia.17  The arrival of European traders in the early 16th 
century led to increased trade with Europe, both directly and through the gradual 
integration of European merchants into Asian trade networks.  China’s luxury exports 
such as silk, ceramics and tea, found new markets in Europe’s expanding and 
increasingly sophisticated cities (Jan de Vries, 2008; Timothy Brook, 2010).  Europe also 
supplied its own luxury products (for instance window glass, clocks, and coral), as well 
as metals and fabrics to Chinese buyers (Frank Dikötter 2006, p. 28).   Data remain 
sketchy, but one percent of GDP appears to be a generous upper bound to China’s 
trade ratio (imports plus exports divided by GDP) during the Ming and pre-1800 Qing 
period.18  Scattered evidence also suggests that prior to the growth of trade with 
Europe, overseas shipments may have claimed only a modest share of output from the 
main export industries.19  These exports, however, may have been more important 
measured from the perspective of the importing countries.   
China’s persistent merchandise trade surplus financed massive Chinese imports of 
New World silver.  These imports were driven by several important factors including 
huge differences in the gold price of silver between China and the rest of the world 
(Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, 1994) and the rising commercialization and 
growth of the Chinese economy described above.  China had limited deposits of 
precious metals and, after repeated misadventures with paper currency during the early 
Ming period (von Glahn 1996), a decided preference for hard money.  In the context of 
                                                      
17 Gang Deng provides a detailed account (1997, Chap. 5). 
18  China’s Maritime Custom trade data begin in the 1850s; the first comprehensive set of national 
income estimates are for the 1930s (Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, 1965). Combined, they suggest 
that China’s trade ratio may have been as high as 8-10% of GDP just before the Depression. Backward 
projection based on these trade data and reasonable assumptions for GDP growth puts this ratio at no 
more than 2 percent in 1870.   Since trade surely outpaced output growth during the 19th century, we 
may suggest one percent of GDP as a generous upper bound for the trade ratio during earlier centuries. 
19  Robert Gardella reports calculations by WU Chengming indicating that tea exports amounted to 23 
percent of total output in 1840 (1994, p. 6).  But tea exports carried by the East India Company doubled 
between 1786 and 1830, while export of Fujian tea to Russia increased by a factor of six between 1798 
and 1845 (ibid., 37-39) indicating far smaller export shares in the 18th century.  Less detailed evidence for 
silk points in the same direction: Lillian M. Li shows that exports took up 55 percent of 1880 output, 
which totaled approximately 2.1 million piculs (1981, p. 100).  Occasional figures suggest that, prior to 
1800, silk exports were a tiny fraction of the 1880 total: Li cites sources reporting that Japan imported 
3,000 piculs of Chinese silk “in an exceptionally good year” and that annual shipments to Mexico, 
another major outlet, may have totaled 10,000 piculs (ibid. 64-65).  A picul is a measure of weight 
equivalent to 60.489 kg. or 133 1/3 pounds. 
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a bimetallic monetary system20 in which copper was used for small daily transactions, 
and silver for the rest, the demand for silver grew.  Richard Von Glahn (2003) estimates 
that in the 18th century, these imports may have exceeded a billion taels, which works 
out to an annual inflow equal to 0.24 percent of GDP.21  By 1640, these flows had 
eliminated major cross-national differences in the gold price of silver; thereafter, “silver 
continued to gravitate to the Chinese market … because there was a huge number of 
buyers at a relatively stable world price” (Flynn and Giraldez 1995, p. 433).  Significant 
price differentials persisted, however, with respect to other important agricultural and 
non-agricultural commodities.   
 
2.2.3. Institutions and private organizations. 
Informal networks and institutions played an important role in facilitating China’s 
long history of local and long-distance commerce.  In addition to numerous studies of 
guilds (cited below), Fu-mei Chen and Ramon Myers (1978, 1989/1996) and Madeleine 
Zelin (1994) have shown how mercantile associations and customary law contributed to 
the formation of stable and reliable commercial practices.  With clear parallels to Avner 
Greif’s (2006, 2008) work on Europe, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong (2011) 
emphasize the crucial function of informal arrangements in connection with long-
distance trade: when trade partners reside far apart, high costs of transport and 
communication prevent official courts from efficiently resolving disputes.  Under these 
conditions, informal arrangements appear “not to palliate failed formal institutions but 
as complements that enables market exchange”.   
 
2.2.4. Urbanization 
This well-developed market network supported increasingly dense population 
settlements, particularly in prosperous, trade-oriented regions like the lower Yangzi area.  
                                                      
20 Standard references on China’s monetary history include Eduard Kann 1962, Frank H. H. King 1965, 
and PENG Xinwei 1968. 
21 These back-of-the-envelope calculations for the late 18th century assume a population of 250 million; 
annual per capita grain consumption of 3 shi; an average grain price of 2 taels per shi; a consumption 
basket in which grain accounted for 40 percent of total expenditure; and 90 percent of GDP going to 
consumption. Average annual GDP over the century then becomes (3*250*2)/(0.4*0.9) or 4,167 million 
taels.  Average annual silver imports of 10 million taels thus amount to  0.24 percent of annual output.  
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Rather than giving rise to large urban centres, the Lower Yangzi region followed a 
distinctive pattern, forming clusters of market towns along the dense regional network 
of rivers, creeks, and man-made canals, with extensive geographic specialisation in the 
marketing and production of agricultural and handicraft products (LIU Shijie 1987).  The 
resulting economic geography, with no clear boundaries between urban and rural 
districts or farming and non-agricultural activity, defeats standard measures of 
urbanisation.  Authors like Gilbert Rozman (1974) and G. William Skinner (1977ab), 
who assign the label “urban” to settlements exceeding a fixed number of residents, 
may seriously underestimate the degree of urbanization, which LI Bozhong estimates to 
have reached 20 percent in Mid-Qing (2000, p. 414).  
While LI, Pomeranz and others stress the efficiency of organizing non-agricultural 
production in the densely-populated countryside, there are alternative interpretations 
for these patterns. With China’s largest cities reportedly no longer growing, Kang Chao 
and others have stressed the role of a low and declining agricultural surplus, coupled 
with flexibility of rural families in their use of labor.  Alternatively, and so far not 
considered, is the possibility that limited growth of cities reflects differential costs 
associated with urban locations, perhaps due to higher formal and informal taxation, 
weaker property rights, or greater exposure to official predation.   
 
2.2.5. Finance   
Networks of markets and trade in Ming-Qing China drew support from both 
formal and informal finance. The formal financial system was organized around 
traditional or “native” banks (qianzhuang) that were largely local in nature, but 
maintained links beyond their home regions.  This system included a nationwide 
network (the “Shanxi banks,” whose name signified their roots in Shanxi province) that 
specialized in managing official funds and transferring funds over long distances 
(Andrea McElderry 1976, Randall Morck and Fan Yang 2011).  These privately-owned 
institutions, whose owners faced unlimited liability, accepted deposits, issued loans, 
arranged interregional (and in some cases, overseas) remittances, and sometimes 
originated bank notes (which typically circulated only in local communities).   
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At the local level, “money shops” specialized in currency exchange (between 
copper and silver, between notes and hard currency, and among numerous local and 
trade-specific bookkeeping currencies) as well as currency valuation (i.e. facilitating 
transactions by verifying the fineness of un-coined silver or valuing strings of copper 
cash that included counterfeit or “clipped” coins).  Pawnshops issued small loans 
against a variety of collateral, which might include agricultural crops, livestock, farm 
tools, clothing, jewels, or art objects.   ABE Takeo places the number of rural 
pawnshops at 19,000 in the mid-18th century and 25,000 by the early 1800s, indicating 
an average of approximately 10 establishments for each of China’s counties (Madeleine 
Zelin 1991, p. 44). 
Beyond these formal institutions stood a vast array of informal financial 
arrangements.  Shopkeepers, tradesmen, and individuals served as regular sources of 
personal loans; relatives and friends provided funds on a more casual basis.  The market 
for farm land provided multiple options permitting land-owning households and even 
tenant farmers to quickly convert land-use rights into cash.  Transactions ostensibly 
involving the exchange of land or labor often included elements of lending or 
borrowing: contracts could specify initial deposits, and land rents or wages of long-term 
workers could be paid before or after the harvest (Loren Brandt and Arthur Hosios, 
1996). 
This system, especially its informal components, contributed substantially to the 
prosperity and expansion of China’s economy during the Ming-Qing era, providing 
sufficient funds to support gradual expansion of monetization and agricultural 
commercialization as well as substantial and growing volumes of local and long-
distance trade.  Widespread availability of personal loans, particularly against the 
collateral of land-use rights, cushioned untold millions of farm households against 
threats of extreme downward mobility arising from bad harvests, death, or illness. 
Despite these arrangements, the cost of finance remained high.  Although 
Chinese culture provided no philosophic or religious objections to money-lending, 
successive dynasties did enact (but rarely enforced) statutory limits on annual interest 
charges: 36 percent under the Ming, falling to 20 percent during Qing and the Republic 
(Zhiwu Chen, Kaixiang Peng and Weiping Yuan 2010).  Such restrictions however did 
not shield Chinese households from elevated borrowing costs: historical materials such 
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as a recent compilation showing three centuries of rural interest rates in selected 
Chinese counties reveal no sign of the gradual decline in interest rates observed in 
Western Europe in the early modern era22  Ramon Myers’ study of two north China 
provinces found that, aside from seasonal fluctuations, borrowing costs for rural 
households “appear to have been quite constant over a period of two hundred years” 
ending in the 1930s (1970, p. 243).23  High Chinese rates may have reflected limited 
supply of capital under institutional constraints such as the lack of reliable third-party 
enforcement, especially outside one’s immediate locale, along with tenure 
arrangements favoring small-holders, who could reclaim mortgaged land by repaying 
long overdue debts, pushed loan rates upward (Debin Ma 2011b, KISHIMOTO Mio 
2011).     
The efforts of millions of households to use land rights as a vehicle for 
maintaining and, if possible, improving their socio-economic status produced a variety 
of outcomes, some of which became extremely complex.  Figure 1 presents material 
discovered by LONG Denggao demonstrating that a single plot of land could have over 
100 separate owners, some with shares as small as 1/608.  Given the irregular income 
stream associated with farming, the rich array of transaction arrangements that 
mimicked many contemporary financial instruments allowed average farmers to 
“financialize” land use rights (including tenancy as well as ownership) – their premier 
store of wealth – to provide liquidity, stabilize their livelihood and improve their welfare. 
The same features also facilitated payment of land taxes.  
During the Qing era, formal and informal financial arrangements provided 
sufficient liquidity and credit to support substantial expansion of rural commercialization, 
a growing volume of domestic trade, and also the absorption of massive population 
increases with no apparent decline in living standards.  Along with these substantial 
accomplishments, it is equally important to emphasize what Chinese finance did not 
                                                      
22 See PENG et al 2009 for China, For Western Europe, see Donald McCloskey and John Nash 1984; 
Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla 2005. 
23 Surveys conducted during the 1930s showed a wide range of interest rates for personal loans; modal 
values for annual interest costs ranged from 20-30 percent in relatively commercialized coastal regions 
like Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang to higher figures approaching and sometimes exceeding 50 percent 
in poorer and less commercialized interior provinces like Henan, Suiyuan, and Ningxia (Loren Brandt and 
Arthur Hosios, 2009; PEGN et al 2009).  Philip Huang cites reports from the 1930s showing that rural 
households in north China borrowed at monthly rates between 1.2 and 3 percent, “with most loans 
made at 2 percent” per month (1985, p. 189). 
 
19 
 
achieve.  There was no market for financial assets, not even for government debt, 
which, prior to 19th century treaty-port system, were negotiated informally with wealthy 
merchants. (See ZHOU Yumin 2000, pp. 277-287).  
In this economy, land was the sole asset suitable for passive wealth-holding: 
landowners could entrust their holdings to managers or bursaries and expect them to 
collect rents and pay taxes (e.g. MURAMATSU Yūji 1966).  The reasons for the 
complete absence of financial assets of the sort developed in the Netherlands in the 16-
17th century and subsequently in England in the 18th century and elsewhere will emerge 
during the course of our survey. 
 
2.2.6 Households and human capital 
FANG Xing describes China’s Qing farm economy as a “dual system combining 
farming and handicrafts for household consumption and for commercial sale” (quoted 
in WU Chengming 2002, p. 187).  Detailed studies on the rural economy of North 
China by Ramon Myers (1970) and Philip Huang (1985), of Fujian and Hunan by Evelyn 
Rawski (1972), and of the Lower Yangzi region by Huang (1990) and LI Bozhong (1998, 
2000, 2010a), among others, give a clear picture of a diligent, ambitious, market-
oriented peasantry that responded quickly to opportunities for economic advance.24  
Villagers were deeply involved in marketing: in the more commercialized coastal and 
riverine districts, many households made daily trips to local markets (Madeleine Zelin 
1991, p. 38).  Individual villagers could easily venture into petty trade.   Frequent use of 
brokers and go-betweens allowed resourceful and reliable individuals to enter the world 
of commerce with no prior accumulation of wealth.  With no official restrictions on 
personal mobility, peddlers and merchants were free to shift operations to promising 
locations; records of numerous huiguan, local organizations of merchants from distant 
places, attest to the importance of commercial sojourning (He Bingdi 1966).  Chinese 
                                                      
24 John L. Buck’s  survey results from 1921-1925, which reflect the acceleration of commercialization 
following the introduction of the telegraph, steamships, and railways during the previous half-century, 
are illustrative:  Buck found that 2,866 farms in seven provinces sold slightly more than half of their 
output (by value) – 43.5 percent in four northern provinces, 62.8 percent in Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, and 
Jiangsu, and 52.6 percent overall (1930, p. 199).   
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guilds united people who shared lineage or native-place ties as well as common 
occupations.25 
Written documents pervaded economic life at every level of Chinese society.  
Summarizing work by Myron Cohen and others, Madeleine Zelin observes that (1991, 
pp. 40-41):  
“Even in remote villages during the Qing period, written contracts were used in the 
hiring of labor, sale and rental of property, distribution of land-use rights, marriage and 
concubinage, and the sale and indenture of human beings.  Societies for the maintenance of 
irrigation works … also used written agreements ... ordinary people used written agreements to 
pool and redistribute resources … [e.g.] partnership contracts … revolving credit associations 
were common … associations … were formed to build bridges and schools, endow ferries, and 
repair roads ... [This] encouraged the rise of a whole genre of literature directed specifically at 
educating people on the practical side of business and trade.” 
The practical environment of village life placed a considerable premium on literacy 
and numeracy, both of which reached substantial levels.  Historical links between 
education and social mobility reinforced this tendency, as did popular culture: the 
heroes of widely circulated stories include scholars like ZHUGE Liang as well as 
monarchs and swordsmen.  Evelyn Rawski (1979) shows that strong household demand 
for education, coupled with low prices for teaching services and for books, produced 
levels of literacy in Qing China that outstripped much of preindustrial Europe.  Official 
interactions with the rural populace, including the collection of land taxes and the 
registration system intended to promote public security, routinely used written materials.  
A substantial publishing industry churned out agricultural manuals and other practical 
materials as well as cheap editions of popular novels (Cynthia Joanne Brokaw and Kai-
wing Chow 2005).   
John L. Buck’s rural surveys, conducted during the late 1920s and 1930s, found 
that 45% of males over the age of seven and 2% of females had received some 
schooling (Evelyn Rawski 1979, pp. 6, 18).  Recent work on age-heaping, i.e. the 
tendency for uneducated people to give their ages in round numbers, also suggest 
levels of numeracy in the Chinese population of the 19-20th centuries amongst the 
                                                      
25 Work on guilds includes John Burgess 1928/1966; Hosea B. Morse 1932, NEGISHI Tadashi 1951, 
William T. Rowe 1992, and Christine Moll-Murata 2008. 
 
21 
 
highest in the pre-modern world (Joerg Baten et al 2010). Recent scholarship also 
points to the widespread practice of book-keeping and accounting at the levels of 
households, business, lineage trusts and guilds as an attestation to the high level of 
commercial orientation and numeracy in early modern China (Robert Gardella 1992, 
Weiping Yuan and Debin Ma 2010).  
“The historical record includes ample evidence that Chinese villagers deployed 
their knowledge of reading and arithmetic for purposes of economic gain.  There was a 
brisk market for cheap books containing “sample contract[s] … forms for selling and 
mortgaging lands, houses, or livestock; tenancy contracts; [and] loan agreements” 
(Evelyn Rawski 1979, p. 114); agricultural handbooks included discussions of household 
allocation choices couched in language reminiscent of modern price theory textbooks 
(Evelyn Rawski 1972, pp. 54-55). 
Detailed studies of rural economy suggest that the concept of “homo 
economicus,” invented by thinkers with little knowledge of life in Asia, fits well with the 
historical realities of Chinese village life.  G. William Skinner’s study of Chinese migrants 
in Thailand reinforces this conclusion.  In contrast to Thai natives, Skinner commented 
that Chinese migrants hailed from a different universe: “... a grimly Malthusian setting 
where thrift and industry were essential for survival.”Ideology reinforced this 
divergence: Chinese struggled for wealth to preserve family and lineage continuity, 
while Thai norms frowned on “excessive concern for … material advancement.”   
Differences in proverbs tell the story: for the Chinese, “Money can do all things,” but 
for the Thai, “Do not long for more than your own share” (Skinner 1957, pp. 97, 92, 
93, 95). 
Chinese recognition of economic rationality has a long history.  Anticipating the 
Wealth of Nations by nearly two thousand years, Han Fei-tzu (ca. 280-233 BC) used 
language that precisely matches Smith’s description of individual behavior:  
“in the case of workmen selling their services in sowing seeds and tilling farms, the 
master would … give them delicious food and by appropriating cash and cloth make payments 
for their services. Not that they love the hired workmen, but that … by so doing they can make 
the workmen till the land deeper and pick the weed more carefully. The hired workmen … 
speedily pick the weed and till the land ...  Not that they love their master, but that ... by their 
so doing the soup will be delicious and both cash and cloth will be paid to them. Thus, the 
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master's provisions and the workmen's services supplement each other as if between them 
there were the compassion of father and son. However, their minds are well disposed to act for 
each other because they cherish self-seeking motives.” (Han Fei-tzu, n.d.). 
China’s enduring tradition of commercial activity and market participation 
involving both elites and villagers provides a striking counterexample to Karl Polanyi’s 
contention that, prior to the English enclosure movement, “the alleged propensity of 
man to barter, truck, and exchange is almost entirely apocryphal … [and that] no 
economy prior to our own [was] even approximately controlled and regulated by 
markets” (1944, pp. 43-44).    
 
2.2.7. Demography 
Along with studies of commerce, historians have also explored individual 
demographic behaviour, reporting patterns sharply at odds with assertions about 
Chinese population dating back to Thomas Malthus and expressed in the more recent 
work of Phillip Huang (1985, 1990), Kang Chao (1991) and others.  James Lee, Feng 
Wang and others emphasize the importance of preventive (i.e. voluntary) checks on 
population growth, arguing that China’s unusual combination of near-universal female 
marriage and relatively low birth rates reflects the widespread incidence of female 
infanticide, primitive contraception and abortions, intentional spacing of births, and 
adoptions (Lee and Wang 1999; William Lavely and R. Bin Wong 1998; LI Bozhong 
2003, pp. 137-240).26   
 
2.2.8. State capacity 
Research by Madeleine Zelin, R. Bin Wong, Pierre Etienne-Will, Peter Perdue and 
others revises long-standing views about Qing state capacity, pointing to the 
                                                      
26   This field continues to evolve. Critics question both the suitability of the data used by Lee and Wang 
and their conclusion that Chinese women had lower fertility than women in other pre-modern societies 
(see the summary in Matthew H. Sommer 2010, pp. 101-103).  In a comprehensive review of work by 
James Lee and others, Osamu Saito (2002), the Japanese demographer, notes the presence of preventive 
checks and low birth rates across East Asia, despite contrasting patterns of family system and geographic 
mobility. Saito’s summary is a sharp departure from an earlier consensus (for example James Nakamura 
and Matao Miyamoto 1982) that viewed China’s population as subject to Malthusian positive checks in 
contrast to Tokugawa Japan’s “precocious” demographic transition. 
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emergence of purposive and competent Qing state action in fields as diverse as fiscal 
management, famine relief, water control, and military activity.27 
 
2.2.9. Summary of pre-1800 economic evolution under the Ming and Qing  
Recent research on a millennium of economic evolution moves away from the 
view of the “Song peak” and instead postulates a lengthy historical development 
process replete with gradual and cumulative progress in many dimensions prior to the 
end of the 18th century.28  This perspective shares much in common with research on 
England that downplays any structural or revolutionary break separating the “pre-
industrial” era from the “Industrial Revolution,” highlighting instead the long period of 
slow cumulative change that preceded the industrial surge beginning in the late 18th 
century.  This new approach also includes a global dimension: instead of a long-term 
reversal of China’s fortune, the California school claims that, particularly in the 
advanced Lower Yangzi region, Qing development of commerce and market institutions, 
as well as the standard of living, compared favorably with circumstances in 
Northwestern Europe through the end of the 18th century.   
This new narrative portrays China’s advanced regions, particularly the Lower 
Yangzi, as more alike than different from their European counterparts, particularly 
England.  Pomeranz (2000) sees both as facing similar constraints emanating from 
pressures on land and natural resources that threatened to curtail growth.  Pomeranz 
sees imports of land-intensive goods from newly-acquired colonies and Eastern Europe, 
together with Britain’s fortunate endowment of cheap coal deposits, as key 
determinants of divergent economic trajectories for Europe and China after 1800.  This 
approach relegates other political, social, and institutional differences to the 
background.  Its claims typically rest on indirect, often micro-based evidence relating to 
household consumption, access to luxury goods, productivity in agriculture and other 
sectors, urbanization and so on.  As the Appendix shows in some detail, this supporting 
evidence is prone to the same selection biases that bedevil the Song peak thesis. 
                                                      
27 Relevant works include Zelin (1984), Will, Wong and Lee (1991), and Perdue (2005). 
28 This recasting of the Qing has been accompanied by reinterpretation of the Ming, for example by 
Timothy Brook (1999, 2010). 
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2.3 The Great Divergence 
Whether the great divergence between west European and Chinese levels of per 
capita income occurred in the 14th or the 18th century, the problem of explaining 
China’s long economic decline relative to the industrializing West and then to Japan 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries, and subsequently to a number of dynamic East 
Asian economies during the third quarter of the 20th century, remains unresolved.  
Different authors point to a variety of causal mechanisms operating during multiple 
periods. 
Kenneth Pomeranz’ widely cited study (2000) offers explanations for two distinct 
patterns of divergence: within China itself, and between leading regions in China and 
Europe.   
On the domestic side, he argues that the dynamism and economic prominence of 
the Lower Yangzi region rested on domestic trade flows that brought shipments of 
grain, cotton, and other materials to Lower Yangzi destinations in exchange for 
shipments of textiles and other finished goods.  As demographic expansion and rising 
productivity strengthened the economies of China’s peripheral regions, the Lower 
Yangzi faced higher prices for material imports and reduced demand for its handicraft 
and manufactured exports, changes that Pomeranz sees as having weakened the 
regional economy.   On the international side, as noted earlier, Pomeranz (2000) 
emphasizes similarities between the economic level and economic institutions of the 
Lower Yangzi and advanced regions of Western Europe during the 18th century, and 
attributes England’s rise to global economic leadership to two specific factors: cheap 
coal and access to ample supplies of land-intensive products from its colonies.  
An earlier generation of scholars attribute China’s relative economic decline to a 
general drop-off in innovative activity in the Ming and Qing compared to the Song.  
Although researchers led by the late Joseph Needham (Needham and Ronan 1978) have 
compiled monumental documentation of Chinese scientific accomplishments and 
Benjamin Elman’s recent work forcefully rejects the “scholarly consensus about the 
alleged failed history of science in China” (2005, p. 420), researchers assuming that late 
imperial China was unable to develop “even some homegrown modern science” (Mark 
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Elvin 2010, p. 152) have offered a host of economic and political explanations focusing 
on forces influencing the demand and supply for new technologies and innovation, the 
key source of intensive growth  
On the demand side, some analysts view the long and sustained growth of 
China’s population as the source of Malthusian pressures that led to a declining wage-
rental ratio.  This, in turn, promoted the adoption of labor-using technology and labor-
absorbing institutions that effectively crowded out labor-saving and capital-using 
technical changes that might have promoted higher labor productivity and rising per 
capita incomes.  This dynamic is explicit in the work of both Kang Chao (1977, chap. 
VII) and Philip Huang (1985, pp. 191-195) who argue, for example, that widespread 
development of handicraft textiles discouraged the emergence of more capital-intensive 
factory production. Similar pressures constrained the growth of cities. 
Mark Elvin offers a similar perspective:   
“In late traditional China economic forces developed in such a way as to make profitable 
invention more and more difficult.  With falling surplus in agriculture, and so falling per capita 
income and demand, with cheapening labor but increasingly expensive resources and capital, 
with farming and transport technologies so good that no simple improvements could be made, 
rational strategy for peasant and merchant alike tended in the direction not so much of labor-
saving machinery as of economizing on resources and fixed capital. Huge but nearly static 
markets created no bottlenecks in the production system than might have prompted creativity. 
When temporary shortage arose, mercantile versatility, based on cheap transport, was a faster 
and surer remedy than contrivance of machines.” (1973, pp 314-315).   
On the supply side, many authors have linked declining interest in science among 
China’s educated elites (a notion explicitly rejected by Elman 2005) to a slowdown in 
technical change.  The former is sometimes related to a shift in Chinese thinking: Elvin 
detects “a change in the attitudes of philosophers towards nature” which meant that 
“Interest in systematic investigation was short-circuited” so that “There were ... no 
advances in science to stimulate advances in productive technology” (1973, p. 204).  
Elman himself notes that the transmission of Western scientific knowledge was 
hampered by the demise of the Jesuits, by the growing scientific prominence of 
Protestant regions with few links to China, and by the reluctance of both Protestants 
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and Catholics to translate materials about the solar system or evolution that seemed to 
contradict Christian theology (2005, pp. xxxii, xxxiii, 350). 
Justin Lin (1995) postulates two sources of innovation: experience, and science-
based experimentation.  For the former, the probability of innovation is directly related 
to population size, which helps explain why the great civilizations of early antiquity 
(Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, and China) appeared in areas favorable to agriculture that 
could support large populations.  The latter however required innovations based on 
science and experimental methods, which Lin contends developed less fully in China 
than in Europe; following others, he attributes this to skewed incentives that 
encouraged China’s most able youths to pursue Confucian education and examination 
success in the hope of entering the ruling bureaucracy. 
Robert Allen (2009) and others dismiss this view, arguing that scientific progress 
played only a modest role in Europe’s advance.  Elvin agrees, saying that “Chinese 
technology stopped progressing well before basic scientific knowledge had become a 
serious obstacle” (1973, p. 298).  Joel Mokyr (2002, 2009), though, insists that while 
basic science may have a limited role in the First Industrial Revolution, it became 
increasingly important and indeed, indispensable to the second and third waves of 
industrialization that followed.  Mokyr argues that what distinguishes the Industrial 
Revolution and modern economic growth from prior phases of pre-modern growth 
spurts is its sustainability powered by continuous and cumulative growth in scientific 
knowledge, which itself is partly a social outcome of the early modern Enlightenment.   
The role of the state in scientific and technological innovation is a source of 
debate.  Historically, the Chinese state contributed to generating and diffusing 
innovations, for example in hydraulics, which may have compensated for limited 
private-sector dynamism.  Mokyr (1990) argues for a major post-Song retreat in the 
Chinese state’s predisposition toward, and contribution to developing new technologies.  
He sees the Ming-Qing state as somewhat inhospitable to innovation, paralleling the 
rise in more conservative social forces.  Such changes, if they occurred (Elman 2005, 
working with far deeper knowledge about China, would deny Mokyr’s premise) may 
have arisen from concerns about possible dislocation associated with technical and 
economic change, a concern that certainly figured in periodic official efforts to limit 
external trade. 
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This shifts the focus to China’s political institutions, specifically, to the capacity of 
the political unity that prevailed throughout most of Ming and Qing to choke off 
political competition.  European cities enjoyed considerable autonomy, developing their 
own charters and civil codes.  Intense competition between cities and states allowed 
individuals to relocate to favorable environments – opportunities that were largely 
absent in the unitary Ming-Qing polity, which stifled the sort of institutional change 
that is widely seen as beneficial to economic development in Western Europe (Mokyr 
1990, chap. 9).  
The historiography on the role of the traditional Chinese state and institutions has 
long reflected overly simplistic theoretical frameworks based on oriental despotism (Karl 
Wittfogel 1957/1976) or theories of class struggle (for example Wang Ya’nan 
1981/2005).  Recent literature has partly corrected these limitations by emphasizing 
that benevolent imperial rule provided a framework that taxed the peasantry lightly, 
protected private property rights and interfered little in the operation of well-established 
markets in land and labor.29   
Our political economy discussion (below) seeks to provide a unified framework for 
analyzing long-term economic trends by systematically pursuing the economic 
implications of Ming-Qing political structures.  While the traditional framework of 
oriental despotism may be misleading and overly pessimistic, we contend that the state 
– especially its absolutist features and highly centralized political and fiscal regime – 
figures prominently in the formation of property rights, contract enforcement and 
incentives, and therefore in the economic dynamics of imperial China.  
In particular, the classic dilemma of government credible commitment as posed 
by Douglass North – economic growth requires a strong state to secure property rights, 
but an overly powerful state becomes a potential threat to the security of private 
ownership – recurs throughout the two millennia of Chinese dynasties.  Our framework 
focuses on the implications of China’s enormous size and population growth for the 
agency costs inherent in decentralized governance structures, fiscal capacity, and a set 
of complementary institutions, most notably, property rights, which North and others 
                                                      
29 Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) and R. Bin Wong (1997) discuss factor markets and taxation; Debin Ma 
(2011) reviews China’s traditional legal institutions.   
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(North 1994; North and Robert Paul Thomas 1973) see as crucial ingredients in the 
emergence of modern economic growth.30  
Recent contributions, including imaginative and insightful studies focused on the 
domestic economy, on China’s overseas economic links, and on comparison of China’s 
economy with European counterparts, have added richness and depth to the field of 
Chinese economic history.  But China’s stunning economic rise beginning in the late 
20th century raises new questions: now that recent events oblige us to recognize the 
dynamic capabilities inherent in Chinese social formations and economic structures, 
why did realization of this vast potential occur only in the past three decades?  How did 
partial and limited reform initiatives manage to initiate China’s ongoing boom?  In 
particular, why is there no sign of accelerated growth during the closing decades of the 
Qing era, roughly from 1870-1910, when China experienced substantial openness to 
domestic market forces and to international flows of trade and investment, substantial 
influx of engineering and organizational technology, opportunities to populate fertile 
new territories in Manchuria and to repopulate farmland abandoned during the fiercely 
contested Taiping rebellion (1854-1865), as well as considerable internal stability under 
a regime that demonstrated modest interest in reform?  Whatever the obstacles to 
accelerated growth during these decades, why did China’s greatest growth spurt occur 
more than a century after her opening? 
We see institutional analysis as a promising avenue for understanding both the 
obstacles to modern economic growth during the late Qing period and the erosion of 
these constraints during the course of the 20th century.  Our approach follows recent 
efforts of economists, notably, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. 
Robinson (2005) to elucidate the contribution of institutional structures and institutional 
change to long-term economic growth.  
The task is not simply to explain China’s delayed industrialization, but rather to 
account for a multi-stage process that includes long periods of limited advance, 
followed by an unprecedented surge of economic expansion.  It is this issue that the 
following sections propose to address.  Our approach will rely on the perspectives of 
                                                      
30  Our approach has much in common with recent work by Tuan-hwee Sng (2010) on the link between 
geography and fiscal capacity in a world of pre-modern communication and transport.  We also echo 
ideas from the  influential works of JIN Guantao and LIU Qingfeng (2011) widely publicized within China 
during the 1980s.  
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political economy and institutional analysis, methodologies that, in our view, have much 
to contribute and that recent studies of Chinese economic history have often neglected.    
 
3. The Political Economy Of The Traditional Chinese State 
With basic political structures and social arrangements displaying substantial 
continuity throughout the Qing era, which lasted from the mid-17th to the early 20th 
centuries, how can we connect generally stable institutional formations to highly 
variable economic outcomes?  While our survey of recent research reveals many areas 
of controversy, there is no disagreement about overall trends in the Qing economy, in 
which a generally prosperous 18th century gave way to a period of growing economic 
difficulty after 1800 during which China was notably slow to grasp new opportunities 
radiating from the British industrial revolution.  Extending the task to encompass 
potential links between Qing institutions and China’s recent growth explosion broadens 
the challenge confronting efforts to develop a cohesive analysis of long-term economic 
outcomes that can explain how stable institutions first stimulated, but later constrained 
Qing economic expansion, and how Qing legacies affected China’s economic 
performance after the dynasty’s fall in 1912.31 
What follows represents an initial step in this direction.  We begin by postulating 
the existence of a few key structures.  We then follow the logic of incentives and 
constraints to sketch out a heuristic model of China’s traditional political economy.  The 
result is a surprisingly comprehensive framework that illuminates the underpinnings of 
Qing stability and success, pinpoints mounting tensions and constraints that may have 
gradually reduced the system’s effectiveness, and reveals specific circumstances that 
hindered efforts at fundamental reform.   
We focus on interactions among four key actors: the imperial household, the 
bureaucracy, local elites, and the masses.  The bureaucracy refers to imperially 
                                                      
31 These challenges are evident in Francis Fukuyama’s recent work (2011). Recognizing many similarities 
between Qing and PRC political institutions, but observing high-speed growth only after 1978, Fukuyama 
contends that: “What China did not have was the spirit of maximization that economists assume is a 
universal human trait.” He goes on to claim that “It is far likelier that cultural attitudes towards science, 
learning, and innovation explain why China did so poorly in the global economic race in previous 
centuries, and is doing so well at the present, rather than any fundamental defect in political 
institutions.” 
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appointed officials; Chung-li Chang [ZHANG Zhongli], focusing on the 1880s, tabulated 
23,000 officeholders – 2,600 in the imperial court, 13,000 provincial and local officials, 
and 7,000 military officers (1962, p. 38).  The local elite includes retired imperial 
appointees and graduates of provincial and metropolitan civil service examinations who 
were eligible for imperial appointments but held no formal posts, as well as holders of 
lesser degrees and non-degree holders who possessed sufficient land, education, 
wealth or reputation to merit recognition as part of the local (or even national in the 
case of prominent salt merchants) elites, along with their extended families.32   
While all institutions are in principle endogenous, we take as given important 
political institutions of the late Song that had evolved over the previous millennium and 
were to endure until the collapse of the Qing regime in 1911.33  After describing these 
enduring legacies, we explain how incentives surrounding these key institutions shaped 
the behaviour of the four key groups that populate our model: the throne, bureaucracy, 
gentry, and commoners. The results illuminate fundamental dimensions of political 
economy under the Chinese imperial system.   
 
3.1 Key Political Institutions 
From the 10th century on, much of what is now regarded as China was under 
nearly continuous unitary rule.34  Map 1 depicts the borders of the Ming (1368-1644) 
and Qing (1644-1911) empires.  Although Qing military and diplomatic prowess 
extended their territory far beyond the boundaries of Ming rule, we simplify the 
following analysis by assuming an empire of fixed size.  We also posit the presence of 
three key institutional features, each dating at least from the Song (960-1279) era, 
                                                      
32 Chung-li Chang [ZHANG Zhongli] tabulates the ranks of gentry, which in his study includes all holders 
of both earned and purchased examination degrees, at 1.09 million before (i.e. about 1850) and 1.44 
million after (i.e. about 1870) the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864).  Assuming an average of five persons 
per gentry household, he concludes that the gentry population amounted to approximately 1.3 percent 
“of the whole population … in the first half of the nineteenth century” and to “well over seven million 
… [or approximately] 1.9 percent of the total population” after the defeat of the Taipings (1955, pp. 
111-112, 139-141).  Focusing on the 1880s, Chang concluded that gentry households, while comprising 
roughly two percent of the Qing population, received 24 percent of national income, and enjoyed per 
capita disposable incomes approximately 17.7 times the comparable figure for commoners (1962, pp. 
326-329).  
33 Our approach with respect to these political institutions of the late Song largely follows the well-known 
Naito thesis expounded by the Japanese scholar NAITŌ Konan, summarized in Hisayuki Miyakawa 1955.  
34 Debin Ma (2011) traces the long history of Chinese unification.  
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which we take as given or exogenous: central and unitary imperial rule; a hierarchical, 
meritocratic system of staffing the imperial bureaucracy; and a land-based fiscal system.  
We briefly examine each of these before pursuing their larger implications.  
The consolidation of political control in the hands of the Song emperors 
represents an important departure from the preceding four or five centuries, during 
which the power of the throne was checked by a relatively autonomous imperial 
cabinet and by regional aristocrats.  By the beginning of Song, absolute power had 
become vested in the emperor.  Moreover, there were no institutional constraints on 
the Emperor other than a vaguely defined principle of legitimacy emanating from the 
so-called “mandate of heaven.”  As Ray Huang explains in the context of Ming:  
None of the deterrents to unlimited exercise of imperial power – including Confucian 
morality, reverence for the standards set up by imperial ancestors, public opinion, or the 
influence of senior statesmen – had the effect of law.  If the emperor chose to defy all these 
and was determined to exercise his absolute power to the full, there was no way of checking 
him (1974, p. 7). 
With the elimination of an aristocracy or any other autonomous intermediary 
social or political groups, governing the empire’s vast territories required a bureaucratic 
structure that extended beyond the imperial household.  China’s administrative needs 
included border protection, internal security, provision of public goods, and the 
collection of sufficient tax revenues to finance these activities as well as the 
consumption of the imperial court.   
From the 8th century, bureaucratic recruitment became increasingly impersonal 
and meritocratic.  Candidates for official positions were primarily selected from 
successful graduates of a standardized progression of periodic civil service examinations 
open to most male commoners.  Examinations took place at the county, provincial and 
national levels. Successful candidates received degrees according to prefectural and 
provincial quotas, which meant that imperial officials were recruited nationwide, in 
numbers roughly proportional to each province's population (MIYAZAKI Ichisada 1976, 
Benjamin Elman 2000).  
32 
 
Examination contents were rooted in Confucian ideology, which itself reflected 
the ideal of a hierarchical, patrimonial structure with the emperor at the top.35  
Successful candidates (often called degree holders) commanded immense prestige; they 
enjoyed lifelong tax exemptions and legal immunity.  These men constituted a non-
hereditary elite whose welfare was intimately tied to the survival and success of the 
imperial regime.  A traditional poem eloquently sketches the connection between 
learning, wealth and power that the examination system imprinted in the consciousness 
of Chinese households (MIYAZAKI 1976, p. 17): 
To enrich your family, no need to buy good land: 
Books hold a thousand measures of grain. 
For an easy life, no need to build a mansion: 
In books are found houses of gold. 
Going out, be not vexed at absence of followers: 
In books, carriages and horses form a crowd. 
Marrying, be not vexed by lack of a good go-between: 
In books there are girls with faces of jade. 
A boy who wants to become a somebody 
Devotes himself to the classics, faces the window, and reads. 
 
The system of imperial examinations offered the prospect of upward social 
mobility, possibly over several generations, to commoner households.  Coupled with the 
“rule of avoidance,” which proscribed officials from serving in their home county, 
prefecture, or province, and the frequent rotation of incumbent officials, the 
examination system endowed the imperial state with both talent and legitimacy.  
                                                      
35  This concept of the state is in many ways an extension of the Confucian ideal of a patriarchal 
household.  With the elimination of hereditary aristocracy, the transition from feudalism to central rule 
extended the stand-alone imperial household (家) into the national sovereign (国).  Indeed, the unity of 
individual, family and state is encapsulated in the enduring Confucian adage that the enjoyment of 
universal tranquility requires self-cultivation, proper household management, and benevolent rulership (修
身 齐家 治国 平天下). The literal translation of the Chinese character for nation-state (国家) is “state-
family” or what Max Weber (1951/1964) described as a patrimonial or “familistic” state.”    
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In principle, the emperor commanded property rights over all factors of 
production.  Imperial ownership of land and labor is expressed by the traditional notion 
of ‘Wangtu wangmin (王土王民, king’s land, king’s people/all land and all people are 
owned by the sovereign)’, which appeared in The Book of Songs compiled during the 
age of Warring States (403-221 B.C.) and persisted throughout the imperial period.36  
Despite the emperor’s theoretical ownership, imperial rulers often assigned land to 
individual households in return for payment of taxes.  By the end of Tang (618-907), 
the state began to relinquish control and regulation of land ownership, leading to the 
gradual emergence of a system under which private owners held de facto ownership of 
land and assumed personal responsibility for the payment of land taxes, which became 
the cornerstone of imperial revenues.  Thus de jure imperial property rights gave way to 
de facto rights to the collection of taxes.  In parallel fashion, private labor markets 
gradually replaced systems that had formerly required households to provide labor 
services to the state at prescribed intervals.   
  
3.2 Toward a Heuristic Model 
With absolute hereditary power and without formal constraint on its rule, the 
biggest threats to China’s imperial household came from external invasion or internal 
insurrection.  Rebellions were an enduring feature of Chinese history.  A well-known 
admonition to the Tang emperor to the effect that people can support or upend rulers 
just as water can float or overturn a boat provided a constant reminder of the ever-
present danger of insurrection. Indeed, Confucian ideology long railed against excessive 
extraction as posing greater threats to commoners’ livelihood than devouring tigers and 
venomous snakes (see the classic tale of the snake-catcher by the great Tang dynasty 
Confucius scholar-bureaucrat Liu Zhongyuan).   
External security required tax revenues to finance defence spending.  In addition, 
the state needed to support the imperial household and finance the costs of running 
the bureaucracy as well as public goods expenditures.  Concerns about internal 
                                                      
36 KISHIMOTO Mio (2011) summarizes imperial ownership and the nature of traditional Chinese property 
rights.  
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rebellion, however meant monitoring the amount and distribution of taxation to ensure 
a satisfactory level of income and welfare for the populace.  
Countless examples illustrate the potential for violent tax resistance. Madeleine 
Zelin recounts a Qing episode in which a newly appointed magistrate, seeking to collect 
overdue land taxes in Shanghai county, ordered the arrest of defaulters, including a 
headman initially assigned to pursue tax evaders.  The result was chaos:  
“while a mob attacked the magistrate’s deputy,” the wife of the arrested headman 
committed suicide.  When “the magistrate, accompanied by an entourage of yamen runners, 
went on a tour of inspection … a large crowd led by [relatives of the deceased woman] … 
stoned the … magistrate’s retinue and drove the magistrate out of town … Similar riots also 
broke out … in An-fu hsien [county] in Kiangsi [province], after the magistrate [of that district] 
personally directed the collection of old tax debts” (1984, p. 255). 
China’s fiscal system was centered on the taxation of privately-owned land.  Data 
for 1753, a year in which, according to Yeh-chien Wang, official fiscal data were “more 
reliable and complete” than at other times, show land taxes accounting for 73.5 
percent of officially-recorded revenue, with the balance coming from the salt tax (11.9 
percent), native customs (i.e. taxes on internal and foreign trade, 7.3 percent) and 
miscellaneous taxes (7.3 percent).37  For simplicity, we assume a fixed stock of taxable 
land, so that total fiscal revenue depends on the official tax rate on a unit of land and 
the size of bureaucracy devoted to tax collection. Government revenue was increasing 
in both: raising the tax rate generated more revenue, as did adding more tax collectors.  
Fiscal administration also involves expenditures: adding tax officials increases the 
government’s wage bill and outlays on maintaining tax offices.    
In this very simple setting, the problem facing the Emperor is to determine the tax 
on land and the size of the bureaucracy to maximize net fiscal revenue (total tax 
collection less administrative costs), subject to leaving farm households with a 
satisfactory level of after-tax income.  In this quest, the Emperor needed to consider 
indirect, agency costs that arise in any hierarchical organization because of 
informational asymmetries and imperfect monitoring.  Agency costs were especially 
                                                      
37 Wang (1973, pp. 68, 80).  The dominant share of land tax in total revenues persists throughout the 
Ming and Qing dynasties.  Guanglin Liu (2005) and others find that commercial or indirect taxes formed a 
larger share of tax revenue during the Song era than during Ming-Qing.  
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pertinent in China, where imperially-appointed officials were entrusted to govern far-
flung regions linked only by networks of slow pre-industrial transport and 
communication.38   
As imperial agents, local officials were expected to treat taxpaying households 
equitably and to provide full and honest accounts of the amounts collected.  But, like 
governments everywhere, China’s bureaucracy often veered toward the pursuit of self-
interest.  The problem was further compounded by the limited official fiscal allocation 
for local government during Ming and Qing, which forced local officials to impose 
informal levies unsanctioned by any imperial decree simply to maintain their offices and 
perform their duties.  Such conditions made it difficult for both external monitors and 
the bureaucrats themselves to separate what might be called “public-interest 
corruption” from peculation intended to secure illicit personal gains.  As we will show, 
officials employed a host of malpractices to pillage the public purse, exaggerating the 
severity of harvest shocks, overstating the extent of tax arrears, colluding with local 
landholders to remove land from the tax rolls, or simply diverting public funds for their 
own benefit.   
The land tax system created sharp conflicts between local officials and land-
owning households, including local elites, who often held substantial acreage.  Tax 
collectors often bullied ordinary households, for example by manipulating weights and 
measures to extract payments in excess of the legal tax obligation.  The prevalence of 
unofficial tax-farming provided ample opportunity for local officials to divert excess 
revenues for their private benefit. Commoners resisted such impositions (and also 
sought to escape taxation) through violent tax resistance and by allying themselves with 
local gentry.  The gentry used their elite status and the dependence of understaffed 
local administrations on their active cooperation as levers to reduce or even escape tax 
obligations, typically with the connivance of local officials.   
These circumstances meant that the intended and actual outcome of efforts to 
collect land taxes differed widely, and in several dimensions.  Some land-owners, 
particularly small-holders without the protection of elite patrons, were squeezed by the 
                                                      
38 Prior to the advent of railways, travel from the capital to Shenyang required 30 days, to Xi’an or Wuhan 
50 days, to Nanjing nearly 50 days, to Guangzhou 90 days, etc. (Joseph B.R. Whitney 1970, p. 47). 
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collectors, and ended up making payments that exceeded their statutory obligation. 
Gentry landowners, as well as commoners enjoying their patronage, often persuaded or 
bribed local officials accept payments amounting to substantially less than the statutory 
amount.  Officials’ need for gentry cooperation to successfully execute routine 
administrative responsibilities made it difficult for magistrates to resist gentry pressures 
for informal tax relief.  Finally, there was considerable revenue leakage from the tax 
system, as clerks, runners, and officials siphoned public funds into private purses.  
Chinese emperors, keenly aware of these difficulties, established institutions 
aimed at limiting the impact of agency costs.  Confucian ideology, which prescribed 
codes of behaviour for all social groups, including officials, acted to promote upright 
behaviour even in the absence of effective monitoring from the center.  Frequent 
rotation of officials, as well as the “law of avoidance,” which barred officials from 
serving in their home districts, aimed to direct official loyalties toward the throne.  The 
Censorate, a branch of the central bureaucracy paralleling the organization of the six 
major ministries and five military commissions, dispatched roving observers to serve as 
the emperor’s eyes and ears by circumventing routine official channels to report 
episodes of official malfeasance directly to the throne.   
These internal checks, which entailed additional administrative costs, could not 
fully resolve the conflicts inherent in the centralized hierarchy. The Censorate itself was 
plagued with corruption, as is its contemporary counterpart.39  Formal bureaucratic 
posts often evolved from personal appointments in which the emperor assigned trusted 
lieutenants to the task of improving the center’s grip on outer layers of administration.  
Over time, these positions merged into the formal bureaucratic structure, leading to the 
assignment of fresh cohorts of inner court personnel to the (now enlarged) tasks of 
monitoring and control.  This gradual multiplication of bureaucracy, which arose from 
internal dynamics unrelated to population growth or territorial expansion, contributed 
to what some historians have referred to as the “externalization” of the inner 
bureaucracy (QIAN Mu 1966, p.44, WANG Ya’nan1981/2005 pp. 48-49).   
                                                      
39  A 2010 news report noted that “a former top anti-corruption official in east China's Zhejiang Province, 
was sentenced to death. . . for taking bribes.”  See  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-
09/09/c_13486543.htm. 
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Writing in 1896, LIANG Qichao, a celebrated intellectual and reformer, noted this 
self-weakening aspect of the imperial bureaucracy, commenting that as rulers cannot 
trust their officials, they set up multiple layers of bureaucracy to check one other. In the 
end, nothing gets accomplished as no one takes responsibility for anything. Moreover, 
lower level officials become more interested in pleasing their superiors than in serving 
the people (1896/1984, pp. 27-31).  Liang’s observations anticipate G. William Skinner’s 
observation that “Chinese history saw a secular decline in governmental effectiveness 
from mid-T’ang [i.e. from the mid- to late 8th century] on to the end of the imperial era” 
as well as the findings of modern theorists who show how lengthening a hierarchy by 
adding new supervisory layers increases agency costs and generates organizational 
diseconomies of scale (Skinner 1977b, p. 19; Jean Tirole 1986;  R. Preston McAfee and 
John McMillan 1995). 
These agency costs defy precise specification, but represent some combination of 
informal taxation on individuals and households, rent extraction by bureaucrats, and 
lawful taxes that went unpaid as a consequence of elite manipulation.  Formal land 
taxes impinged primarily on the income and welfare of ordinary farm households.  
Informal taxation, bureaucratic extraction and elite tax avoidance undermined the 
financial position of both the emperor and the non-elite populace.  Importantly, the size 
of agency costs limited the Qing system’s potential to increase the level of formal 
taxation on land.40   
In a slightly more complicated setting, the Emperor not only had to set the formal 
tax rate on land and the size of the bureaucracy devoted to formal tax collection, but 
also had to set the number of personnel monitoring the bureaucracy, all with an eye to 
maximizing formal fiscal revenue (net of collection and monitoring costs), but subject to 
an insurrection constraint.41  This constraint represents the necessity, reinforced by 
                                                      
40  While agency costs constrain the ability to collect formal tax revenues, higher tax rates probably lead to 
increased levels of agency costs as local elites intensify their efforts to avoid taxation, thereby increasing 
the burden on commoner households and probably raising collection costs as well. 
41 In a dynamic setting, we could represent policies as designed to maximize the discounted present value 
of the imperial household’s welfare, implying an important role for imperial time horizon in policy-
making.  The more dynastic the emperor’s view, the longer the time horizon and thus the lower the 
discount rate used in these calculations. In Mancur Olson’s (1982) framework based on the analogy of 
stationary and roving banditry, extending the ruler’s time horizon would make the throne’s interests more 
encompassing and less predatory, thereby contributing to a “virtuous equilibrium” of low extraction and 
high mass welfare. 
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Confucian ideology, of allowing sufficient after-tax income to focus popular attention 
on cultivation rather than revolt.  The resulting net revenue can provide for security, 
administrative costs, supporting the Imperial household, and public goods.  
 
3.3 What Kind of Political Equilibrium Emerged? 
This simplified framework offers surprisingly powerful insight into a range of 
outcomes, including the role of the state in the Chinese economy, the nature of state-
society interactions, and the trajectory of the Chinese economy that we may describe as 
the political equilibrium of the Chinese imperial regime.  In what follows, we look at 
taxation, the size and activities of the state, the nature of property rights in land, 
informal taxation and corruption, the vested interests of the gentry, and the role of the 
legal system.  We apply the term “equilibrium” because the implied outcomes were 
historically stable, mutually reinforcing and extremely difficult to alter, short of major 
systemic shocks imposed from outside.  
 
3.3.1 Low formal taxation, small bureaucracy and limited state scope of state 
activity 
High agency costs associated with administration of the empire and concerns 
about insurrection steered imperial China toward outcomes built upon modest formal 
taxation, a small official bureaucracy, and a correspondingly limited scope of non-
military activities financed from the public purse.   
After rising during the early years as the new Qing dynasty re-established order, 
formal tax revenue expressed in silver taels remained fairly constant between 1700 and 
1850, averaging around 36 million silver taels annually, of which approximately 70 
percent came from taxes on land.42  With stable revenue and substantial growth of 
population, per capita tax collections fell steadily:  By 1850, per capita revenue was less 
than half the level for 1700.  Nominal revenues rose sharply in the late 19th century, but 
the increase was modest in real terms.   The share of government revenue in total 
                                                      
42 The Qing monetary system included multiple silver taels, which typically represented 35-40 grams of 
pure silver.  For details, see Frank H.H. King (1965) and Eduard Kann (1975). 
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output during Qing was also low: Yeh-chien Wang finds that late 19th-century land 
taxes represented 2-4 percent of the produce of the land in most areas, although they 
may have consumed a larger share in the prosperous Yangzi delta region.  Total 
government revenue from all sources amounted to roughly 2.4 percent of net national 
product in 1908 (Debin Ma 2011; Yeh-chien Wang 1973, pp. 80, 128, 133), suggesting 
that tax revenues remained well below five percent of total output throughout the Qing 
period.   
Historical compilations summarized in Table 2 indicate that tax revenues under 
the Song and Ming dynasties exceeded those in the Qing period, both in aggregate and 
especially in per capita terms (Guanglin Liu 2005).  While the Song revenue figures are 
subject to the qualifications noted earlier, the ordering implied by the data in Table 2 
seems consistent with information on the size of Chinese armies during the three 
dynasties (IWAI Shigeki 2004, p. 33). 
Figure 2 displays trends in nominal, real, and per capita fiscal revenues during the 
Qing dynasty.  Nominal revenue showed little fluctuation for approximately 200 years 
beginning in the early 18th century.43  Population growth and inflation produced an early 
decline in real and per capita revenues, followed by trendless fluctuation during the first 
half of the 19th century.  All three nominal revenue measures rose during the final half-
century of Qing rule, with per capita revenue in the early 20th century regaining levels 
recorded during the initial period of Qing rule. 
Comparative data shown in Table 3 demonstrate the Qing dynasty’s limited fiscal 
capacity.  During the late 18th century, per capita revenues of the leading European 
states, expressed in grams of silver, were 15-40 times comparable figures for Qing 
China.  England’s government revenue actually surpassed the comparable figure for the 
immensely larger and more populous Qing Empire!  The data also show that per capita 
revenues, which remained roughly constant over long periods under the Qing, tended 
to increase elsewhere.  Expressing the tax burden in terms of the number of days an 
unskilled urban laborer would have to work in order to earn the equivalent of the 
                                                      
43 Sources for Figure 2: fiscal data are from IWAI Shegeki (2004, p. 37) and HAMASHITA Takeshi (2006, p. 
73); population from Angus Maddison (2007); grain prices are from Yeh-chien Wang (1992). 
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average individual tax payment provides an alternative view of the Qing empire’s 
modest fiscal capacity. 
Limited revenues and the prospect that enlarging the bureaucracy would 
undermine administrative effectiveness meant that the size of the bureaucracy lagged 
far behind the growth of population.  Indeed, the number of counties (xian), units ruled 
by magistrates who occupied the lowest rung of the official hierarchy, hardly changed 
after Han (206 BC-220 AD) times.  Despite a vastly larger population, Qing China had 
only 1,360 counties compared to 1,180 under the Han and 1,230 under the Song 
(Skinner 1977b, p. 19).  Limitations on the size of the bureaucracy help explain why the 
official administrative apparatus of the Qing never penetrated below the county level.  
With a near-static administrative structure, population growth meant that an average 
Qing county had perhaps six times the population of a typical county during the Han 
and more than triple the inhabitants of an average Song county.  This increased the 
administrative burden facing local magistrates and magnified their dependence on the 
active cooperation of local gentry, which in turn reinforced the pressures mandating a 
low-tax regime, as efforts to increase taxes would place local officials in direct conflict 
with the economic interests of the same local gentry whose advice and cooperation was 
needed to manage local affairs and preserve social order. 
A 19th-century example from Xinhui, Guangdong illustrates the helplessness of 
local officials in the absence of gentry cooperation.  When the Qing state imposed likin 
(lijin) taxes on domestic trade, the local palm-leaf guild raised no immediate objection.   
But this seemingly obscure group effectively blocked subsequent efforts to increase the 
likin tax rate: 
“When the guild resisted ... there was nothing the magistrate could do but request a 
waiver [exempting the guild from the higher likin rates] ... He was unable to survey the palm-
growing areas to tax them directly, because the guild and its supporters refused to cooperate.  
He was unable to muster community support ... when he called a meeting of local gentry … 
no one came” (Susan Mann 1987, p. 130). 
Similar conditions existed elsewhere.  Local magistrates, while bearing the 
emperor’s imprimatur, were lone outsiders facing tightly-knit communities that often 
included several hundred thousand residents. The reality of gentry power was 
inescapable; this emerges most strikingly from the decision of the Kangxi emperor (r. 
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1662-1722), among the strongest Qing rulers, to abandon a proposed empire-wide 
cadastral survey in the face of resistance on the part of local elites. The outcome was 
continued use of obsolete Ming land registers coupled with a permanent freeze on tax 
quotas – “a gigantic concession to local gentry and landlords … throughout the 
empire ... [under which] gentry landlords received a permanent tax exemption on 
wastelands brought under the plow” (John F. Richards 2003, p. 124).  Kangxi’s 
successor, Yongzheng (r. 1722-1735) sought to incorporate informal taxes and 
surcharges into the formal tax base in an effort to restrain local corruption and stem the 
leakage of resources from the public purse.  Here again, top-down imperial reform 
proved incapable of surmounting resistance from local magistrates, who valued the 
discretion (and opportunities for rent extraction) associated with the traditional system 
and their gentry allies.  Since informal local revenues were essential to the normal 
functioning of local governance, the information asymmetry surrounding these local 
revenue flows protected them against extraction by higher-level officials (Madeleine 
Zelin 1984, chap. 7, Debin Ma 2011a).   
Under these circumstances, well-informed emperors who understood the dangers 
of excess tax demands on commoners as well as the revenue leakage arising from 
official peculation and gentry manipulation might reasonably conclude that raising the 
rate of land taxes was not a practical option.  Given the relatively stationary size of the 
imperial household and the imperial desire for dynastic longevity, Chinese imperial 
ideology evolved toward fixing a revenue target for normal years (in the absence of 
harvest failure or external crisis). This ideology was famously encapsulated in the Kangxi 
emperor’s 1712 proclamation fixing nominal land taxes in perpetuity at a time when 
Manchu conquest of China was largely complete (Ma 2011a).  
Like all revenue-constrained pre-modern empires, Qing public spending was 
limited to programs that addressed fundamental issues of external and internal security.  
Expenditures on the military and border defences protected the largely sedentary 
agrarian populace.  The central government’s outlays on civilian public goods focused 
on measures intended to stabilize and increase agricultural productivity – for example 
investments in water control and irrigation – and on the operation of official granaries 
that could stave off famine and hence maintain public order when natural disaster 
struck (Peter Perdue 1987; Pierre-Etienne Will, R. Bin Wong and James Z. Lee 1991; 
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Lillian M. Li 2007).  Such programs contributed directly to mass welfare and thus 
supported the longevity of the imperial system.  They also relied on local contributions, 
highlighting both the need for magistrates to secure the cooperation of local elites and 
the difficulty of reconstructing a complete picture of government revenues.  
China’s large size, limited revenues, long communication lines, and small 
bureaucracy, influenced the nature as well as the scale and scope of official activity.  A 
late 19th century commentator described the focus of the central government as 
“registering and checking the actions of various provincial administrations [rather] 
than. . . assuming a direct initiative in the conduct of affairs” (William F. Mayers 1897, 
pp. 21-22).  Subsequent research supports this characterization even in arenas of 
central dominance.  Man Bun Kwan finds that the Board of Revenue, which bore major 
responsibility for managing the imperial salt monopoly, was “primarily a transmission 
center of documents and repository for ledgers. . . [that] rarely initiated policy (2001, p. 
32).  Frank King notes that even in the monetary sphere, a central government 
responsibility, “the Board of Revenue could not be the source of a coherent monetary 
policy.  It had no power to inspect the quality of provincial coins ...  It could comment 
on provincial memorials only if they were referred to the Board …” (1969, p. 34).  
Transforming these bureaucratic structures into effective promoters of economic 
growth would require major administrative changes that appeared only in the 20th 
century. 
 
3.3.2 A shift to private property rights in land and commerce 
In contrast to earlier regimes that had assigned land to households that were 
capable of delivering taxes,44 China’s Tang rulers shifted the main source of tax revenue 
from labor to land at the end of the 8th century.  From the perspective of tax collection, 
this put a premium on establishing clearly defined property rights in land.  Accordingly, 
the state began to relinquish control and regulation of land tenure.  While the emperor 
retained theoretical control over all land, this new arrangement contributed to the 
                                                      
44 The well-known equal-field system (均田制) used during the Tang (618-907 AD), for example, allocated 
land (授田) to adult males on the basis of their productive capacity, upon which the state levied the so-
called triple tax (租庸调). 
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emergence of de-facto private land-ownership and fostered the rise of a family-based 
owner-tenant system of agricultural cultivation that dominated the economy of imperial 
China for the next millennium.   
Commercial life experienced a similar transformation, as earlier systems “of 
administered trade became increasingly arduous and expensive to enforce ... a process 
of trial and error … punctuated by the periodic reimposition of controls … [led to] a 
general withdrawal by government from the minute regulation of commercial affairs” 
and a notable expansion of privately established markets and private mercantile activity 
(Skinner 1977b, pp. 24-25 – note the obvious parallel with China’s recent reform 
experience). 
The emerging private property rights over land typically included residual 
claimancy; the right to rent, sell or mortgage; as well as the right to bequest. 
Recognition of these rights allowed private owners rather than the state to capture the 
benefits associated with rising productivity, new land reclamation, and population 
growth.  If households became unable to farm the land themselves, the opportunity to 
transfer their land use rights via sale or rental allowed them to capture the returns to 
their investments in the land.   
Although de-facto private property rights in land date back to much earlier 
periods, the Tang reforms encouraged the development of increasingly deep and 
sophisticated markets for land in which layers of ownership and user rights could be 
purchased, sold, rented, mortgaged, and divided.45  Ownership of a single plot could be 
vested in separate parties endowed with rights over the surface and sub-surface 
respectively – the so-called yitian liangzhu (two lords to a field) or even yitian sanzhu 
(three lords to a field) system – rights that could then be sold, leased, or used as 
collateral.  Tenants as well as owners could freely buy, sell, lease, or mortgage their 
access rights.  Figure 1 (above) illustrates the scope for complex division of ownership 
under this system. 
 
                                                      
45 Land transactions were often recorded in written documents, many of which survive in libraries and 
archives.  MURAMATSU Yūji (1966) and ZHANG Deyi (2009) provide examples of documents recording 
land transactions.  
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3.3.3 Informal taxation, rent extraction, and property rights    
Land taxes collected from rural communities were mostly remitted to higher levels 
of the official bureaucracy.  Madeleine Zelin estimates that county magistrates retained 
approximately one-fifth of official collections to meet local needs.  Much of the retained 
funds went to fulfill imperially-mandated expenses, for example provisioning military 
forces and maintaining imperial relay stations.  What remained fell far short of what 
was needed to maintain government offices, pay the magistrate’s own salary, and 
support the required complement of secretaries, clerks, runners and personal servants.46  
This reflects both the state’s limited fiscal resources and the center’s deliberate effort to 
limit the growth of local power bases by constraining locally available fiscal resources.   
To make ends meet, sub-national officials of necessity relied on informal or 
extralegal surcharges (苛捐杂税). The necessity of informal taxation, which was “an 
established practice in the mid-eighteenth century as it was necessary for keeping 
public administration at work” (Yeh-chien Wang 1973, p. 72), blurred the distinction 
between legitimate and corrupt official behavior, and thus complicated efforts to detect 
and deter the diversion and embezzlement of public funds.  The weak financial position 
of local governments increased the dependence of magistrates on contributions and 
cooperation from local elites, as the following passage attests: 
The local elite, consisting of scholar-officials and rich landowners, played a crucial role 
here by helping the magistrate with his duties; from the maintenance of water conservancy 
works to the organization of local defense corps.  It is generally agreed that the magistrate, as a 
non-native of the region where he held office, was to a certain extent dependent on the local 
elite’s advice in carrying out his magisterial duties, as well as on their support in the leadership 
of local people. . . . In “reward” for its “efforts,” the local elite was in turn also in a position to 
enjoy certain tax exemptions, and moreover, to falsify land registers and population reports, or, 
even, to appropriate tax revenue which normally would have passed to the state (Harriet 
Zurndorfer, 1989, pg. 3). 
                                                      
46 T’ung-tsu Ch’ü indicates that county-level governments employed several hundred (and in some cases, 
several thousand) clerks, several hundred (and in some cases, over 1,000) “runners” (i.e. messengers, 
guards, policemen and other menial employees), and 10-30 personal aides (1962, pp. 39, 56, 59, 77).  
Some of these personnel received salaries from the magistrate; others received no salary, but imposed 
irregular fees on citizens who sought access to official services.   
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Madeleine Zelin provides a detailed description of these informal revenue sources, 
which ranged from the levying of various surcharges, manipulation of weights, 
measures and currency conversion in tax collection, falsifying reports, shifting funds 
across fiscal years, and concealing tax revenue from commerce and from newly 
reclaimed land to extracting contributions and donations from local farmers and 
merchants.  Zelin chronicles an episode in 18th-century Jiangsu province in which an 
investigating magistrate discovered widespread embezzlement of official funds: “there 
was not a prefecture, chou or hsien [county] in the region in which [secret records 
providing a true picture of land-ownership and tax payments] ... were not compiled” 
(1984, p. 240).47  Provincial officials solicited gifts from their bureaucratic subordinates 
and skimmed funds by inflating the cost of official purchases (1984, pp.46-71).  
Reliance on informal local taxation and the employment of unofficial staff for public 
administration also often led to the privatization of public services.48   
Revenue constraints at all levels of government led to a common pattern: officials 
granted merchants, guilds, or kinship groups unwritten but well understood and 
enforceable commercial property rights in return for a stream of tax revenues, in what 
amounted to a form of tax-farming.  In describing these arrangements, Eiichi Motono 
notes that government “granted commercial monopolies to groups of merchants in 
return for the delivery of supplementary taxes” and refers to the “economic principle 
that no one could acquire the right to do business without paying. . . tax” (2000, pp. 3-
4, 64). 
Examples abound. Ping-ti Ho comments that every Qing-era salt merchant “owed 
his position to government recognition” and notes that “the right to sell salt was 
farmed out to those merchants who were financially able to pay the salt gabelle [tax] in 
advance” (1954, pp. 142, 136).  Tianjin transport workers “received government 
permission to monopolize transport in a particular area.  From the Kangxi to the 
Xianfeng reigns (1662-1861), the Qing government issued ... notices of official approval 
to the transport guilds.  Under the Guangxu emperor (1875-1908), successive 
                                                      
47 Franklin L. Ho (1967) reports similar practices in early 20th-century Hebei province.  
48 Ch’ü T’ung-tsu’s classic book (1962) on Qing local government offers a vivid portrayal of county clerks 
extracting bribes with the threat of delaying legal cases submitted, runners demanding “chain-release 
money” from the families of accused criminals who might otherwise be chained or tortured, retaining 
part of the goods recovered from thieves, or sometimes resorting to outright extortion of wealthy 
residents.  Even the porters guarding the magistrate’s office expected tips for accepting documents or 
warrants. 
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magistrates issued 11 orders supporting the special privileges of the guilds” (1986, p. 
117).  During the late 19th century, Susan Mann finds a “familiar historical pattern ... [in 
which] local trade organizations began to purchase the right to collect [recently 
imposed] lijin taxes from their own members by ... paying tax quotas in advance” (1987, 
p. 111, with emphasis added). 
These accommodations typically involved agreements between officials and 
commercial groups (rather than individual merchants).  Mercantile groups selected 
leaders whose authority was recognized by both officials and fellow merchants.  
Officials expected these “head merchants” to deliver tax revenues and control the 
actions of their associates.  In return, officials stood ready to utilize their power – either 
directly or by allowing authorized merchants or their agents to act as informal official 
deputies – to block initiatives that threatened the operations of the “legitimate” or 
“insider” merchants (and hence the established revenue streams).  Ho observes that 
“the interventionist state ... protected the vested interests of all salt merchants” (1954, 
p. 142). 
These arrangements equipped mercantile groups with substantial control of their 
trades – at least within the territories administered by cooperating officials.  
Management of specific trades was often farmed out in this fashion to mercantile 
guilds, which typically allowed newcomers to enter their business provided that they 
obeyed guild rules, which might include provisions related to currency, weights and 
measures, product quality, apprenticeship, wages, piece rates, and, of course, tax 
payments.   
“Mercantile leaders – the so-called “head merchants” - wielded considerable 
power: their special status provided ready access to officials; they could enact and 
enforce rules and sanction non-conforming members with fines or even expulsion from 
the officially-recognized trade body - the commercial equivalent of capital punishment.  
Thus in the salt trade, “merchant chiefs and head merchants formed a powerful ruling 
clique ... head merchants exerted powerful control over distribution and sale of salt” 
(Ho 1954, pp. 138, 141). 
Such practices, which essentially amounted to official sales of market control in 
exchange for informal revenues, had important implications.   The presence of 
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entrenched commercial interests with backing from local or even central officials may 
have acted as a long-term brake on innovation.  As we show below, the hostility of 
incumbent official-merchant coalitions became a major impediment to commercial and 
industrial innovation during the second half of the 19th century, when the newly-
established treaty port system began to accelerate the inflow of new products, 
technologies, and business methods. 
The prevalence of irregular taxation at all levels of government helps to explain 
the apparent contradiction between the low rates reflected in the receipts of the Board 
of Revenue (see Tables 2 and 3 above) and the popular image of Ming and Qing as 
rapacious regimes.  The Kangxi-era governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu placed 
extra-legal surcharges at 40-50 percent of the official tax quota (Zelin 1984, p. 73).  
Yeh-chien Wang argues that such imposts were less severe, at least in 1753, a year for 
which the historical record is particularly rich; Wang concludes that “non-statutory 
surcharges amounted to as much as the statutory ones, which generally ranged from 
10 to 15 percent of the [authorized tax] quota” (1973, p. 69). 
Information about the overall incomes of office-holders provides added 
perspective on the impact of the tax system. While estimates of unrecorded payments 
are always hazardous, the carefully documented work of Chung-li Chang [Zhang 
Zhongli] which concludes that the total incomes (including receipts from landholding 
and other non-official activities) accruing to imperial appointees during the 1880s may 
have amounted to twenty times the official payments associated with their positions.  
Chang also concludes that annual informal income obtained by sub-provincial office-
holders approached 60 million silver taels, equivalent to three-quarters of the central 
government’s recorded annual revenue of 80 million taels during the 1880s (1962, 40, 
42, 328).  While the absolute magnitude of such fiscal extraction on a per capita basis 
was still relatively modest compared with contemporary taxation in England and the 
Netherlands (Table 3), the informal and extralegal nature of these tax collection may 
have imposed disproportionately high distortions on capital- or contract-intensive 
activities.   
Chang’s figures, however crude, also reveal the capacity of officials at all levels to 
extract wealth from the private sector and help to explain the extraordinary loyalty of 
Chinese elites to what was, after all, a conquest dynasty led by the descendants of 
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Manchu invaders whom most Chinese perceived as “barbarians.”  At the national level, 
the throne’s relations with leading merchants, especially the beneficiaries of officially-
established monopolies, presented an intricate minuet of ad hoc tax assessments, 
imperial confiscation and “voluntary” contributions to state coffers.49  It seems likely 
that similar circumstances, but with lower stakes, prevailed within regional and local 
jurisdictions.   
 
3.3.4 Law, economic security and patronage economy in Ming-Qing china 
Formation and disposition of property rights are closely linked to the legal system, 
which, as in any nation, exerted substantial influence over economic activity in Ming-
Qing China.  Chinese emperors faced the task of governing a vast land mass with a tiny 
corps of officials.  To maintain long-term political stability, the throne required sufficient 
flexibility to strike quickly and powerfully at potential threats.  To prevent such threats 
from forming, emperors sought to eliminate possible nodes of countervailing power - 
aside from the gentry, who, as noted earlier, were indispensable bulwarks of the status 
quo. 
In the legal sphere, these requirements point to a system that is fully controlled by 
the official hierarchy while remaining subject to imperial discretion.  Historically, this is 
exactly what we observe. In China, as in Rome, the emperor is the source of law.  The 
Tang dynasty established an elaborate and systematic criminal code that was largely 
retained by subsequent dynasties.  Modifications arose primarily from occasional 
imperial interventions that extended or contravened existing codes; such actions 
constituted new laws or sub-statutes that served as precedents for subsequent decisions 
(Shiga et al pp. 12, 120-121; Su Yegong 2000, chap. 9).  
Under normal circumstances, imperial penal codes were strictly enforced, with 
decisions on legal disputes involving corporal punishment mandatorily reviewed within 
the bureaucratic hierarchy (and, in capital cases, by the emperor himself).  County 
                                                      
49 Ping-ti Ho 1954, Man Bun Kwan (2001, pp. 43-47); Michael Greenburg (1951, pp. 52, 63, 66-67) 
illustrate such transfers.  Canton merchants involved in foreign trade contributed 3.9 million taels (plus 
unrecorded sums) during 1773-1832; Liang-huai salt merchants contributed 36.4 mill taels to the imperial 
treasury during 1738-1894 (Ho 1954, p. 154). 
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magistrates also ruled on civil and commercial matters that entailed no corporal 
punishment. Both the procedures and rulings at county-level courts were more akin to 
intermediation than adjudication.  Clearly, broad swathes of economic and social life 
were governed by private customs regulated and enforced by family, clan, and village 
elders, by local gentry, and by mercantile associations (e.g. Fu-mei Chen and Ramon 
Myers 1978, 1989/1996). Unlike Western Europe, where the efforts of autonomous 
legal professionals contributed to the formalization of private customs and rules and 
legal clarification of property rights, the Chinese imperial hierarchy viewed non-official 
legal specialists with suspicion. Legal secretaries who assisted county magistrates were 
not on the official roster, but were personally hired and paid by the magistrates.  The 
Ming code banned “incitement to litigate”; the Qing went further, criminalizing the 
occupation of “litigation master,” a profession remotely resembling modern-day 
lawyers (Melissa Macauley 1998). This explains the curious co-existence of the 
proliferation of private customs and rules with what many Western observers viewed as 
the absence of formal civil or commercial law in imperial China (Jerome Bourgon 2002, 
Debin Ma 2011b).  
The lack of legal formalization in commercial and civil matters introduced an 
element of uncertainty into private ownership.  Private property rights in Ming-Qing 
China were genuine and substantive under normal circumstances.  From the official 
perspective, however, private ownership remained secondary to or derivative from the 
political standing of the property holders.  Faced with the possibility, however remote, 
of confiscatory intervention that no legal response could ward off, property holders felt 
it necessary to seek shelter under an umbrella of political power (Deng Jianpeng 2006, 
p. 69).  Despite elaborate and generally predictable informal arrangements for 
recording, protecting, and transferring rights over land and other tangible assets, the 
foundation of property rights in imperial China, particularly in the sphere of commerce, 
rested on politics rather than law, with implications for economic change during the 
19th century and beyond to be discussed later on. 
For property holders in imperial China, risk reduction necessitated some 
accommodation with officialdom, which for most Chinese meant group rather than 
individual action.  These efforts extended the elaborate network of what Andrea 
McElderry (1995, p. 28) describes as “fiduciary communities” within which individual 
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operators could limit risk and transaction costs, to create zones of official protection 
from sudden and arbitrary exactions.  Among the many studies illuminating the 
formation and operation of such networks, we may cite research on production and 
trade in salt ( Ho 1954, Kwan 2001, Madeleine Zelin 2005), studies of commercial 
groups with origins in Ningbo (e.g. Susan Mann 1987) and elsewhere, Mann’s work on 
official-merchant interactions, and previously mentioned studies of Chinese guilds.  Fu-
mei Chen and Ramon Myers explain how such network arrangements, and the 
customary practices that they perpetuated, contributed to the reduction of transaction 
costs by specifying weights and measures, currency standards, and other business 
practices (1989/1996). 
Relationships within these networks, including within families and lineages, often 
took the form of patron-client ties rather than transactions among equals.  David Faure 
quotes Prasenjit Duara’s study of 20th-century North China: 
“In a society where neither the market nor the state fully regulated economic 
relationships, the individual peasant (or village household) was often dependent on a powerful 
local figure … to ensure the fulfillment of a contract, to provide access to the market … and to 
protect him from predatory local government functionaries.  In return, the patron received 
expressions of gratitude and loyalty on which he built a stock of political capital” Prasenjit 
Duara 1988, p. 183) 
Similarly, Susan Mann finds that “marketers and traders unprotected by 
patronage or family connections were vulnerable to harassment and extortion” (1987, 
p. 62). 
Faure goes on to observe that “Ming and Ch’ing [Qing] local as well as long-
distance trade was conducted under extensive patronage networks just as rural life 
was” (1989/1996, p. 93).  By emphasizing the ubiquity of “trading under patronage” 
but also observing that “... Ming and Ch’ing markets were relatively open ...  because 
the patrons competed” (1989/1996, p. 95), Faure offers a sensible bridge between 
competing visions that analyze economic processes during the imperial era in terms of 
competitive markets (e.g. Ramon Myers 1980, Myers and Yeh-chien Wang 2002) or, 
alternatively, in terms of rivalry among gentry and official predators for opportunities to 
extract resources from hapless commoners (e.g. Albert Feuerwerker 1968; Philip Huang 
1985, 1990).  As we shall see, the idea that genuine, but limited or incomplete property 
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rights lead to what might reasonably be termed a “patronage economy” makes sense 
not only for the Ming-Qing era, but for contemporary China as well.  
 
3.4 The Long-run Political Equilibrium: Stability, But With Limited Prospects for 
Reform 
Starting with the simplest of assumptions – the emperor rules his large domains 
with a non-hereditary bureaucracy selected by competitive examination, employing the 
land tax as the primary source of fiscal revenue – we employ the method of political 
economy to derive implications that accurately depict major aspects of the actual Ming-
Qing regime.  The following observations summarize the long-run properties of both 
the “model” and, we believe, of the system that existed prior to the 19th-century 
escalation of western imperial pressure:   
 
3.4.1 Stability, resilience and path dependency.     
The institutional arrangements described above demonstrated great strength, 
resilience, and stability throughout most of the Ming-Qing era, supporting the 
enormous expansion of territory and population depicted in Table 1 and Map 1 in an 
increasingly commercialized but primarily agrarian economy. The stability of this system 
rested on a common ideology and close alignment of incentives among the imperial 
household and overlapping bureaucratic, scholarly, commercial, and landed elites.  The 
vested interests of these elites reflected huge benefits that enriched members of the 
bureaucracy and local gentry.50   
The dynastic regime was also highly resilient in that it had the inbuilt capacity not 
only to withstand certain shocks but also to restore stability in the wake of potentially 
destabilizing disasters. Calamities such as the mid-19th century Taiping Rebellion that 
massively disrupted private property rights and cost millions of human lives encouraged 
average commoners to appreciate the benefits of a stable imperial rule.  Tongzhi 
                                                      
50 Chung-li Chang [Zhang Zhongli] (1962) concludes that gentry incomes from official positions, 
landholding, and business activity may have exceeded one-fourth of the Qing empire’s late 19th-century 
output. 
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Restoration in the wake of the Taiping uprising, demonstrated the willingness and the 
capacity of local elites to reinstate orthodox Confucian ideology, to reconstruct a fiscal 
regime of low and fixed land taxes, and to restore regular civil service examinations 
system sponsored largely by elites, actions that effectively re-established the Qing 
empire’s foundation of a unitary and centralized rule. This system is path-dependent in 
the sense that the same forces that promoted stability also militated against reforms 
that might threaten the standing, the incomes, or the future prospects of these 
interlocking socio-economic leadership groups.   
 
3.4.2 Low official fiscal resources and high tolerance for official peculation and 
rent extraction.   
The Ming-Qing system faced stringently limited fiscal potential.  In a world of 
rising state revenues (Table 3), static overall and declining per capita revenues recorded 
in the central treasury restricted the system’s capacity to mobilize resources either to 
implement new administrative initiatives or to meet national emergencies.   Although 
Qing ideology celebrated the beneficial welfare consequences of a “small state,” we 
cannot determine whether this reflects the rulers’ initial belief or represents a 
rationalization of unavoidable realities of governance arising from China’s unique 
political economy. The low official fiscal revenue and the lack of fiscal provision for local 
governance also made it often difficult to differentiate personal corruption from the 
collection of informal revenues intended to support administrative costs and public 
goods.  Hence, considerable portions of gentry income were linked to rent extraction 
and corruption on the part of officials.   Emperors accepted, even implicitly approved, 
substantial financial abuse, relying on ideology and occasional severe punishments to 
deter extreme behavior.51   
 
                                                      
51  Rulers who became concerned about excesses of corruption and malfeasance imposed extreme 
punishments on prominent miscreants with the aim of persuading the entire bureaucracy to reduce the 
level of extraction.  Ping-ti Ho describes the use of selective capital punishment to control Qing 
officialdom (1962, 293-295).  The People’s Republic employs similar tactics to control official abuse. 
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3.4.3 Mutual reinforcement between ideology and incentives, between de facto 
and de jure political and economic power.  
The combination of status, power, and high incomes available to examination 
graduates, official appointees, and their families provided incumbent elites and 
ambitious commoners with powerful incentives to seek advancement within the 
imperial system by investing in Confucian education for bright sons in the hope that 
they might earn examination degrees.  The frequency with which poor households 
sought schooling for sons who, while eligible to compete, had no realistic chance of 
achieving examination success reflected both the practical benefit of literacy in a society 
permeated by written documents and the long-term impact of Confucian ideology, 
which accorded respect and status to men whose educational attainments, however 
modest, exceeded the local norm.  
The result was a remarkable consistency of objectives, incentives, and mobility 
strategies across social strata.  Rich and poor, elites and commoners, farmers and 
craftsmen, all used financial resources to invest in education and relied on educational 
attainment to promote both social standing and economic gain.  In this fashion, 
generations of Chinese strengthened an ideology that associated leadership with 
educational attainment and exalted hard work and thrift as the proper route to upward 
mobility through training, discipline, and self-cultivation. 
Recent efforts by Daron Acemoglu and others to investigate the institutional 
backdrop of long-term economic growth emphasize links between de jure power 
arising from legal provisions and other formal institutions and de facto influence 
attributable to custom, wealth, and other informal arrangements (Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson 2005).  Imperial China displayed extreme interpenetration of formal and 
informal influence and power.  Public office was the most important source of prestige 
and wealth.  At the same time, money was essential to finance the long years of 
preparatory instruction and study needed to pass the civil service examinations: During 
1834/35, 81 percent of provincial examination graduates and 93 percent of successful 
palace examination candidates were over 24 years of age; over half of the palace 
graduates and nearly 40 percent of the provincial degree-winners were over 35 years 
(Benjamin Elman 2000, pp. 704, 706).  Thus Ping-ti Ho notes that “the children of salt 
merchants probably received the best schooling in the empire,” which enabled a group 
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of fewer than 300 families to produce 139 palace degree-holders and 208 provincial 
examination graduates between 1646 and 1802 (1954, p. 162). This cross-fertilization 
of economic resources, status, and political power represented both a bulwark of 
stability and a formidable obstacle to reform.   
 
3.4.4. Informal property rights and a patronage economy.   
The absence of effective checks and balances on official power meant that, with 
the exception of the smallest petty exchange, regular commercial operation 
presupposed some accommodation with whatever body of officials had the capacity to 
obstruct business activity.  This is the foundation of David Faure’s “patronage” 
economy (1989/1996).  The accommodation typically consisted of an exchange in 
which commercial operators undertook to provide a stream of revenue in exchange for 
unwritten but well-understood and enforceable commercial rights, often involving 
territorial control over the sale or purchase of specific commodities.  As the next section 
will show, 19th century foreign and Chinese businesses alike – including rich and well-
connected operators – experienced great difficulty in fending off opposition from such 
merchant-official combines, which turned out to be strong, resourceful, and 
determined in opposing initiatives that they perceived as threats to their position.  
Similar forces may have been at work earlier, quietly discouraging entry, risk-taking and 
innovation, especially outside of agriculture.  
3.4.5 Limited development of monetary and financial systems. 
Qing China operated under a bimetallic copper-silver monetary standard, with no 
regular issue of official paper currency.  National authorities supervised the minting of 
subsidiary copper coins (cash).  There was no official minting of silver; the economy 
relied on a combination of un-coined silver bullion and imported silver coins.  Along 
with multiple metallic currencies, different localities and trades maintained their own 
units of account. The outcome was a maze of exchange rates among silver, silver coins, 
copper cash, private bills, and units of account that varied by region and trade.  
These important features of the monetary system were a direct product of 
China’s political equilibrium.  Ironically, the Chinese experiment with large scale 
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issuance of paper or fiat money under the Song (960-1279) preceded that of Europe by 
several centuries.  Fiscal constraints at the center and the absence of a credible 
commitment to limit seigniorage led to high levels of inflation and bankrupted the 
reputation of paper money, apparently constraining Qing official minting to copper 
cash, a small-denomination currency.  The outcome is a monetary system characterized 
by a large array of overlapping and sometimes ad hoc exchange rates and units of 
account that gave rise to high transaction costs and the proliferation of money 
exchangers throughout the empire. (Peng Xinwei 1958, King 1965).  
 Property rights issues (and the underlying legal system) seem largely responsible 
for the restricted development of financial instruments, an area in which China looks 
much different from pre-industrial European nations, particularly Holland and England.  
In China, we see no early appearance of tradable long-lived financial instruments, 
indeed no scope for financial transactions beyond spot exchanges in the absence of 
personal links.  This continued well into the treaty port era, when “much share capital 
was raised through private connections” (David Faure 2006, p. 52).  In the economy of 
imperial China, only land was suitable for long-term passive wealth-holding – owners 
could rely on managers or bursaries to collect rents and pay taxes, and will their 
properties to their descendants. 
 
 
4. Turbulent Century: China Confronts The Industrial Revolution, 1840-1939 
4.1 China’s Opening, 1840-1895: An Overview 
The stability of the equilibrium we have described hinged on the imperial capacity 
to head off potential internal and external threats.  China’s Manchu Qing rulers, leaders 
of a semi-nomadic ethnic group with origins in China’s northeastern frontier region, 
were unusually adept at containing the long-term threat posed by non-Han nomads 
based beyond the Great Wall through a combination of diplomacy and, if needed, 
military conquest.52 The 19th century brought a notable acceleration of political and 
                                                      
52 The term “Han” or “Han Chinese” describes the ethnicity of the majority of China’s populace.  “Non-
Han” refers to ethnic Manchus, Mongols, Koreans, Tibetans, and other ethnic groups residing within 
China’s borders. 
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economic change arising from both internal and external forces.  Beginning with the 
White Lotus (1796-1804), a series of domestic rebellions, culminating with the vast 
Taiping uprising (1851-1864), both reflected and contributed to the erosion of the Qing 
regime.  In the first half of the 19th century, falling terms of trade, unfavorable weather 
trends and the reversal of long-standing silver inflows may have inflicted further shocks 
on the Chinese economy.53   
The challenge arising from Western imperialism represented a watershed in 
Chinese history - an external threat drastically different from China’s traditional nemesis 
of land-based invasion across her northern frontier. The rise of European imperialism 
threatened the economic, political, institutional and ideological underpinnings of 
China’s imperial system. The turbulent period from roughly 1800 to 1949 helps to 
illuminate the dynamics of the Ming-Qing imperial system.  While demonstrating the 
strength and resilience of the Qing empire, events during the century following the 
1842 Nanjing treaty settlement also reveal the strong and persistent influence of 
institutional obstacles to economic growth that emerge from our political economy 
analysis.   
Prior to 1800, European trade with China was a lopsided affair dominated by 
Chinese commodity exports, notably tea and silk, which were exchanged for silver coin 
and bullion shipped from the Americas.  British merchants, frustrated by the limitations 
of the “Canton system,” which, from 1757, had restricted European trade54 to that city 
(now known as Guangzhou), urged London to demand wider access to the China 
market, initially with little success.  The Qianlong emperor (r. 1735-1796) rebuffed 
proposals from the 1793 McCartney mission, which sought to expand the scope of 
trade, writing famously that, although China had no need for British goods, he would 
graciously allow British traders to purchase tea and silk at Canton.55   
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
53 Jeffrey Williamson (2011, pp. 33-34) concludes that China’s external terms of trade fell by 85 percent 
between 1796 and 1821; David D. Zhang et al 2007 and  Lillian M. Li (2007, pp. 27-30) cite evidence of 
low temperatures and declining rainfall; Man-houng Lin cites contemporary accounts suggesting that 
silver outflows during the first half of the 19th century might have reduced China’s stock of monetary 
silver by 7-19 percent (2006, pp. 83-85).  
54 The Canton system did not affect trade with Asian partners, which involved a number of port cities.  
55 The text appears at 
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/classes/2c/texts/1792QianlongLetterGeorgeIII.htm . 
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Soon thereafter, British and Indian traders discovered a ready Chinese market for 
India-grown opium.  Believing the ensuing shift in China’s trade balance from surplus to 
deficit and the reversal of long-standing silver inflows were linked to rising opium 
imports,56 a disturbed Qing court dispatched a high official, Lin Zexu, to extirpate the 
Canton opium trade.  When he did so, the British merchants sought London’s 
protection from what they regarded as an illegitimate seizure of mercantile property 
and disruption of trade.    
The result, fuelled by British visions of a vast China market, was the Opium War 
of 1839-1842.57  British arms forced the Qing to accept the Treaty of Nanking (1842), 
which ceded Hong Kong to the British, forced the Qing to accept a regime of virtual 
free trade, and initiated the “treaty port” system by opening five Chinese ports to 
British merchants.  This agreement, which set the tone of China’s international 
economic relations during the century prior to the Pacific War, subsequently expanded 
to include dozens of treaty ports where foreign residents were protected by 
extraterritoriality at the expense of Chinese sovereignty.    
While these innovations initiated a long process of change that resulted in 
substantial economic advance during the early 20th century and contributed to the 
genesis of China’s current boom, the initial pace of change was slow.  Historians 
writing in the mid-20th century focused on the task of explaining the contrasting 
responses of China and Japan to the humiliation of unexpected defeats at the hands of 
powerful Western intruders.  Searching for ways of understanding China’s 
shortcomings and lacking any hint of China’s subsequent dynamism, historical 
researchers proposed multiple interpretations of China’s 19th century experience, none 
of which encompass the possibility that China’s initially slow response to Western 
incursions might eventually develop into a protracted and explosive economic boom. 
Some observers viewed the 19th-century encounter with globalization as 
essentially irrelevant to the overall trajectory of China’s economy.  Authors like Marion J. 
                                                      
56 Recent research has questioned the link between rising opium imports and silver exports during the 19th 
century, citing other potential sources for the reversal of silver imports, including the rising gold price of 
silver, declining domestic demand for silver, as well as a breakdown in the Spanish Peso Standard. See 
Man-houng Lin (2006) and Alejandra Irigoin (2009). 
57 Linda Cooke Johnson cites multiple descriptions of the large scale of Shanghai’s domestic trade prior to 
the Opium War, including references to “forests of masts” and suggestions that Shanghai’s trade volume 
surpassed London’s during the 1830s (1993, pp. 175-176). 
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Levy (1953) and Albert Feuerwerker (1958) view the particularistic nature of Chinese 
personal relations and the prevalence of corruption, factors that figure prominently in 
our own discussion of China’s patronage economy, as binding constraints blocking 
economic advance.  Chinese intellectuals active in the May 4th Movement, born of 
nationalistic outrage over the 1919 Treaty of Versailles,58 proclaimed similar views, 
excoriating traditional culture for its incompatibility with modern values of science and 
democracy.59   
Others dismissed the 19th century treaty system, along with the accompanying 
expansion of foreign residence, trade, and investment, as too small and too isolated 
from the vast rural hinterland to have any major impact on the trajectory of China’s 
economy.  R.H. Tawney, an eminent British historian who became interested in Chinese 
affairs, famously described China’s treaty ports as “small islands of privilege at the 
seaports and on the great rivers … a modern fringe ... stitched along the hem of the 
ancient garment” (1932, p. 13).  Rhoads Murphey elaborated on this view, arguing that 
the treaty system left “the great majority of Chinese … unaffected, directly or 
indirectly” and that “materially, China went on behaving for the most part as it had 
always done” (1977, pp. 226-227).  
Subsequent events have undermined these perspectives.  Big growth spurts in 
several East Asian economies have revealed that high levels of productivity and income 
do not require that social relations follow the patterns observed in Western Europe or 
North America.  And recent research has shown that despite their small initial share of 
total output, China’s 19th century treaty ports and trade did indeed initiate processes of 
change that, while slow to develop, eventually resulted in a remarkable transformation 
of China’s economy that continues today.  Ironically, Rhoads Murphey’s book insisting 
                                                      
58 China, which supplied over 100,000 non-combatant workers to support British and French forces in 
Europe, expected the Versailles settlement to include the return of German concessions in Shandong 
province.  Instead, Article 156 of the treaty awarded these territories to Japan.  
59 Hu Shi, a Cornell graduate who became China’s wartime ambassador to the United States, 
encapsulated this perspective with a witty and bitter tale of “Mr. Just About” (Chabuduo xiansheng), 
who substitutes brown for white sugar, confuses two provinces with like-sounding names, writes 10 in 
place of 1,000, fails to keep track of the time, and summons a veterinarian to attend to a human patient.  
See http://www.readchinese.net/chabuduoxiansheng for Chinese and English versions. The economic 
success of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and overseas Chinese communities despite continued 
reliance on personal ties (guanxi) and other cultural practices formerly deemed to be incompatible with 
modernization undercuts this approach.  Indeed retired Singapore leader LEE Kuan Yew (and many 
others) now point to “Asian values” not as an obstacle, but as a bulwark of growth, prosperity and 
technological progress. 
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that treaty ports were “tiny and isolated islands in an alien Chinese sea,” concluded by 
predicting – accurately, as subsequent events confirmed in short order - that China 
might “come to travel … along the same road which the western colonists first urged” 
(1977, pp. 225, 233-234). 
 
4.2 Change and Resistance to Change, 1840-1895 
The absence of rapid economic transformation under the treaty port system 
causes difficulties for  Kenneth Pomeranz’ widely cited analysis attributing Britain’s 
unique economic success and the consequent “great divergence” between European 
and Asian incomes to Britain’s superior access to cheap coal and new sources of land-
intensive goods (2000).  If this were true, the 19th century treaty system, which allowed 
unlimited and virtually duty-free importation of mining equipment as well as coal and 
other land-intensive products, along with the gradual increase in migration of Chinese 
farmers into the sparsely populated and fertile plains of Manchuria, should have relaxed 
these constraints and provided a major impetus to Chinese growth.  The absence of any 
such outcome lends credence to our view that persisting institutional factors, which 
Pomeranz downplays, may have imposed binding constraints on China’s growth 
prospects both before and after the start of the treaty port system. 
 
4.2.1 Political accommodation and institutional change to 1895.  
The new era marked by China’s forced opening began disastrously for the Qing, 
which was nearly toppled by the devastating Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864).  Chinese 
Confucian elites based in Hunan and Anhui provinces, men like top-ranking 
examination graduates Zeng Guofan (1811-1872) and Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), who 
mobilized funds, assembled regional armies of militiamen, and led successful campaigns 
to defeat the powerful Taiping rebel armies.  This episode, in which regional elites from 
the China’s Confucian mid-Yangzi heartland took up arms, suppressed rebel forces, and 
transferred newly-won power to a child emperor (Tongzhi, r. 1861-1875) descended 
from non-Chinese conquerors, demonstrates the resilience of the traditional regime in 
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aligning incentives of the throne with elite commoners whose self-interest lay in the 
preservation of a unitary and centralized empire.  
Under the so-called Tongzhi Restoration (1861-1875), the Qing also engineered a 
remarkable economic recovery through the revitalization of traditional institutions: the 
reinstatement of Confucian orthodoxy, the restoration of the National Civil-Service 
Examination (largely interrupted during the Taiping Rebellion), and temporary 
exemption from land taxes to lure cultivators back to war-torn agricultural regions. The 
likin (lijin) tax, a form of transit tax on internal trade, initiated as a new source of local 
revenue to confront the mounting Taiping crisis, became institutionalized within fiscal 
system.  Along with new taxes on seaborne international trade collected by the foreign-
administered Imperial Maritime Customs, an arrangement forced on the Qing by 
European pressure, the likin system began to restructure the Chinese fiscal regime, with 
the result that by 1908, the long-dominant land tax declined to a mere 35 percent of 
officially recorded revenue, while the share of commercial taxation rose to over 65% 
(Yeh-chien Wang 1973, p. 80).     
Nor did the Qing remain entirely passive to Western incursions. As a natural 
extension to the Tongzhi Restoration, powerful regional bureaucrats such as Li 
Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) sponsored the Self-Strengthening 
movement (1860-1894), a program that aimed to expand Chinese military strength by 
developing a small number of Western-style, capital-intensive enterprises financed by 
the state and directed by prestigious officials who possessed the highest credentials 
awarded under the Confucian academic system.  Although these enterprises, which 
included arsenals, factories, and shipyards, were fraught with inefficiency and 
corruption, they did manage to record modest achievements (Ting-yee Kuo and Kwang-
Ching Liu (1978).  The Jiangnan Arsenal, located in Shanghai, impressed Japanese 
visitors in 1873.  Japanese reformers relied on Chinese translations of European 
scientific treatises (Elman 2005, p. 411).  China’s Hanyeping steelworks began 
production five years ahead of Japan’s Yawata complex.   
Despite these innovations, the overall ideological orientation during this period 
remained conservative, representing, as aptly suggested by the title of Mary Wright’s 
classic book (1962), the last stand of Chinese conservatism. In contrast to the 
concurrent Meiji reform in Japan, there was no effort to overhaul the fundamentals of 
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the traditional regime: no introduction of modern constitution or commercial law, no 
reform of the currency system; modern banks and modern infrastructures such as 
railroads were expressly prohibited; steamships were limited to the Yangzi and other 
major rivers (Mary Wright 1962, SUZUKI TOMŌ 1992).  After examining this record, 
Dwight Perkins (1967) concludes that “If the imperial government of China was an 
obstacle to industrialization, it was more because of what it did not do than because of 
harmful efforts which it did undertake ... The real problem was that although the 
Ch'ing government ... did take a number of positive steps they were few and feeble” in 
large part because its financial resources were “almost unbelievably weak” (1967, pp. 
491-492).  Developments during the second half of the 19th century highlight Qing 
strength and flexibility, but also reveal the limits of China’s traditional imperial regime.   
 
4.2.2 Economic change and its limits: the partial unraveling of economic 
institutions 
The expansion of China’s international trade was the first and most obvious effect 
of the treaty port system, which opened a growing list of ports to European commerce 
while restricting Chinese tariffs to a modest 5 percent.  China’s Maritime Customs data 
show real imports more than doubling in the two and half decades prior to 1895, and 
exports increasing by half this amount  
Despite its modest scale, trade gradually pulled major domestic commodity 
markets into close alignment with international exchange throughout the Pacific Basin.  
Loren Brandt’s discovery that, starting in the late 1880s, domestic prices for rice, wheat, 
and cotton moved in close harmony with market shifts throughout the Pacific basin 
demonstrates that several decades of unfettered trade forged unprecedented global 
links with vast swathes of China’s economy (1985, 1989).  By the late 1880s, millions of 
villagers inhabiting the Yangzi river’s drainage area who grew, bought, or sold rice, or 
worked for or traded with partners who engaged in those activities, had become 
unwitting participants in far-flung networks of international commerce, influencing and 
being influenced by distant producers, consumers, and traders of rice.    
The treaty system accelerated the arrival of new technologies, initially to the 
treaty ports themselves, which in both the 19th and 20th century versions of expanded 
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links to global markets, became staging points for the spread of technologies into the 
domestic economy.  The development of manufacturing, however, fell far short of the 
potential associated by the expanded inflow of goods, technology, and knowledge 
during latter half of the 19th century.  
Attempts by Chinese and European entrepreneurs to capitalize on opportunities 
linked to new technologies and trade arrangements encountered powerful obstacles to 
innovation within China’s late Qing economy.  These barriers, which affected the 
expansion of key public infrastructure such as railroads and inland steam shipping 
(Shannon Brown 1978; Suzuki Tomō 1992), are most clearly visible in the history of 
private efforts to introduce new technologies and business arrangements in the 
processing of agricultural commodities like soybeans and silk larvae.    
When Jardine, Matheson, a British firm with deep pockets and potent 
connections, set out to establish a steam-powered silk filature in Shanghai during the 
1860s, they anticipated difficulties in installing imported machinery and training 
Chinese workers to operate it.  What they did not expect, and what destroyed the 
project’s prospects, was their inability to obtain prompt and efficient delivery and 
storage of cocoons: 
The mandarins [officials] were bribed to oppose me, people and brokers, more or less in 
the hands of the silk hongs [companies] frightened from me, suitable houses were refused me 
or set fire to, and what I actually built was pulled down and the Chinamen that did assist me 
were put in chains (Shannon Brown 1979a, pp. 561-562). 
Efforts to establish a steam-powered facility for processing soybeans met a similar 
fate (Shannon Brown 1979b).  Chinese entrepreneurs fared no better: during the 1870s, 
riots by traditional silk weavers caused a local magistrate to order the closure of 
mechanized silk-reeling factories that an overseas Chinese merchant had established in 
Guangdong (Debin Ma 2005).   
Conflicts arose when new ventures clashed with vested interests arising from 
what Eiichi Motono describes as the “economic principle” guiding traditional Chinese 
economic administration:  “no one could acquire the right to do business without 
paying … tax” (2000, p. 64).  Officials at all levels granted commercial monopolies to 
groups of merchants in return for delivery of supplementary taxes.  Commercial entry 
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was thus restricted to operators who organized themselves into tax-paying groups and 
negotiated trade rights with the state (Motono 2000, pp. 3-6).  These arrangements 
had a long history: in Tianjin, for example:  
“By the early eighteenth century ... groups of transport workers had become organized 
into a guild system in which groups of workers received government permission to monopolize 
transport in a particular area.  Official notices were pasted up in each sector, delimiting its 
boundaries and naming the authorized transport agent.  From the Kangxi to the Xuanfeng 
reigns (1662-1861), the Qing government issued ‘dragon tickets’ or other notices of official 
approval to the the transport guilds “... Under the Guangxu Emperor [r. 1875-1908], successive 
magistrates issued 11 orders supporting the special privileges of the guilds.” (Gail Hershatter 
1986, p. 117). 
The resulting merchant-official combines joined forces to repel interlopers who 
threatened mercantile profits and official revenues.  In response to complaints from 
merchant clients, officials either intervened directly (“the Chinamen that did assist me 
were put in chains …“) or empowered incumbent merchants and their agents to act as 
official deputies in enforcing barriers to entry.  During the 1870s, merchants from the 
southern city of Swatow (now known as Shantou) controlled Shanghai’s opium trade.  
When newcomers imported large stocks in advance of an increase in taxes, the Swatow 
guild obtained permission to bring in “runners” who assumed the role of policemen.  
These agents 
“attempted to collect the Lijin tax from anyone who dealt in opium, regardless of [where 
and by whom] … it was stored.  Moreover, they charged… non-members of the Swatow ... 
group a higher rate than their members.  Furthermore, they confiscated all opium the moment 
it left the foreign importers’ hands … unless the transaction was carried out by members of the 
group.  In order to prevent commercial activities by non-members, they sent spies and informers 
around the shops.” (Motono 2000, p. 98) 
Contemporary and retrospective accounts agree that such arrangements posed 
serious obstacles to innovation.  Writing in 1909, H.B. Morse noted that 
“all Chinese trade guilds are alike in interfering with every detail of business and 
demanding complete solidarity of interest in their members, and they are all alike also in that 
their rules are not dead letter are actually enforced. The result is a tyranny of the many over of 
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the individual, and a system of control which must by its nature hinder ‘freedom of enterprise 
and independence of individual initiative” (1909/1966, p. 24). 
Shannon Brown echoes this sentiment: “Caught between the guilds on the one 
hand and the officials on the other, the Chinese merchant was hardly in a position to 
play the role of an innovative Schumpeterian entrepreneur” (1979b, p. 183). 
The treaty system acted to undermine the very merchant-official nexus that 
tormented would be innovators and therefore slowed the transfer of technology and 
discouraged investment.  The key factor was an obscure provision of an 1858 Sino-
British agreement that allowed foreign merchants to avoid domestic taxes on goods in 
transit to or from a treaty port by paying a fixed ad valorem fee.  This “transit pass” 
privilege, often cited to illustrate the intransigence of local Chinese officials and the 
limited reach of British power,60 became an unlikely catalyst for institutional change. 
Chinese operators quickly recognized that transit passes intended for the use of 
foreign traders could shield their own goods from domestic taxation.  Yen-p’ing Hao 
shows that Chinese merchants bought transit passes from British firms, paid foreign 
residents to assume nominal ownership of goods in transit, and even created “pseudo-
foreign” trading houses operated entirely by Chinese, who again shared the resulting 
savings with their passive foreign partners (1986, pp. 263-267).  The insightful work of 
Eiji Motono (2000) reveals the full impact of these initiatives, which destabilized a long-
standing equilibrium that had preserved local monopolies, allowed local officials to 
share in commercial profits, and, as is evident from the treaty-port case studies 
assembled by Shannon Brown and others, to throttle interlopers.    
Motono argues convincingly that these merchant-official combines formed the 
structural foundation of traditional Chinese merchant groups and networks, and that 
the Western presence, although small in relation to China’s national economy, 
constituted a new source of power and authority in China that eroded the imperial 
system’s long-standing monopoly over political power.  He sees the transit pass system 
as a vehicle for eroding the authority of mercantile guilds, fracturing traditional group 
                                                      
60 Thus the historian John K. Fairbank echoed contemporary complaints to the effect that “the British 
were quite unable to prevent the taxation of their goods” outside the treaty ports (cited in Dong Wang 
2005, p. 18). 
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solidarity among members of particular trades, and enhancing the property rights and 
security available to Chinese businesses.  
The outcome of China’s treaty port system (and also of China’s more recent 
“opening up” policy) richly illustrates Paul Romer’s (1993) insistence that the impact of 
international trade resides in flows of ideas as much as in shipments of commodities.  
The treaty system brought many new organizational forms into the treaty ports, into 
the domestic economy and into China’s governmental machinery.  Early examples 
include modern banks, the Shanghai stock exchange, shareholding companies with 
limited liability, the foreign-managed Imperial Maritime Customs, and China’s new 
foreign ministry, the Zongli yamen. The treaty ports also served as transmission belts for 
new structures of knowledge and belief:  engineering, medicine, international law, legal 
jurisprudence, political representation, pragmatism, democracy, and Marxism.  New 
ideas moved through numerous channels.61  Christian missionaries opened schools, 
hospitals, universities, and YMCA branches in both rural and urban areas.  The success 
of graduates of schools with modern curricula, as well as students returned from 
overseas training and alumni of western-style schools in Hong Kong, demonstrated that 
Confucian training was no longer the sole route to economic gain and upward 
mobility.62  Overseas Chinese, formerly targets of official predation, were increasingly 
welcomed for their knowledge and wealth: an 1893 edict ordered that “all Chinese 
merchants … may return home [from overseas] to practice their trade upon receiving a 
pass from the Chinese minister or consul … they may go abroad again to carry out their 
business and must not as in the past be subjected to extortion” (Michael Godley 1981, 
p. 78). 
 
 
 
                                                      
61 XIONG Yuzhi (2011) offers the most comprehensive treatment of the diffusion of Western influence in 
China. The treaty ports themselves epitomized new ideas and practices.  ZHAO Jin explains the shocking 
impact on Chinese sensibilities when authorities in Shanghai’s International Settlement refused to halt 
traffic to make way for the entourage of high level Chinese officials such as LI Hongzhang (1994, p. 118). 
See Debin Ma 2011c discusses the influence of Western legal system and practice in Shanghai.  
62 Drawing on employee records of the late 1920s for the Tianjin-Pukou railroad, Noam Yuchtman (2010) 
shows that individuals with Western education from modern schools established either by foreigners or 
Chinese commanded a higher skilled labor premium than individuals educated in traditional schools that 
prepared students for the imperial civil service examinations.    
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4.3 The Shock of Defeat by Japan as a Turning Point 
China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 by a nation long regarded 
as a student rather than an equal marked the end of the Self Strengthening Movement, 
which events revealed to be feeble and ineffective. 63  This ignominious military failure 
inflicted a profound mental shock on Chinese elites and the public at large.  The 
Celestial Empire, having stumbled into the unwelcome role of global laggard, faced 
unprecedented mockery as the “sick man of Asia.”  
The shock effect of Japan’s victory magnified the importance of the 1896 Treaty 
of Shimonoseki.  The agreement granted foreigners the right to establish factories in 
the treaty ports.  Eliminating the prohibition against foreign factories in the treaty ports 
sparked a rapid expansion of foreign direct investment.  It also had the beneficial effect 
of indirectly legitimizing Chinese modern enterprises, and therefore reduced the 
harassment that conservatives had routinely inflicted upon modern Chinese ventures, 
especially those outside the protection of prominent national and regional reform 
leaders. 
In addition, China’s naval defeat directly triggered the Hundred Days’ Reform 
centered in the southern province of Hunan in 1898.  Largely inspired by the Japan’s 
successful Meiji reforms, sponsored by influential provincial leaders and intellectuals, 
and backed by the young Guangxu emperor (r. 1875-1908), this reform effort was 
crushed by conservatives led by the emperor’s aunt, the Dowager Empress Cixi.  The 
subsequent debacle surrounding the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the ensuing multi-
national foreign invasion battered the Qing with fresh setbacks and forced a new round 
of concessions.  The yawning gap between China’s continuing humiliation and Japan’s 
rapid modernization launched a fresh wave of domestic reform initiatives, with Cixi, the 
former arch-reactionary, now assuming a leading role. 
Modeled directly on Japan’s Meiji reforms, the Qing constitutional movement of 
1903-1911 ironically echoed numerous initiatives of the recently rejected Hundred 
Days’ agenda.  The new reform effort was comprehensive and ambitious. It aimed at 
steering China toward a constitutional monarchy by drafting a formal modern 
                                                      
63 Benjamin Elman argues that China’s military defeat encouraged an excessively negative assessment of 
the Self-Strengthening Movement and an inappropriate emphasis on Chinese backwardness (2005, pp. 
379-382, 392-393).  
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Constitution with national, provincial and local level parliaments.  Military 
modernization was high on the reform agenda.  Administrative reforms sought to 
modernize public finance and adopt a national budget.  The reform initiative gave birth 
to new Ministries of Education, Trade and Agriculture and encouraged the founding of 
local chambers of commerce.  Additional policy initiatives aimed at currency reform, 
establishing modern banks, and expanding railroads and other public infrastructure 
(Douglas Reynolds 1993).   
New developments in taxation, law, and education foreshadowed the demise of 
China’s traditional political economy.  The top priority of the newly established Ministry 
of Commerce was “to break the control of the Qing local governments over the 
Chinese merchants’ groups and Chinese firms.”   To this end, the reformers set out to 
eliminate tax-farming arrangements involving cooperation between “the leaders of the 
prominent Chinese merchants’ groups and the officials of the Lijin tax bureau” (Motono 
2000, pp. 154-156).   The same Ministry, through the Company Law, introduced 
limited liability into China’s economy and also sought to establish new opportunities to 
establish and operate businesses without the need for informal partnering with 
incumbent officials (William Kirby 1995).  A year later, the decision to abandon the 
thousand-year tradition of Confucian civil service examinations shook the foundation of 
the power structure that had long supported the patronage economy of imperial China. 
 
4.4 Economic Developments 1912-1949: Mixed Outcomes and Partial 
Breakthrough 
Even though the Qing dynasty’s collapse in 1911 quickly terminated late Qing 
constitutional reform efforts, the dramatic acceleration of reform efforts in the wake of 
the 1896 Treaty of Shimonoseki sparked the first major wave of Chinese 
industrialization.   
 
4.4.1. The onset of China’s industrial revolution 
Beginning at the very end of the 19th century, activity in mining and 
manufacturing accelerated sharply from its small initial base.  Overall industrial output 
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showed double-digit real annual growth during 1912-1936, a phenomenal result for 
that period, especially in view of China’s turbulent political scene and the impact of the 
Great Depression (John K. Chang 1969).  Factory production, initially focused on textiles, 
food processing, and other consumer products, clustered in two regions: the lower 
Yangzi area, where both foreign and Chinese entrepreneurs pursued factory expansion 
in and around Shanghai, and China’s northeast or Manchurian region, where Japanese 
initiatives predominated (D.K. Lieu 1936, Elizabeth B. Schumpeter 1940, Manshū 
kaihatsu 1964-65, Ma 2008).  By 1935, Chinese factories, including some owned by 
British or Japanese firms, produced 8.0 percent the world’s cotton yarn (more than 
Germany, France or Italy) and 2.8 percent of global cotton piece goods production (ILO 
1937, vol. 1, pp. 57-58).64  
Despite the importance of foreign investment in Shanghai and especially in 
Manchuria, Chinese-owned companies produced 73 percent of China’s 1933 factory 
output (T. Rawski 1989, p. 74).  Growing production of light consumer and industrial 
goods, combined with the accumulation of experience in operating and repairing 
modern machinery generated backward linkages that spurred new private initiatives in 
machinery, chemicals, cement, mining, electricity, and metallurgy.  Official efforts 
(including semi-official Japanese activity in Manchuria) also promoted the growth of 
mining, metallurgy, and arms manufacture (Thomas Rawski 1975; 1989, chap. 2). 
China’s economic prospects acted as a magnet for trade and investment during 
the prewar decades.  China’s foreign trade rose to a peak of more than two percent of 
global trade flows in the late 1920s, a level that was not regained until the 1990s 
(Nicholas Lardy 1994, p. 2).  C.F. Remer calculated that, between 1902 and 1931, 
inflows of foreign direct investment grew at annual rates of 8.3, 5 and 4.3 percent in 
Shanghai, Manchuria and the rest of China between 1902 and 1931 (1968, p. 73).  By 
1938, China’s stock of inward foreign investment amounted to US$2.6 billion – more 
than any other underdeveloped region except for the Indian subcontinent and 
Argentina (Chi-ming Hou 1965, p. 98).  Although estimates of pre-war capital flows 
often blur the distinction between direct and portfolio holdings, it is evident that China 
played a substantial role in global capital flows.  The 1938 figure of US$2.6 billion for 
                                                      
64 Hong Kong’s prominence in the textile sector during the early postwar decades resulted from the arrival 
of Shanghai textile entrepreneurs, who diverted shipments of imported equipment to Hong Kong as 
Communist prospects for victory in China’s civil war advanced during the late 1940s. 
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China’s stock of foreign investments amounts to 8.4 percent of worldwide stocks of 
outward foreign investment; China received 17.5 percent of outbound foreign direct 
investment in that year (Michael Twomey 2000, pp. 32, 35).  By contrast, China’s 2001 
share of worldwide inward foreign direct investment was only 2.1 percent (Dirk Willem 
te Velde 2006, Table 2).  Domestic investment also showed substantial growth.  
“Modern-oriented” fixed investment (calculated from consumption of cement, steel, 
and machinery) grew at an average annual rate of 8.1 percent between 1903 and 1936, 
outpacing Japanese gross domestic fixed capital formation in mining, manufacturing, 
construction, and facilitating industries, which advanced at an annual rate of 5.0 
percent.  Despite the effects of the Great Depression and political tumult, economy-
wide gross fixed investment exceeded ten percent of aggregate output during 1931-
1936 (T. Rawski 1989, pp. 251, 261). 
Transport development contributed substantially to economic expansion.  China’s 
growing railway network, although much smaller than India’s, was particularly 
important, as the length of track grew from 364 kilometers in 1894 to over 21,000 by 
1937, newly constructed north-south lines slashed economic distances across a 
landscape dominated by rivers flowing from west to east (YAN Zhongping 1955, p. 
180).  Completion of railway and telegraph connections linking Peking (now Beijing) 
and the central China river port of Wuhan in 1906 reduced the time needed to ship 
commodities between these cities, sell the goods, and receive the proceeds in response 
to observation of a favorable market price from 150 days to 2-3 days (based on 
information in Joseph Whitney 1970, p. 46).  Growing availability of rail transport 
stimulated coal production, with the result that “falling energy costs stimulated new 
activity in a wide range of industries …[including] railway workshops [and] 
manufacturers of cement, textiles, flour, cigarettes, matches, chemicals” and others.  
Lower fuel prices also “led to the revival of native industries which had earlier 
languished because of the high cost of fuel” (T. Rawski 1989, pp. 224-225; Tim Wright 
1984, p. 46).  Railway transport also encouraged the commercialization of agriculture, 
raising farmers’ terms of trade and boosting production of regional specialties like 
cotton, fruit, sesame, peanuts, and tobacco (Ernest P. Liang 1982, chap. 5). 
In a remarkable triumph of a free banking version of the silver standard, privately 
held Chinese banks, often cooperating with foreign financial institutions and traditional 
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money shops, transformed the financial face of China by persuading households and 
businesses to transact with paper banknotes that were convertible into silver on 
demand.65  This monetary transformation reduced transaction costs.  The expansion of 
branch networks allowed major domestic banks to “attract deposits from all regions 
and recycle them to the areas of greatest demand,” contributing to the emergence of 
an embryonic national market for funds (T. Rawski 1989, p. 159).   
These forces resulted in increased per capita output and structural changes of the 
sort associated with Simon Kuznets’ concept of modern economic growth in two major 
regions: the Lower Yangzi, where private domestic and foreign investment in and 
around Shanghai served as the key driver (Debin Ma 2008) and the Northeast 
(Manchuria), where Japanese investment and eventual takeover provided key 
momentum (Kang Chao 1982, MIZOGUCHI Toshiyuki and UMEMURA Mataji 1988) 
More controversially, Thomas Rawski (1989) argues that developments in industry, 
transport, and finance precipitated an episode of modern economic growth at the 
national level during the early decades of the 20th century.  His estimates of substantial 
modern-sector growth resemble earlier results (e.g. John K. Chang 1969 for modern 
industry).  With the modern sector accounting for only 12.6 percent of GDP in 1933 
(Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh 1965, p. 89), growth in modern sector alone says 
little about aggregate output.  In contrast to Rhoads Murphey (1977), Rawski finds that 
substantial spillovers from modern sector activity pushed output expansion ahead of 
population growth in several non-modern sectors, including the native banks 
(qianzhuang), handicraft textiles, and traditional water transport.   
With agriculture occupying two-thirds of the economy, any significant revision to 
growth estimates rests on a reappraisal of agricultural performance, which is 
constrained by the unreliability of available information on acreage and yields by crop 
(Rawski 1989, pp. 282-285).  In the absence of reliable figures on the growth of 
agricultural output, Rawski appeals to indirect measures of agricultural labor 
productivity: wages of hired farm labor and non-farm wages available to unskilled rural 
                                                      
65 The promise of convertibility was maintained until China’s decision to go off silver late in 1935. Two 
decades earlier, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications vehemently resisted pressure from 
the new Republican government to suspend convertibility because of growing fiscal constraints.  
Ironically, similar pressures may have been at work in the decision in 1935 to move to a managed 
currency (Loren Brandt and Thomas Sargent, 1989). 
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migrants in male (coal mining) and female (cotton textile factories) occupations that 
competed for farm labor.  The argument is that, with ample labor mobility and 
competitive labor markets, sustained increases in real wages paid to farm laborers, 
miners, and mill hands cannot occur in the absence of parallel increases in the marginal 
product of agricultural labor, and therefore in the real income of the majority of self-
employed farmers who operated independently as owners or tenants (1989, chap. 6).  
Brandt (1989) makes a similar case for Central and Eastern China, focusing on 
increasing specialization and commercialization in the farm sector, a process that he ties 
to growing openness to the international economy, favorable terms of trade, and 
spillovers from China’s emergent modern/urban sector. 
 
4.4.2 Problems of state- and nation-building  
Except in Manchuria, where semi-official Japanese agencies moved toward a 
regime of central planning, these developments primarily reflected private initiative.  
Following the establishment of the Kuomintang-led Nanjing government in 1927, the 
Chinese state mounted a vigorous effort to establish administrative structures that 
could formulate and implement developmental policies.  These efforts 
“coalesced in a number of important pockets of Republican government: in 
finance and tax, in water conservancy, in the national personnel policy articulated by 
the Examination Yuan and Ministry of Personnel, in the National Resource Council and, 
from the middle of the 1930s, through the activities and writings of a group of 
administrative reformers headed by Gan Naiguang of the Ministry of the Interior” (Julia 
Strauss 1997, p. 340). 
William Kirby notes that “the greatest progress” toward “the creation of modern 
developmental bureaucracies ... occurred under the National Resources Commission ... 
the technical and managerial agency that came to dominate state industry under the 
Kuomintang regime (1927-1949) and then formed “the basic institutional arrangement 
of China’s [post-1949] state-owned enterprise,” a core element in the planned 
economy under the People’s Republic of China (William Kirby 1990, p. 125; Morris L. 
Bian 2005, p. 213). 
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Non-government agencies, many the products of initiatives by returned students, 
supported these efforts.  The National Association of Mass Education Movements 
formulated a Ten Year Plan covering 1930-1940 that proposed a systematic program to 
promote literacy, education, health, agriculture, and industry at the village level (Charles 
Hayford 1990, pp. 105-107). 
Despite these gains, China’s Republican governments could not roll back 
developmental obstacles arising from insufficient administrative capabilities and 
persistent shortfalls in revenue.  Central government revenue never reached 3 percent 
of China’s aggregate output (T. Rawski 1989, p. 15). A substantial portion of 
commercial tax collections was dedicated to servicing foreign and domestic debts. The 
Kuomintang declared its newly established Nanjing regime as the national government 
at a time when its actual control spanned only a handful of provinces.  To obtain the 
nominal allegiance of various regional governments, the new government ceded all 
agricultural taxes to the provinces.  This step, which left Nanjing heavily reliant on 
revenues from foreign trade and coastal urban businesses, proved disastrous once 
Japanese forces forced the Kuomintang to abandon its coastal base and retreat into the 
interior. 
Strauss comments that “central state capacity was extremely limited with respect 
to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian 
institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and 
external military pressure” (1997, p. 333).  Abolition of the Confucian civil service 
examinations opened the door to new personnel policies, but since  
“nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement. ... short-term 
pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be 
allies repeatedly stymied the re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and 
impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle ... in this highly unfavourable 
environment of ... slender resources and external pressures, what the central 
governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional 
breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and 
begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while 
standing up to external pressure” (Strauss 1997, pp. 334-335). 
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Unfortunately, no such breakthrough occurred.  The same obstacles that 
bedeviled earlier attempts at top-down reform were much in evidence under the 
Kuomintang administration of the 1930s and 1940s.  In response to late Qing reforms, 
provincial officials, eager to preserve their traditional bureaucratic equality with the 
center’s Boards (of Revenue etc., which became Ministries in the final years of Qing) 
resisted efforts to establish a “unitary” system that would subordinate provincial offices 
to their central counterparts.  Qing reforms actually strengthened the position of local 
elites.  “Attempting to consolidate its rule by putting the gentry members under the 
control of the local officials,” the new structures had the effect of converting de facto 
gentry privilege into de jure rights and powers: “officially approving their domination of 
the locality. . . by formally incorporating their functions into the lowest level of 
government” (Chūzo Ichiko 1980, pp. 394, 402).   
The Kuomintang encountered similar difficulties, especially beyond its Lower 
Yangzi power base, where “local society was dominated by secret societies and rural 
elites,” which sturdily defended “their long-standing political, military, and economic 
dominance” so that Nanjing’s “controls in the interior – horizontally over the provinces, 
and vertically down to the rural elites and the urban moneyed classes – remained 
weak” (Lloyd Eastman 1984, pp. 219, 221). 
Mixed outcomes prevailed within the Yangzi delta region that the Nanjing regime 
did control prior to Japan’s 1937 invasion.  There are clear signs of continued effort to 
replace the patronage system with genuinely open markets: 
“In 1928, the Nationalist government abolished the trading privileges of the 
Cocoon Merchant Guild, lifted the restrictions on the opening of cocoon hangs, and 
started reforms in commercial taxation and tax farming. Between 1928 and 1929, the 
number of cocoon hangs in Wuxi county jumped by about 30%.” (Debin Ma 2004a, p. 
392) 
At the same time, the old system under which businesses operated on the 
sufferance of political elites remained much in evidence.  In Tianjin, “Guild bosses. . . 
opposed the efforts of some merchants to introduce motor vehicles … threatened to 
kill the general manager of the factory [that had purchased trucks, so that] the factory 
had to turn control of transport back to the guild” (Hershatter 1986, p. 134).  
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Historians vigorously debate the nature of government-business relations in and around 
Shanghai, the heartland of China’s modern economy prior to the Pacific War.  Parks 
Coble argues that Kuomintang efforts to control and tax the business sector often 
involved coercion, including the use of criminal elements to pressure enterprises located 
in Shanghai’s foreign-controlled concessions.  But with even Coble’s critics agreeing, for 
example, that prominent industrialist “Jung Tsung-ching, threatened with arrest and 
confiscation of his property ... used connections and escaped with only having to make 
a modest purchase of government bonds” (Parks M. Coble 1986, preface, quoting p. xi), 
it seems evident that even the immunity conferred by foreign banks and foreign-
controlled concessions in major Chinese cities proved unable to supplant the traditional 
patronage system with secure private property rights.  Jung’s vulnerability seems no 
different from that of Qing-era salt merchants.   
Beginning in 1929, China’s economy faced a succession of shocks arising from 
the Great Depression and falling export demand, the severance of Manchuria in 1932 
by the Japanese, and rapidly rising silver prices triggered by Britain’s decision to go off 
gold and the United States Silver Purchase Act of 1934.  Considerable debate persists 
over how well the Chinese economy weathered the storm, and the severity of the 
combined impact of these events on aggregate economic activity.66   
There is little controversy about what followed.  Twelve years of war, with large-
scale civil strife following the defeat of Japan’s invading armies, battered China’s 
economy and rolled back much of the progress achieved during the preceding decades.  
Warring armies and predatory soldiers killed draft animals, commandeered or destroyed 
vehicles and emptied markets.  The textile industry, China’s largest, was cut off from 
supplies of raw materials and virtually ceased production.  Facing terrifying uncertainty, 
farmers retreated into self-sufficiency.  Roaring inflation reinforced this backward march 
and crippled China’s financial sector.  Corruption hobbled the public sector and 
embittered the populace.  When MAO Zedong’s victorious armies marched into Beijing, 
the new People’s Republic of China inherited a shattered economy wracked by physical 
destruction and extreme macroeconomic instability.  
 
                                                      
66 For divergent views of this period, compare Tomoko Shiroyama (2008) with T. Rawski (1989) and Loren 
Brandt and Thomas Sargent (1989). 
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5. Development Under The People’s Republic Of China. 
5.1 Socialist Planning 1949-1976 
The broad contours of economic change following the establishment in 1949 of 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the re-unification of China under CCP rule are 
well understood. The new government quickly implemented an orthodox mix of fiscal 
and monetary policies to restore fiscal balance and quell hyperinflation, steps that 
helped facilitate recovery from damage inflicted by 12 years of war and civil strife.  
Following violent campaigns that expropriated the assets of urban and rural elites, the 
latter through a land reform that redistributed approximately 40 percent of the 
agricultural land (Peter Schran 1969, p. 22; John Wong 1973, p. 160; Charles R. Roll 
1980, chap. 4), the PRC moved to implement socialist planning. The new system was 
loosely modeled after the Soviet Union, the source of loans, technology, and advice for 
China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957). 
The new regime swept away the remnants of several Qing-era institutional 
constraints on growth, completing a process that had begun prior to World War II.  
Land reform eliminated powerful local interests that may have had links with previous 
political regimes and obstructed reform efforts.  Economic growth figured prominently 
in Beijing’s policy agenda.  Reflecting Leninist theory as well as knowledge and 
experience acquired from the administration of rural base areas during several decades 
of intermittent civil war with the Kuomintang (Peter Schran, 1976), the Communists 
came to power with a disciplined party hierarchy, to which they quickly added a 
vertically-integrated administrative system that, for the first time in Chinese history, 
penetrated to the village level.  This system gave the PRC an unprecedented capacity to 
ensure nationwide implementation of official instructions and directives without relying 
on the cooperation of local gentry or other independent agents.  Although provincial 
and local leaders often adapted and distorted messages from Beijing in ways that 
benefited their own agendas, this new structure represented a major change that 
brought important consequences. 
The new government vastly expanded state control over resources, rapidly 
eliminating the long-standing shortage of fiscal revenue that had prevented earlier 
governments from financing aggressive development initiatives.  The ratio of fiscal 
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revenue to national product, which remained below 10 percent throughout the Qing 
and Republican eras, rose rapidly after 1949 and averaged more than 25 percent 
between 1952 and 1977. (Compendium 2010, p. 18).   
China’s plan system, introduced with Soviet advice during the early 1950s, bore 
strong resemblances to its Soviet counterpart (Barry Naughton 1995, chap. 3).  In both 
cases, the overriding objective was not to raise living standards, but rather to develop 
and expand a self-sustaining military-industrial complex.  This called for high rates of 
saving to finance investment skewed toward heavy industry along with an elaborate 
planning apparatus to capture resources and channel them into high priority 
investments. With markets virtually eliminated, the regime managed prices in order to 
extract forced savings from farmers and consumers. These savings made their way to 
the state coffers through profit remittances of state-owned enterprises.  In the 
countryside, resource extraction from households was made possible by collectivization 
of agriculture and strict controls on the mobility of the rural population through the 
hukou system of residential permits.  In the cities, rationing contributed to a buildup in 
household savings. 
There were also differences.  Chinese planning was never as extensive as the 
Soviet Union's, and remained much more decentralized (Christine Wong, 1985).   In 
contrast to the U-form hierarchy of the Soviet Union, the Chinese economy resembled 
an M-form, and was comprised of a large number of relatively self-sufficient regions, 
e.g. provinces and prefectures (Audrey Donnithorne, 1972; Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian 
and Chenggang Xu, 2000).67 
Starting in 1958, China distanced itself both from Moscow's political leadership 
and from Soviet economic strategy, as MAO Zedong embarked on a daring campaign 
to accelerate the pace of development by amalgamating rural households into large-
scale collective units (renmin gongshe or People’s Communes), and by promoting rural 
industrialization.  The communes proved to be a costly failure: poor incentives, false 
reports of rising crop output, excessive grain procurement, and a massive reallocation of 
labor from agriculture to industry inflicted an immense famine on China's peasantry 
                                                      
67 Using terminology derived from studies of corporate structures by Alfred Chandler and others, Maskin, 
Qian, and Xu (2000) describe Chinese industrial structures as “M-form” – i.e. analogous to multi-
divisional corporations, which they contrast with “U-form”  (resembling unitary corporations) structures 
observed in Soviet industry. 
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that cost tens of millions of lives.68  Efforts to revive forward momentum in the early 
1960s met with some success, but the economy suffered further setbacks in the mid-
1960s when a political campaign known as the "Cultural Revolution" sparked a new 
reversal in economic policies and incentive mechanisms. 
Mixed economic outcomes characterize China’s quarter-century of socialist 
planning under MAO and his colleagues.  The plan era brought notable expansion of 
industrial and technological capabilities, as well as major improvements in literacy, 
school attendance, maternal and infant survival rates, public health, and life expectancy. 
Real annual GDP growth of roughly 6 percent (aggregate) and 4 percent  in per capita 
terms69 surpassed gains in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Brazil and other large low-
income nations, often by large margins (David Morawetz 1978).   
These successes were accompanied by shortcomings and setbacks, which 
occurred in part because the PRC government, while eliminating institutional barriers 
inherited from the past, used its unprecedented administrative capacity to implement a 
succession of anti-economic policies, including an assault on individual and firm-level 
incentives, persecution of intellectuals and educators, forced collectivization of farming, 
a destructive regimen of local self-reliance, the diffusion of unsuitable technological 
innovations in both agriculture and industry, and severe restriction of cross-border flows 
of trade, investment, people, and information.70  
Under socialist planning, growth occurred almost entirely along the extensive 
margin, sustained only by a rising share of GDP channeled into investment.71  Although 
output per person increased, consumption did not.  Calorie availability for China’s 
immense rural population fell below World Bank standards for minimum subsistence 
during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and did not regain that benchmark for two 
                                                      
68 Discovery of new materials has tended to raise estimates of famine deaths.  Frank Dikötter’s review 
“puts the number of premature deaths at a minimum of 45 million” (2010, p. 325).   Earlier estimates of  
PENG Xizhe(1987) and Basil Ashton et al (1984) suggest excess mortality between 20-30 million. 
69 These official figures for 1953-1978, based on what the Chinese call “comparable prices,” are from 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2007, p. 7).  Use of 2000 prices, which avoids upward bias 
inherent in plan prices assigned during the 1950s, results in average annual growth of 4.4 percent for 
real GDP during 1952-1978 (Dwight Perkins and Thomas Rawski 2008, p. 839). 
70 The dwindling trade ratio and near-elimination of foreign investment characteristic of China during the 
years 1949-1976 represents a joint outcome of U.S.-led efforts to prevent its allies from trading with 
China and China’s own anti-trade policies. 
71 Official data show that gross capital formation absorbed 22.2-25.8 percent of GDP during 1952-1957 
and 32.2-36.0 percent during 1970-1977 (NBS 2007, p. 19).  See also Shigeru Ishikawa (1983). 
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decades (Thomas Rawski 2007, p. 91).  Many millions of Chinese villagers were no 
better fed in the 1970s than in the 1930s (Nicholas Lardy 1983; Chris Bramall 1989), 
and rationing was pervasive.  Food supply problems also limited the growth of the 
urban population, which, measured as a percentage of the total population, scarcely 
increased between 1958 and 1978.72  Moreover, a substantial gap emerged between 
the living standards of urban and rural households (Thomas Rawski, 1982).   
Long-term failure to provide an adequate food supply reflected the conflict 
between central planning and individual incentives endemic to socialist systems. State-
run research institutes made significant advances in the development of high-yielding 
varieties, but benefits were undermined by planning inefficiencies and weak incentives 
(Lardy, 1983).73  Similarly, as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, industrial 
innovation languished because the plan system’s focus on physical output spawned 
powerful incentives for factory leaders to focus on quantity and skimp on quality, 
variety, cost reduction, specialization, and customer service (Joseph S. Berliner 1976; 
Thomas Rawski, 1980).  A typical report complained that First Auto Works, one of 
China’s premier manufacturers, found its “obsolescence of equipment and models 
worsening day by day” following “thirty years of standing still” (LI Hong 1993, p. 83). 
 
5.2 The Reform Era Since the Late 1970s 
The death of MAO Zedong (1893-1976) was widely recognized as the end of an 
era for both the PRC and for China’s economy.  China’s reform initiatives of the late 
1970s arose from twin concerns about food security and the growing gap between 
productivity and living standards in China and neighboring East Asian economies, both 
of which threatened the political legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party (CCP).  The 
initial reforms focused on four areas: rural liberalization, expansion of foreign trade and 
investment, policies aimed at “enlivening” state-owned enterprises, and fiscal 
decentralization (Carl Riskin 1987; Justin Lin, Fang Cai and Zhou Li 2006; Barry 
Naughton 2007).    
                                                      
72 Official data show that urban residents comprised 16.2 percent of the national total in 1958 and 17.9 
percent in 1978 (Compendium 2010, p. 6). 
73 As discussed below, this untapped potential, especially in major grains and cotton, likely played an 
important role in the acceleration of agricultural growth after 1978. 
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5.2.1 Policy initiatives during the first decade of reform 
Agriculture and the rural economy.  The central feature of China’s rural 
reform was the return of household farming.  Initially permitted as an experiment in a 
few poverty-stricken areas, the “Household Responsibility System” (HRS) spread rapidly 
as villagers “voted with their feet” to abandon collective agriculture in favor of the new 
system, which established what amounted to a system of tenancy, with cultivators 
paying fixed rents to the local government and retaining marginal earnings for 
themselves.  Along with the HRS, the reform raised state procurement prices for grain 
and relaxed controls over rural markets for both products and farm inputs. 
 These reforms elicited an explosive response (Justin Lin 1988, 1992).  Grain 
output rose by almost a third between 1978 and 1984, with output of cash crops and 
farm sidelines growing even more rapidly.  Equally important, rapid productivity growth 
in farming freed up a large pool of labor formerly trapped in collective agriculture 
(Thomas Rawski and Robert Mead, 1998), which combined with a growing supply of 
agricultural goods, rising household incomes, and freeing up of markets for both inputs 
and outputs sparked a massive boom in rural industry, especially in China’s coastal 
provinces (Chris Bramall 2009, chap. 3).  Within less than fifteen years, employment in 
China’s township and village enterprises expanded by nearly 100 million. The success of 
both the HRS and township and village enterprises demonstrated the remarkable 
resilience of a tradition of private contracting in an environment of vaguely defined 
property rights and pervasive political patronage.  
Globalization.  Following a period of intense debate in which, as in late Qing, 
conservatives insisted that international contacts threatened to erode the cultural 
foundations of Chinese society (LI Lanqing 2009, ZHAO Ziyang 2009), the PRC 
embarked on policy of gradual opening, initially focused on the establishment of four 
Special Economic Zones in the southern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, 
along with increased autonomy for those provinces to approve foreign investments and 
retain foreign exchange earnings.    
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After an initial period of confusion,74 the new zones powered a steep increase in 
labor-intensive manufactured exports.  Guangdong and Fujian moved quickly to 
welcome investments by overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, many of whom had family 
ties to those provinces.  Overseas investors were classified as “compatriots” (tongbao) 
rather than “foreign merchants” (waishang) and accorded special privileges.  China 
benefited enormously from a historical accident: Beijing’s decision to allow inflows of 
foreign direct investment came just as steep increases in labor costs prompted 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong entrepreneurs to seek new locations for their labor-intensive 
export operations.  This resulting marriage of ethnic Chinese business operators with 
Chinese migrant workers provided a massive boost to nascent reform efforts and 
launched China on a trajectory toward its current status as “workshop of the world.”    
Foreign direct investment focused on labor-intensive export production soon 
spilled beyond the zones to encompass China’s rapidly expanding rural factories, first in 
Guangdong and Fujian, and then to other coastal provinces.  When early experiments 
with openness were seen to generate large benefits, regional competition sparked 
growing enthusiasm for expanding foreign trade and investment, with officials at every 
level scrambling to capture opportunities linked to growing flows of trade, inward 
foreign direct investment, and (perhaps most important) inflows of knowledge and 
information, both through personal interaction and via the gradual diffusion of 
telephone, fax, computers, and the internet.   
At the same time, falling international transport costs and new 
computer/information technologies allowed large multi-national manufacturers to 
reduce costs by setting up far-flung supply chains to take advantage of international 
differences in capabilities and costs.  These firms viewed China as a stable source of 
inexpensive and cost-effective labor; for China, the multi-nationals promised new 
inflows of capital, managerial knowledge, market access, and technology.  This 
confluence of interests produced first a trickle, and then a torrent of capital inflows as 
local governments strained to attract top international companies.  The initial emphasis 
was on export production, but China’s ongoing economic expansion sharpened the 
interest of multi-national firms in China’s domestic market as well.  This encouraged 
                                                      
74 Overseas Chinese visitors expressed dissatisfaction with the Xiamen SEZ during the summer of 1982, 
complaining that it was impossible to formulate a business plan because the SEZ authorities refused to 
specify the cost of critical elements including land, water, and electricity (1982 interview).  
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Chinese officials to hone their strategy of offering access to the domestic market in 
exchange for large-scale technology transfers to the foreign firms’ suppliers and joint 
venture partners.  
As a result, China, formerly among the most isolated economies, moved rapidly 
to rejoin the global system of exchange.  Between 1978 and 1993, official data show a 
rise in China’s trade ratio from 9.7 to 31.9 percent.  At the same time, China began to 
absorb large flows of foreign investment. 
Enlivening state enterprises.  Between 1955 and 1978, the number of 
industrial enterprises increased from 125,000 to 348,000, output rose by a factor of 10, 
and employment expanded from 5.9 to 61 million workers.  In 1978, state-owned 
enterprises contributed 77.6 percent of industrial production, with the remainder 
coming from collective firms, most controlled by local governments or state-owned 
firms.75  Most firms, most managers, and many workers had no market-economy 
experience.  Firms carried out instructions.  Pricing, advertising, marketing, selecting the 
product mix, and responding to market developments played no role in day-to-day 
operations.  Observations from 1982 regarding two manufacturers of sewing machines 
illustrate pre-reform circumstances in Chinese state firms.  When a Chinese visitor 
suggested that the work force at a Canton factory was three times the necessary size, 
the manger agreed, but said “if we did not employ them, where would they go?”  At a 
large Shanghai plant, the manager repeatedly insisted that he did not know the unit 
cost of the products coming off his assembly line; his position: “our job is to produce 
sewing machines; costs are the concern of the general company office” (1982 
interviews). 
China’s reformers, dissatisfied with the passivity of firms that were intended to 
lead China’s economy, set out to “enliven” state-owned industry by injecting new 
incentives, flexibility, and technology.76  Neither privatization nor bankruptcy was 
considered.    Instead, managers of state enterprises were granted greater autonomy in 
running their firms.  Funding was shifted from grants to loans from newly established 
state-owned commercial banks.  Hints of a labor market began to appear: retirees and 
                                                      
75 Data in this paragraph are from Nai-ruenn Chen (1967, pp. 182, 475); Industry 2000, p. 21; 
Compendium 2010, p. 40; Yearbook (1991, p. 96).  
76 Accounts of initial reforms affecting state-owned industry include Barry Naughton (1995) and Edward 
Steinfeld (1998). 
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workers with special skills concluded informal moonlighting arrangements with firms 
that could benefit from such services.  Also, a new class of “contract” workers emerged 
without the lifetime job security promised to incumbent workers in state-owned 
enterprises. 
Rather than transferring profits (and losses) to the state, firms were allowed to 
keep a share of their profits, which could be spent on new equipment, bonuses for 
workers and managers, or upgrading workers’ housing.  To supply nascent markets, 
firms were allowed to find their own outlets for production that exceeded annual plan 
quotas, which in China tended to be considerably below actual capacity.  In 1984, a 
new “dual track policy” institutionalized these initiatives, essentially partitioning almost 
all commodity markets into plan and market components.  This horizontal bifurcation 
represents a genuine policy innovation, retaining the tax/subsidy elements implicit in 
plan allocations of inputs and outputs while revealing current information about 
marginal costs to agents throughout the economy.77  
Fiscal decentralization.  China’s early reforms included important fiscal changes.  
The new arrangements replaced the former unified system in which the center had 
controlled tax revenues and then assigned funds and responsibilities to lower 
governmental levels (tongshou-tongzhi).  The new set-up divided revenue sources 
among various levels of government and included an array of multi-year fiscal contracts 
which committed lower levels of government to deliver specified revenue flows to the 
level immediately above them in the official hierarchy (Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, 
and Barry R. Weingast 1996).  Combined with an ongoing trend toward 
decentralization of authority over economic management that began during the era of 
socialist planning, this change gave local governments the incentive, the resources, and 
the policy tools to promote local economic growth with an intensity and determination 
rarely visible in other economies.  However, lower rates of growth and rapidly falling 
profitability in the state sector (Barry Naughton 2008, pp. 107-109), agency problems in 
the collection of central government tax revenue, and a combination of nominal tax 
contracting and inflation contributed to sharp erosion in central government tax 
revenue (Christine Wong and Richard Bird 2008). 
                                                      
77 Under modest assumptions, this regime approaches Paul Samuelson’s vision of a market system with 
initial lump-sum transfers. 
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5.2.2 The role of political change 
China’s initial decade and a half of reform rested on important political changes 
which allowed for and interacted with economic initiatives in ways that facilitated the 
economy’s gradual migration toward market-influenced outcomes.  
With improvements in living standards central to re-establishing political 
legitimacy, China’s ruling Communist party shifted its objectives toward greater 
emphasis on economic growth, particularly at the intensive margin, and away from the 
sort of “ideological correctness” that had turned descendents of landlords, 
businessmen, or non-communist political leaders into pariahs and elevated “red” 
enthusiasm over “expertise” derived from knowledge and experience  
The CCP also reformed its internal structure to emphasize governance based on 
formal procedures rather than, as under MAO Zedong, on the personal inclinations of 
top leaders.  Chenggang Xu (2010, p. 16) refers to the early years of reform as a 
“watershed period in which the CCP began to transform itself from a ‘personality-ruled 
party’” into what Susan Shirk (1993) describes as “a system governed by rules, clear 
lines of authority, and collective decision making institutions.”   The changes included a 
strong effort to establish personnel policies that would install objective criteria rather 
than seniority or personal ties as the chief determinants of appointments and 
promotions.   
Elite recruitment reflected this shift, as both government and party welcomed 
new graduates of China’s universities following the revival of merit-based admissions 
beginning in 1977.  The expansion of elite recruitment gradually encompassed 
entrepreneurs and other former pariahs:  the rehabilitation of RONG Yiren, a Christian-
educated entrepreneur, disgraced during the Cultural Revolution, but then tapped in 
1978 to establish the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), 
“the investment arm of the Chinese state” and eventually appointed to the ceremonial 
post of Vice President of China, epitomized this change (Economist 2005).  
Of particular importance was a new system of performance evaluation for sub-
national officials based on quantitative algorithms that assigned heavy weight to GDP 
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growth in the region under an official’s jurisdiction (Susan H. Whiting 2001). Facilitated 
by China’s M-form hierarchy, implementation of these personnel policies inspired 
tournament-like competition among county magistrates and provincial governors, who 
recognized that accelerated economic growth would bring recognition and promotion, 
and made strenuous efforts to ramp up local economies.78 The impact on official 
behavior has been profound, with reform-era career paths reflecting economic 
outcomes in jurisdictions governed by individual officials  (Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou 
2005).   
The newly evident vertical alignment of incentives spanning the CCP leadership, 
local and regional officials, and ordinary Chinese, most of whom stood to benefit from 
rapid economic growth, helped to reduce the agency costs inherent in any system of 
governance in a nation of China’s size and probably strengthened the capacity of 
China’s government and party leaders to shape the behavior of lower-level officials 
assigned to implement the center’s policy decisions (Barry Naughton 2011).   
Under the PRC’s highly authoritarian political system, policy objectives are defined 
by the Party.  However, the reform period also witnessed the refinement of a system of 
policy experimentation with deep historical roots – both during the pre-1949 experience 
with land reform and other matters in Communist-controlled base areas, and, at 
greater remove, during the imperial era, when local experimentation gave birth to the 
nationally-implemented likin (lijin) tax on domestic trade during the second half of the 
19th century.79  Sebastian Heilmann traces Chinese Communist experimentation, 
particularly in the area of land policy, back to the 1930s, and identifies 
“experimentation under hierarchy . . . the volatile yet productive combination of 
decentralized experimentation with ad hoc central interference, resulting in the selective 
integration of local experiences into national policy-making” as “the key to 
understanding China’s policy process” (2008, p. 29). Under this system, proponents of 
specific policies promote experimental implementation.  Successful trials generate 
information that buttress recommendations for widespread implementation; skeptics 
can review such reports and inspect the trial sites.  If trials fail, costs to the national 
economy are slight.   Of course, the advantages of such experimentation depend on 
                                                      
78 Montinola, Qian and Weingast provide examples of such behavior (1995, p. 74). 
79 On policy experimentation in contemporary China, see Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman 2007 and 
Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry 2011.  On the origins, of likin, see Edwin Beal 1958, chap. 3. 
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sufficient local autonomy to allow trial implementation, critical review of initial results 
(notably absent from 1958 until the early 1970s), and the capacity to ensure 
widespread implementation of successful initiatives (often absent during the imperial 
era).   
 
5.2.3 Assessment of the first decade and a half of reform    
Despite obvious limitations, we can see in retrospect that China’s initial reforms –
economic as well as political – represent a watershed in Chinese economic history. For 
the first time, China’s economy avoided most of the Qing-era institutional constraints as 
well as the most restrictive of the fresh obstacles imposed by the PRC.  With the 
environment of the 1980s and early 1990s still far from ideal, and powerful restraints 
still limiting both domestic markets and global participation, the scale of the response 
to new opportunities, which astonished both domestic and overseas observers, attests 
to the underlying potential of capabilities and behavior patterns inherited from the 
decades and centuries prior to 1949 as well as the scale of human and physical capital 
accumulation under the PRC. 
The greatest success occurred in the rural economy, where the explosive response 
to implementation of the household responsibility system banished the specter of food 
shortages and sparked the largest episode of poverty alleviation in human history 
(Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen 2007; Thomas Rawski 2011b).  China’s rural 
economic revival went far beyond an intensification of effort in response to the 
restoration of individual incentives.  The reform unleashed a torrent of entrepreneurship 
replete with written contracts, formation of supply chains and market networks, 
circumvention of official restrictions, bribery, and profiteering – a veritable census of 
way-stations along the “capitalist road” that an unceasing stream of pronouncements, 
speeches, regulations, documents,  campaigns, and exhortations had denounced, 
restricted and often punished during China’s twenty years of rural collectivization.80   
Similar phenomena appeared in the cities.  Dwight Perkins observed that “when 
China stopped suppressing such activity ... Shops, restaurants and many other service 
                                                      
80 Typical descriptions include Anita Chan, Richard Madsen and Jon Unger (1992, pp. 271-282) and 
Thomas Lyons and Victor Nee (1994). 
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units popped up everywhere … [because] Chinese … had not forgotten to trade or run 
a small business” (1995, p. 231). This sudden reappearance of an extensive 
entrepreneurial repertoire following a lengthy hiatus signals the contribution of human 
capital legacies to China’s recent boom and underlines the persistence of “stock[s] of 
knowledge transmitted from generation to generation” including “practical knowledge, 
or ‘knowing how’ ... [leading to] shared behavioral regularities or shared routines within 
a population” (Chris Mantzavinos, Douglass North and Syed Shariq 2004, p. 77).     
Rapid expansion of international trade and investment eliminated long-standing 
shortages of foreign exchange, began to tap the wealth and expertise of Overseas 
Chinese and of multinational corporations, and introduced a long-absent element of 
economic rationality into investment policies by channeling resources into labor-
intensive export production that matched China’s resource endowment.  
Efforts to upgrade state enterprises were far less successful, and losses mounted 
despite massive direct and indirect subsidies.  Throughout much of the 1980s, China’s 
economy was a halfway house combining elements of old and new.  While the plan 
system, the state sector, and the official allocation of resources – especially labor and 
capital – remained much in evidence, the reform policies of agricultural liberalization, 
domestic market expansion, international opening, and fiscal decentralization 
contributed to growth, to the acquisition of new knowledge, and, especially along 
various margins, to a substantial injection of market forces and pressures into the 
economy.  
Although the reform process spawned episodes of social unrest – the 1989 
Tian’anmen protests in part reflected public anger over inflation and corruption – 
several features acted to limit the social friction arising from the initial reforms.  Most 
importantly, the first fifteen years of reform produced no substantial group of losers – a 
rare outcome in episodes of substantial socio-economic change (Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi 
Qian, and Gerard Roland, 2001).   In general, the early reforms mainly affected resource 
flows: adjustments of stocks in the form of layoffs, bankruptcy, or privatization were 
notably absent.   
Reforms such as the dual-track system, which protected the absolute value of the 
economic rents of the planners, even if they subsequently declined significantly as a 
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percentage of GDP, have been singled out in this regard.   In addition, potential losers 
of reforms often became its strongest advocates and beneficiaries.   Dissolution of 
collective farming undermined the power and perquisites of local rural leaders, but the 
same set of reforms simultaneously endowed them with new opportunities, often as 
entrepreneurs or enterprise managers of new or formerly commune and brigade-run 
enterprises, roles that enabled them to turn political networks into economic assets.  
Similarly, the retreat from planning brought widespread commercialization of 
government agencies (partly in response to the fiscal squeeze described earlier), which 
enabled government officials to turn what began as a reduction in their authority into 
economic gain. 
Equally if not more important, however, was the massive redistribution of 
resources from China’s rapidly growing and dynamic non-state sector, to a sluggish 
state sector.  Wages and employment in the lagging state sector were largely able to 
grow because of ongoing injections of credit through China’s highly repressed and 
state controlled financial system.  Rapidly rising saving rates and few alternatives for 
these savings—a product of financial repression—meant that much of the increase in 
savings ended up in China’s state-run banks, which in turn recycled them to state-
linked firms and institutions. Estimates put these flows in upwards of 10% of GDP by 
the late 1980s/early 1990s (Loren Brandt and Xiaodong Zhu, 2000). These flows helped 
to ensure that the gains from rapid growth were more equitably shared than otherwise 
would have been the case. 
 
5.2.4 Political and economic change since the mid-1990s 
 Despite fifteen years of GDP growth averaging eight percent per annum, China 
reached a critical crossroads in the early 1990s.  Growth had become highly cyclical, 
with successive periods of liberalization and reform accompanied by high growth but 
also higher rates of inflation.  Soft budget constraints in the state sector saddled the 
state-owned banks with portfolios dominated by non-performing loans.  Finally, central 
government fiscal revenue had fallen to twenty percent of total fiscal revenue, and only 
3 percent of GDP.  In various ways, these problems can be linked to one central issue: 
persistent costs associated with China’s bloated, plodding, and often inefficient state-
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owned enterprises that manifest themselves in the form of excessive state-sector 
employment, weak management, lax labor and financial discipline, rising losses, and 
overdue debts. 
In the mid-1990s, China’s policy-makers attacked these difficulties with a 
remarkable sequence of policy changes following the Chinese Communist Party’s 
November 1993 decision to adopt the long-term objective of building a “socialist 
market economy” that were designed to limit government’s role to macroeconomic 
control; prudential regulation of such matters as competition, social safety nets, health 
and environment; and strategic planning, with other choices to reflect the outcome of 
market processes.81  The ensuing policy resulted in a sweeping overhaul of the fiscal 
system that sharply increased the center’s fiscal strength (Wong and Bird 2008). 
Reorganization of the financial system that tightened central control, 
strengthened the authority of the People’s Bank of China (China’s central bank), 
removed non-performing loans from the balance sheets and recapitalized state-owned 
banks, increased the commercial orientation of bank operations, and reduced the 
power of provincial and local officials to influence lending decisions (Franklin Allen, Jun 
Qian, and Meijun Qian 2008; Gang Yi 2010). 
Comprehensive restructuring of the enterprise sector, including the furloughing 
and eventual dismissal of over 50 million redundant employees, most in the state sector, 
substantial privatization of both state and collective enterprises, along with further 
reforms – including virtual elimination of planned allocation of materials – that sharply 
increased the market orientation of the remaining government-linked firms.82 
Broad embrace of globalization that transformed China into a major participant in 
global flows of commodities, capital, and technology (Lee Branstetter and Nicholas R. 
Lardy 2008).  To this end, China reduced tariffs and other trade barriers in advance of 
its 2001 entry into the World Trade organization, established numerous economic 
zones and industrial parks to serve the needs of overseas investors, loosened restrictions 
on overseas travel and study for its own citizens, encouraged Chinese firms to invest 
                                                      
81 The text of this decision is available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1993/gwyb199328.pdf, pp. 
1286-1303 (Chinese version) and China Daily, Supplement, November 17, 1993 (English translation).  
Yingyi Qian and Jinglian Wu explain the background and impact of this document (2003, pp. 35-42). 
82 On labor issues, see Thomas Rawski 2006 and Fang Cai 2010.  On state enterprise reform, see Carsten 
A. Holz 2003; Ross Garnaut et al 2005; Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima and Dwight H. Perkins 2006. 
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overseas, and allowed legal, tax, and regulatory changes initially restricted to special 
economic zones and coastal regions to apply throughout the domestic economy. 
Major efforts to expand the market orientation of China’s economy, including 
extensive privatization and deregulation of domestic trade and transportation, general 
withdrawal of official involvement in pricing and allocation of labor and most 
commodities, and a rapid increase in the share of private businesses in output and 
especially employment, backed by new constitutional and legal provisions affirming the 
legitimacy of private ownership and the state’s responsibility to protect private (along 
with state and collective) property.   
These reform efforts were far more systematic than during the early years of 
reform.  They were also far more aggressive, in that reform proponents advocated and 
implemented measures that imposed substantial costs on large and potentially powerful 
groups, including urban state sector workers formerly lionized as the “vanguard of the 
proletariat” and state enterprises inundated with competition from imports following 
steep reductions in trade barriers.  They were also not fore-ordained. 
What critical factors allowed these new reforms to go forward?  Interpretations 
differ, but several are prominent. First, the successes of reform, starting with 
developments in the rural sector, persuaded growing numbers of policy-makers to 
move beyond the 1980s slogan of “planned economy as the mainstream, with market 
allocation as a supplement” (jihuajingji wei zhu, shichang tiaojie wei fu).  Despite the 
dismissal of reformist Premier ZHAO Ziyang and the partial rollback of reform initiatives 
following the June 1989 suppression of mass protests in Beijing and other cities, the 
momentum of reform thinking enabled the 1993 decision to move toward a “socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics.”  The accompanying explanations 
pointed to a market outcome as the long-term goal.  Thereafter, “the functions of the 
government in economic management gradually began to be confined to the spheres 
of macro-control, market supervision, social security, environmental protection, and 
management of state-owned assets” (HU Angang 2010, p. 169).  Beyond these 
boundaries, allocation decisions were, in principle, to move toward market outcomes. 
In this process, Yingyi Qian (2000) has emphasized the accumulation of 
experience among China’s leaders, who absorbed the lessons of China’s initial decade 
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of reform, studied international experience within and beyond the European transition 
economies and former constituents of the Soviet Union, and used the resulting 
knowledge to inform the evolution of Chinese policy.  In this regard, rapid improvement 
in the quality and penetration of official and academic economic research, bolstered by 
the arrival of graduates trained at leading institutions throughout the developed world, 
may have convinced growing numbers of policy-makers that strong measures were 
needed to address long-standing problems such as the costly conflict between 
decentralization and supporting a large and diverse population of state-owned 
enterprises.  
While recognizing the importance of this learning process, it is unlikely that this 
expanded reform effort could have unfolded without important political changes.  Barry 
Naughton (2008) emphasizes the effect of personnel changes among China’s top 
leadership.  During the 1980s and early 1990s, party elders and retired officials retained 
the capacity to block or veto measures that threatened interest groups – for example, 
workers in state-owned firms – with whom they were associated.  Beginning in the 
mid-1990s, the death and decline of these “veto players” empowered JIANG Zemin, 
ZHU Rongji and their successors to undertake decisive, far-reaching moves that were 
formerly beyond the reach even of China’s highest officials. 
Several additional political factors may have reinforced this trend. First, 
educational disruption during the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-1976) provided 
reformers with an acceptable rationale for discarding seniority-based promotion in favor 
of emphasizing personnel “quality” (suzhi), for which the metric is university or post-
graduate training.  The result - leapfrogging a generation of potential leaders whose 
main qualification was loyalty to the Communist Party and to MAO Zedong – surely 
accelerated the pace of market-oriented reform.  Strong emphasis on educational 
attainment in recruiting for official positions and Party membership may have reduced 
the commitment of policy elites to planning and state ownership.83  Second, migration 
of policy-makers and administrators from dynamic coastal jurisdictions to interior 
regions eager to replicate the economic gains of places like Shenzhen and Shanghai 
may have homogenized views within the policy community.  And third, promotion of 
                                                      
83 Emphasis on educational credentials has created a strong demand for both full- and part-time training 
programs, as well as a lively market for forged credentials. 
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some of the same individuals to even higher positions of authority in both the CCP and 
government helped to further reinforce these trends.  
 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 China’s Economic Achievement 
In 1800, China was the world’s largest national economy.  Over the next 175 
years, China’s relative position suffered a long decline.  During the 1960s and 1970s, 
most Chinese had inadequate diets and no savings.  Three decades of reform has 
produced a genuine leap forward in the size of China’s economy and the prosperity of 
its citizens.  China’s recent boom has reshaped China’s economic structure, sharply 
lowering the importance of agriculture in production and especially employment, 
raising the share of industry and, more recently, of services, and beginning a protracted 
process of urbanization.  Chinese producers and consumers are increasingly engaged 
with sophisticated technologies like smart phones, high-speed trains, and space 
exploration. Formerly state-controlled and internationally isolated, China’s economy 
now reflects the deep and expanding influence of domestic and global market forces.   
 
6.2 Linking China’s Economy with the Past: Continuities and Departures 
China’s enormous growth spurt has stimulated efforts to define a “Chinese 
model” of growth or to establish a “Beijing consensus” of development-enhancing 
policies (e.g. S. Philip Hsu, Yu-Shan Wang and Suisheng Zhao, 2011).  This assumes that 
China’s economic, political, and social circumstances are sufficiently close to conditions 
prevailing in other low-income nations to expect that application of Chinese economic 
policies may produce something akin to the favorable outcomes that China’s system 
has delivered over the past several decades.  Such assumptions seem unwarranted 
because of the deep historical roots surrounding important features of China’s current 
institutional structure and the central role of China’s unusual legacy of human capital in 
powering China’s recent economic surge. 
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We attribute China’s recent economic success to a combination of beneficial 
historic legacies, recent accumulations of capital, skill, and policy expertise, and 
important economic and political changes that facilitated the realization of old and new 
potentials.  Despite the success of China’s imperial system in absorbing vast population 
increases, the administrative, organizational, and entrepreneurial skills, commercial and 
transport networks and other developmentally-promising resources visible in the Qing 
economy proved incapable of generating a rapid and effective response to new 
opportunities arising from the British industrial revolution.   If historic accumulation of 
resources and capabilities deserves recognition as an important contributor to China’s 
recent growth, why does China’s boom begin only in the late 1970s?    
To understand the long delay in China’s response to the new landscape of 
modern economic growth that unfolded during the 19th and 20th centuries, we propose 
to focus on institutional constraints.  We view the trajectory of China’s 20th century 
economy as a gradual and as yet incomplete process of rolling back old and new 
institutional barriers standing in the way of prosperity and growth.  We begin by 
comparing the Qing imperial regime with the reform-era People’s Republic, first noting 
major similarities, and then highlighting key institutional differences between the past 
and present Chinese systems.  
 
6.2.2 Major institutional continuities 
Our review reveals substantial areas of institutional continuity linking China’s past 
and present. 
Authoritarian system.  Major elements of institutional continuity begin with 
China’s authoritarian political system.  In the People’s Republic, as under Qing rule, self-
perpetuating elites exercise supreme authority with no formal checks and balances.  
Although the Qing memorial system and the Communist Party’s practice of democratic 
centralism provide avenues for lower ranking individuals to influence policy outcomes, 
decisions emanating from the throne or politburo are final.  Despite the growing 
influence of international norms and practices over the structure and operation of 
China’s legal codes system, the tradition of strong official control over the 
administration of law and justice remains intact.  Today, as in the past, political leaders 
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are free to decide matters that, in other societies, might be determined by legal codes 
or judicial verdicts.  
Personnel, agency and central-local tensions.  To implement central policies, 
both the Qing and the People’s Republic rely on centrally-managed, merit-based 
personnel systems.  The Confucian approach emphasizing “rule of (properly trained, 
selected and motivated) men” rather than “rule of law” prevails.  Both systems rely on 
a combination of ideology and oversight to limit the inevitable agency costs associated 
with granting substantial autonomy to lower-level officials, whose career prospects 
depend more on outcomes than on adherence to carefully prescribed procedures.   
Monitoring is only imperfect however, and we observe similar agency problems 
today as in the Qing. Both regimes, for example, implement vigorous measures to curb 
what the center views as corrupt diversion of tax payments intended for the central 
treasury.  The reform efforts of the Qing Yongzheng emperor (r. 1678-1735) failed to 
dent “informal networks of local power and influence” or to eliminate “the tax evasion 
and tax farming that [had] decreased the level of remittances” to the central treasury 
(Madeleine Zelin 1984, p. 307).  These tensions persist: Vivienne Shue observes that 
rural administration in the PRC both before and after the start of reform “perpetuated 
the contained but unrelenting central-local struggle characteristic of imperial politics” 
(1988, p. 114).  And today, local governments continue to resist Beijing’s efforts to limit 
the scale of taxation and fee collection.  When the center eliminated taxation on 
farmers by village and township-level governments,  local leaders turned the power of 
eminent domain into a new source of revenue by commandeering farmland with 
nominal compensation to the occupants and then reselling it for business use at much 
higher prices.   
Economic decentralization.  Both Qing and the People’s Republic combine 
centralization of political authority with relatively decentralized economies.  The Qing 
economy was essentially a market system with private ownership.  During the pre-
reform decades under the People’s Republic, China’s planned economy, though 
patterned after the Soviet example, was far less centralized than the USSR’s, with 
provincial and local governments controlling a substantial fraction of state-owned 
enterprises and managing substantial resource flows.  Reforms have only increased 
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these decentralizing tendencies, albeit within the context of a largely market economy 
in which upwards of two-thirds of ownership is private.  
Education, human capital and entrepreneurship.  The historical legacy of a 
national civil-service examination designed to support the administrative tools of 
imperial rule helped to make pursuit of education a hallmark of Chinese society 
throughout the past millennium.  It also promoted remarkable cultural and ethnic 
homogeneity in a nation of China’s size.  While PRC emphasis on mass education has 
delivered notable improvements in school attendance and other dimensions of human 
development, stocks of human capital accumulated long before 1949 contributed 
massively to China’s recent economic gains.  Reflecting long-standing cultural values, 
three decades of negative financial returns for graduates,84 school closures and 
suspension of merit-based admissions during the Cultural Revolution (roughly 1966-
1975), and persecution of intellectuals did not deter millions of Chinese families from 
emphasizing learning and study.  Restoration of university entrance examinations in 
1977 attracted swarms of self-taught candidates.   
The legacy of human capital extends beyond reverence for education.  The room 
allowed for small private plots and rural markets under collective agriculture helped to 
ensure that commercial instincts in the Chinese countryside were not totally 
extinguished, and contributed to the boom under HRS when small-holding agriculture 
once again dominated the countryside.  Rapid expansion of production, employment, 
and exports in millions of “township and village enterprises” relied on China’s deep 
reserves of rural management capability, highlighting what Tim Wright has termed 
China’s historic “abundance of small-time entrepreneurs” (1984, p. 325).     
Alignment of Incentives.  The Qing achieved considerable success in aligning 
incentives among the throne, the bureaucracy, the gentry, and the common people – 
all of whom sought prosperity and stability.  The plan era, during which the state called 
on ordinary Chinese to suppress their desire for better living standards for the sake of 
“building socialism,” emerges as a historical anomaly.  Following the death of MAO 
                                                      
84 According to HOU Fengyun, “large-scale wage reductions for high-level mental workers” occurred in 
1957, 1959, and 1961, and “mental workers. . . were mostly excluded” from wage increases in 1959, 
1961, 1963 and 1971.  Hou describes 1976-1990 as an era of “no payoff to education.”  Apparently 
referring to the late 1980s, Hou notes that average monthly pay in universities was RMB57 less than in 
the food and drink sector (1999, pp. 181-185). 
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Zedong, reform policies restored the traditional unity of objectives, with leaders, officials, 
and populace all pursuing economic growth.   
Experimentation.  Chinese governments consistently preface major policy 
initiatives with local experiments, which form “an essential part of the central decision-
making process” in China today (Chenggang Xu 2010, p. 31).  Experimentation 
continues: in October 2011, four sub-national governments were authorized to issue 
provincial or municipal bonds85  
 
6.2.2 Key institutional departures under the PRC 
Vision/objectives.  Like many of their British contemporaries (Deirdre McCloskey 
2010, chap. 10), China’s Qing emperors failed to recognize the enormous potential 
returns associated with the Industrial Revolution.  But even if the Qing had grasped the 
long-term prospects arising from steam engines, railways, and other new technologies, 
concerns that such forces would take on a life of their own and disrupt the delicate 
balance of power and alignment of interests that supported their continued rulership 
would probably have discouraged them from vigorous pursuit of new economic 
opportunities.  
Reform leader DENG Xiaoping’s famous observations that “to get rich is glorious” 
and “it does not matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice” mark the 
completion of century-long process that established economic opening and expansion 
as key elements in the objective function of China’s top leaders, who now see 
“economic growth as a life and death matter for the regime” (Chenggang Xu 2010, p. 
13). Indeed, the capacity to deliver economic growth and high living standards 
constitutes a key source of legitimacy for Communist rule in the reform era.  The roots 
of this ideology, which emphasizes economic development to improve citizens’ life 
chances and to enhance China’s capacity to thrive in a competitive world, originate 
with the weak Qing response to 19th-century imperialist pressures.   
Elite recruitment and absorption of newly emerging interests.  During the 
Ming-Qing era, elite status derived from examination success, which required 
                                                      
85 (http://english.caijing.com.cn/2011‐10‐25/110916003.html). 
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candidates and their families to undertake massive educational investments.  Qing 
gentry resisted efforts to open the door to newcomers whose non-traditional mobility 
paths threatened to devalue traditional Confucian education (Carl Mosk 2010).  They 
did so with good reason as the abolition of the traditional examination system (1905) 
and the collapse of the Qing dynasty (1911) produced a rapid decline in the financial 
payoff to Confucian learning: by the late 1920s, the returns to “modern” education 
had far surpassed the financial benefit from Confucian learning among employees of 
the Tianjin-Pukou railway (Noam Yuchtman, 2010). 
Following the MAO years, which enforced even stricter ideological limits on its 
political elites and actively persecuted excluded groups, the reform-era PRC has 
broadened elite recruitment to include two major channels – education and wealth.  
The new combination of large, widely-shared economic gains and CCP reform enabling 
wholesale absorption of potential regime opponents into elite ranks has tilted policy-
making in economically beneficial directions, while assisting official efforts to 
marginalize dissident groups.  
State capacity.  Building on experience accumulated in the administration of 
isolated rural areas during China’s protracted civil war and in the civil war itself, the PRC 
demonstrated unprecedented capacity to formulate, implement, and monitor 
nationwide policy initiatives that, for the first time in Chinese history, penetrated directly 
to the village level.  Campaigns to expand attendance in school, reduce infant mortality, 
attack “rightists” and force villagers into collectives demonstrated the reach of these 
new administrative structures. With the right policies, often learned through the local 
experimentation described above, and incentives, these structures enabled a scaling up 
of efforts that were essential to delivering economic growth.       
Globalization.  Foreign military power compelled the partial opening of China’s 
19th-century economy.  The Qing government sought to limit the scope of foreign 
activity; individual foreigners, as well as their products and technologies, faced powerful 
informal opposition by local gentry.  China’s initial reform policies resembled those of 
their Qing predecessors, confining foreign commerce to a few localities.  But over time, 
Chinese reform deepened, leading to the gradual dismantling of the fundamental 
institutional structure of the planned economy. The prolonged era of peace and order 
in the last few decades – a sharp contrast China’s Republican era during the first half of 
97 
 
the 20th century marked by two world wars and Japanese aggression – provided time 
and space for gradual reform.  The peaceful and prosperous rise of Japan and East 
Asian tigers offered powerful models of export-oriented economies.  As a result, several 
decades of gradual reform have moved China from extreme isolation to the opposite 
extreme, achieving trade ratios that dwarf those of other major economies,86 absorbing 
large flows of foreign investment, and, most recently, emerging as a substantial 
originator of outbound foreign direct investment.87  
 
6.3 Unfinished business, uncertain prospects 
This essay offers a comprehensive re-evaluation of the historical origin of China’s 
economic transformation.  Our objective is to provide a single analytic framework that 
can explain China’s long-delayed response to the threats and opportunities arising from 
the British industrial revolution as well as the unprecedented speed and scale of the 
growth spurt that began in the late 1970s and continues today.  Our analysis highlights 
ideology and institutions as crucial obstacles that constrained China’s economy 
throughout the 19th century and into the early decades of the 20th century.  We 
emphasize gradual changes in ideology and institutions that relaxed key constraints and 
thereby contributed to modest economic gains during the decades prior to World War II, 
and then supported the more robust economic advance under the planned economy 
regime from 1949 to the late 1970s.  We attribute the genesis of China’s current boom 
to the simultaneous erosion of both Qing-era constraints and new obstacles imposed 
under the PRC’s planned economy.  
Widespread agreement about both the strengths and weaknesses of the present 
system conceals divergent expectations about China’s economic prospects.  Assuming 
domestic political stability and continued access to overseas markets, Perkins and 
Rawski (2008) anticipate that China can maintain real annual growth in the 6-8 percent 
range to 2025.  Others question the assumption of political stability.  Citing evidence of 
                                                      
86 Official data for 2007-2010 show annual trade ratios of 62.7, 57.3, 44.2, and 50.3 percent  (Yearbook 
2010, pp. 38, 229; information for 2010 from China Data Online). 
 
87 In 2009, China’s outbound overseas direct investment reached $59 billion (world rank #5 in 2008), 
while its incoming FDI (world rank #2, following the United States) amounted to $105.7 billion; see 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-03/23/content_12213110.htm, accessed April 12, 2011. 
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corruption, predation, and rent seeking, Minxin Pei argues “the economic costs of 
ensuring the CCP’s political monopoly … though hidden, are real, substantial, and 
growing …” leading to “a set of self-destructive dynamics” that endanger China’s 
“most vital political institutions” (2006, p. 206). 
Pei’s concerns point to long-standing institutional constraints that the PRC has 
not addressed.  The fundamental issue is the absence of checks and balances on 
China’s rulers.  Neither the Qing emperors nor their contemporary successors face any 
form of external accountability that, in other systems, might come from legislatures, 
courts, or elections.  During the Qing era, we argue that the logic of unconstrained 
power led to incomplete property rights.  This, in turn, promoted networks of 
patronage in which property owners sought protection by forming alliances with 
politically powerful individuals and groups, who provided shelter in exchange for 
cooperation and financial benefits. 
While the abuses cited by Pei and others partly reflect what Andrei Schleifer and 
Robert Vishny (1998) call the “grabbing hand,” there is a larger pattern of systematic 
effort that acts to secure and redistribute resources in order to preserve and increase 
cohesion within the ruling groups, its associates and its supporters.  In China, the 
institutional structures surrounding the financing, approval, and execution of 
investment represents the chief vehicle for such activity.   
Access to investment opportunities, credit, and land are routinely used to buttress 
the current regime and its allies.  Official approval (pizhun), an essential step in business 
formation and expansion, may be reserved for well-connected insiders, especially in 
sectors promising high profits.  China’s state-owned banks specialize in lending to 
favored clients, particularly state-owned enterprises, at below-market rates and with 
lenient repayment provisions.  Allocation of land is similarly tilted in favor of official 
associates and clients. 
Although this system is not without advantages – as when China’s government, 
by ordering state-owned banks to dispense massive loans, achieved the V-shaped 
recovery that has eluded the U.S. economy following the 2008 financial crisis, the cost 
of such arrangements, although difficult to specify, is surely high.  India’s economy, 
which is no paragon of efficiency, approaches China’s overall growth rates despite 
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investing a considerably smaller fraction of GDP.  Pouring cheap credit into the state 
sector increases financial risk, fuels outsized seasonal fluctuations, elevates capital 
intensity, contributes to sluggish job creation, and aggravates long-standing 
unemployment problems (Thomas Rawski 2002).  As in imperial times, the patronage 
economy is much in evidence: relatives and associates of top leaders can readily parlay 
their personal connections into prominent and lucrative positions in the business world; 
private entrepreneurs must arrange informal security umbrellas to deflect arbitrary 
disruption of business operations.88   
Thus far, the momentum of China’s long boom, now well into its fourth decade, 
has pushed aside these costs and other seemingly daunting obstacles.89  External events, 
especially the advance of globalization, with the attendant expansion of overseas 
markets, international supply chains and transnational flows of capital and technology, 
have provided enormous benefits.  Most important, perhaps, is the robust development 
of China’s non-state economy, which has provided sufficient resources to sustain rapid 
growth despite the drain associated with the distortions, graft, and rent-seeking that 
bedevil the public sector.      
Once again, costs and pressures may be on the rise within China’s political 
economy.  There are signs of decreasing government effectiveness.  Economic 
rebalancing and management of corruption represent areas where the state has failed 
to attain its own widely advertised objectives.  The lack of independence in the legal 
system adds to the widespread sense of social injustice resulting from corruption and 
inequality.  
Although Beijing has vowed to lessen the economy’s dependence on exports and 
investment since the late 1990s, the GDP share of fixed investment, already at levels 
that no other economy has matched, continues to rise, in part because China’s 
distorted financial system contributes to high personal and business savings, which in 
turn facilitate further growth of investment.    
                                                      
88 A typical description notes that “the price that private entrepreneurs had to pay to ensure political 
protection was in the form of de facto extortion on the part of cadres“ (Kellee Tsai 2002, p. 128). 
89 The costs have also been lightened by China’s exceptional high savings, which is nearly half of GDP, 
and the exceptionally high productivity outside the state sector. 
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Repeated announcements of anti-corruption drives have produced no visible 
results: China’s score in Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index is the 
same in 2010 as in 2001, as is its relative position: better than India or Russia, worse 
than Turkey or Brazil. 
In both instances, policy failure may arise from a clash between publicly stated 
objectives and the inner workings of China’s patronage economy.  Recent infrastructure 
failures, including the July 2011 collision involving two of China’s vaunted high-speed 
trains, highlight the system costs associated with sectors that combine massive 
investment with large-scale corruption. 
Equally striking is growing evidence of rising pressure affecting highly successful 
participants in China’s patronage economy, many of whom are now considering 
overseas migration.  “You can feel the anxiety of the ultra-wealthy and even of the 
political elite.  They feel there’s no security for their wealth or possessions, and that 
their assets could be taken away at any time.  Nobody feels protected against the 
system anymore”90 
These observations raise two sets of questions: 
Can the current institutional structure support continued rapid growth in the face 
of growing pressures as demographic change and rebalancing efforts lower household 
savings rates?  As China’s rising wages erode long-standing comparative advantage in a 
growing range of labor-intensive industries?  With continuing wage pressures as 
formerly “unlimited” supplies of migrant labor begin to dwindle?  As China’s 
technological advances put an end to easy gains from absorbing imported equipment 
and manufacturing processes?  As limited enforcement of intellectual property rights 
inflicts growing damage on innovative Chinese producers? If recession and 
protectionism slow the growth of world trade?  
If continued growth requires another episode of major reform, is China’s current 
political equilibrium sufficiently flexible to withstand large-scale dissolution of rents that 
might accompany a steep reduction in the share of credit reserved for government 
                                                      
90 Jamil Anderlini and Patti Waldmeir 2011, quoting an informant whom they describe as a “publishing 
and fashion mogul.” 
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projects and state-owned enterprises?  Or a no-holds-barred effort to root out 
corruption such as Hong Kong accomplished during the 1970s (Melanie Manion 2004)?   
Such concerns are not new.  Writing the mid-1990s, two prominent China 
specialists expressed grave doubts about the system’s viability.  Barry Naughton wrote 
that 
The political system is simply not adequate to cope with the challenges that 
confront it.  The dysfunctional political system might prevent the Chinese people from 
quickly building the kind of future system they would prefer; it might even jeopardize 
the achievements of recent decades (1995, p. 310). 
Nicholas Lardy concluded his 1998 study by emphasizing the long-run importance 
of 
“restructuring the banking system … [even though this] will require the state and 
the party to surrender a great deal of economic and political power … [in order to 
avoid] a lower pace of economic growth, a declining rate of job creation, and thus an 
even greater challenge to political stability.”(pp. 221-222). 
The ensuing 15 years of continued economic advance even in the face of two 
major global shocks demonstrate the risk of predicting the trajectory of China’s 
complex political economy. 
Careful historical study must figure prominently in serious efforts to grapple with 
these and many other questions surrounding the political economy of contemporary 
China.  This review reveals powerful complementarities between efforts to fathom the 
structures and mechanisms undergirding China’s recent economic advance and studies 
that aim to expand our understanding of China’s imperial economy.  Our survey 
demonstrates the insights that historical study can bring to the analysis of contemporary 
affairs.  Several years of struggling to comprehend an immense body of historical 
scholarship has reinforced our conviction that contemporary developments can also 
provide fresh perspectives for addressing the vast and rapidly expanding storehouse of 
materials on the history of what once was and soon will become the world’s largest 
national economy.  
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Appendix: Which Data Can Illuminate China’s Historical Macroeconomy? 
Historical studies of the Chinese economy rest on data that have long been the 
bread and butter of economic historians. These include population records; information 
on cultivated area and crop yields; commodity prices, especially for grain, along with 
the exchange rate between silver and copper cash, the key elements of China’s 
monetary system; factor prices - wages, land rents and interest rates; material on 
domestic and international trade flows; as well as fiscal records, including information 
on the operation of official mints as well as budgetary data for the Imperial household.   
Some of these data survive as by-products of a bureaucratic state that relied on 
written documents to collect information, study problems, and then to debate, codify 
and disseminate its policies.  The Chinese state initiated semi-regular efforts to survey 
population and cultivated land, factors that directly affected fiscal revenue and domestic 
security.  During much of the Qing era (1644-1911), county officials tabulated and 
reported monthly grain price data, which the state used to monitor local food 
availability and plan famine relief efforts.  Beginning in the 1860s, the British-led 
Imperial Maritime Customs maintained detailed and increasingly comprehensive 
accounts of China’s international commodity trade, including flows of precious metals, 
as well as partial information on domestic trade flows.  Before that, import and export 
records from China’s trading partners provide substantial information.   
Along with these “official” records, historians rely on local gazetteers (difangzhi).   
These local histories were usually compiled at the county (xian) level by local elites, often 
under the sponsorship of local officials.  Endymion Wilkinson reports that over 900 
Ming and 5,600 Qing gazetteers survive in current library collections.  He also 
summarizes their contents, which include maps, information on the local economy and 
population, fiscal affairs, water conservancy and public works, important historical 
events (including man-made and natural disasters), as well as commentary on local 
customs and prominent dignitaries and officials survive(1998, pp. 154, 156).  As a 
legacy of the relatively high degree of literacy in Imperial times (E. Rawski, 1979), more 
scattered data exist in the form of contracts, records of legal proceedings, household 
and business account books, family genealogies, and agricultural and commercial 
manuals.   
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We can distinguish two modes of studying macroeconomic issues.  Dwight 
Perkins’ (1969) influential work on agriculture illustrates a cautious approach that 
combines available data with qualitative information to reach judgments about the 
existence and scale of broad trends.  Other studies in this mode accumulate information 
of the sort described above to establish important features of Chinese economic life, for 
example the rural economy of North China (Ramon Myers 1970), Qing land taxation 
(Yeh-chien Wang 1973), the impact of late Qing and Republican railway expansion on 
Chinese agriculture (Ernest Liang 1982), or long-term efforts to combat famine in North 
China (Lillian Li 2007).   
There is also a more ambitious mode in which researchers use local, sectoral, or 
microeconomic data as a platform to construct broad analytic frameworks or to inform 
sweeping generalizations about economic structures or national trends.  G. William 
Skinner’s work on marketing systems and macroregions (1964, 1977ab), work by 
Brandt (1989) and T. Rawski (1989) on economic growth in Republican China, 
demographic studies by James Lee, Cameron Campbell and Feng Wang (1997, 2002), 
Kenneth Pomeranz’ comparison of Qing living standards with pre-industrial Europe 
(2000), and LI Bozhong’s (2010) construction of income accounts for the Huating-Lou 
region of Jiangsu province during the 1820s, typify this approach.  The limited scope 
and accuracy of the underlying data sources expose these and other attempts at 
systematic quantification to the risk of overconfident generalization.   
The following case studies of demography, agriculture, and national income 
illustrate the characteristics and limitations of available sources. 
Demographic Data.  China’s demographic history is integral to any narrative of 
China’s long-term economic evolution.  There are three crucial dimensions:  the size of 
China’s population at any given date; its rate of growth; and the underlying 
demographic regime, typically described in terms of total marital fertility, mortality, and 
nuptiality.  Estimates of the size and growth of China’s population depend heavily on 
censuses conducted by each dynasty/regime; unfortunately, these efforts display widely 
varying reliability both within and across regimes.   
Demographic information illuminates the impact of Malthus’ positive and 
preventative (i.e. voluntary) checks on population growth, which may critically influence 
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cross-country differences in economic outcomes.  Indeed, scholars have suggested that 
the origins of Europe’s demographic transition, individualism, and 19th century 
capitalism are intertwined and embedded in a family and demographic culture that 
encouraged revolutionary social and political change (James Lee and Feng Wang 1999).  
Recent growth literature linking changing demographic behavior (primarily fertility) and 
investment in human capital seeks to formalize some of these connections.  
Although Song specialists refer to a population total of 100 million (Patricia Ebrey 
1996, p. 141),91 careful empirical study of China’s historical demography begins with 
the work of Ping-ti Ho (1959), who examined the institutional dimensions of census-
taking during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties.  The 1953 
population census, the first conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and 
probably the most accurate to that point, provides an important milepost that helps to 
triangulate earlier estimates.  Table A-1 summarizes official data and prominent 
independent estimates of China’s total population from early Ming to the present. 
Scepticism about both Ming and Qing census figures reflects concerns arising 
from the census system’s reliance on self-reporting, the incentive for misreporting 
inherent in the use of population (and land) registers to assign tax obligations; and the 
incompleteness of reporting systems, particularly in regions populated by ethnic 
minorities.  A Ming ditty captures some of these sentiments:92 
 
Barren soil along the river, the harvest not yet ready 
New taxes are announced, and yet another levy, 
Every household subdivides, trying to evade them— 
And officials mistake the whole thing for a growth in population! 
 
                                                      
91 Song demographic figures suffer from the difficulties noted above; furthermore, available documents 
refer only to numbers of households, and “no secure multiplier is available by which to arrive at the 
actual population” (E.L. Jones 1988, p. 77).  “The strange convention used in [Song era] finance of 
lumping together bushels of grain, lengths of silk, strings of cash, and ounces of silver to give one 
number” raises further questions about the value of quantitative information contained in Song 
documents (Jing-shen Tao 2009, p. 698). 
92 Lanyang xianzhi [Lanyang county gazetteer, 1545], with thanks to Timothy Brook. 
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Catastrophic loss of life in times of dynastic succession or rebellion further 
complicates the usual measurement problems.   These are only magnified at the 
regional level, especially during periods of extensive internal migration.   
Ping-ti Ho makes a case for the comprehensiveness and broad accuracy of the 
early Ming population registration (circa 1400), but finds the remaining estimates for 
the Ming untenable.  In his view, it is not until the mid-Qing, (ca. 1775), and then only 
until the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864), that we can place substantial confidence in the 
official reporting system (1959, p. 270) and the population totals that it generated.  
Coming between the relatively firm totals for 1400 and 1775, the invasion from China’s 
northeast (Manchuria) that ousted the Ming and established Qing rule (ca. 1644) 
resulted in significant, but unquantifiable population loss that could have amounted to 
many millions.  
Typical of the problems encountered is an official registered population for mid-
Ming (circa 1500) nearly the same as that for early Ming despite qualitative indications 
of significant demographic growth.  Timothy Brook captures the general sentiment 
regarding late Ming figures: “Determining how many people were actually alive during 
the late Ming involves calculations with absurd margins of error. The official census 
records were hopelessly out of touch with demographic reality” (1999, pg 162).  Mid-
Qing figures present similar difficulties: official records show impossibly large increases 
of one-third between 1760 and 1775 and one-half between 1760 and 1790, possibly 
because the Qianlong emperor demanded that officials “ascertain the true population 
of the empire” after a 1775 regional crop failure exposed the failings of previous tallies 
(Ho 1959, pp. 47, 281).   
Problems multiply at the regional level.  G. William Skinner (1987) reconstructed 
the arbitrary adjustments that provincial officials used to update early 19th century 
population reports in Sichuan province, raising concerns about other estimates for 
China’s mid-19th century.  Skinner’s revisions, (along with earlier work by Dwight 
Perkins (1969), suggest a population total on the eve of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-
1864) of no more than 390 million, or at least 40 million lower than the official 
estimates.  This revision has important implications not only for our view of 18th and 19th 
106 
 
century population growth, but also for early 20th century demography in light of losses 
from the Taiping Rebellion that earlier estimates placed in excess of 60 million.93 
Population estimates for the three Lower Yangzi provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
and Anhui further illustrate the difficulties surrounding regional demographic data.  The 
official 1851 figure for the combined population of these provinces is somewhat larger 
than the figure of 100.6 million recorded the 1953 census (Nai-ruenn Chen 1967, p. 
132, including Shanghai municipality in the 1963 total).    While the Lower Yangzi 
provinces suffered grievously during the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), it is difficult to 
imagine that natural population growth and in-migration driven initially by the 
availability of prime farmland and subsequently by the region’s early 20th-century 
economic dynamism failed to push the 1953 population above the actual level for 1850, 
which in all likelihood was considerably smaller than the officially recorded total.94     
Recent studies have extended the scope of demographic research by using 
genealogies and other records to create reconstituted family histories (Ted Telford 1990, 
Stevan Harrell 1995, James Lee and Cameron Campbell 1997, Lee and Feng Wang 
1999, Ts’ui-jung Liu 2001, Tommy Bengtsson 2004).  These micro-data complement 
information from official censuses, and support efforts to reconstruct key vital rates.  
They also raise the question of whether the new data samples are representative of the 
larger demographic aggregate.   
The two most important sources of micro-demographic data are for the Qing 
imperial family and for Banner households95 residing in sparsely populated Liaoning.  
Both groups are dominated by ethnic minorities whose demographic behavior might 
differ from that of the majority Han population;96 Liaoning’s abnormally high land/labor 
ratio could also have influenced demographic outcomes.  Moreover, calculations of 
                                                      
93 Skinner’s downward revision to the 1850 population figures raises the possibility that the estimates of 
the loss of life may be too high. Independently, Peter Schran (1978) argues for a speedy recovery of 
population in aftermath of the shock. 
94 Peter Schran finds the notion of “substantial decline” in China’s population between 1850 and 1873 to 
be “quite implausible” and concludes that population “losses due to the Taiping and Nien rebellions had 
almost been made up” by 1873 (1978, pp. 645-646).  CAO Shuji (1997) discusses migration. 
95 Banner populations were a legacy of Manchu military organization.  The Manchu leader Nurhachi 
divided his forces into groups, each of which fought under the banner of one of his kinsmen.  Once the 
Manchus had conquered China and formed the Qing dynasty, the banners, which by then included 
Chinese members along with Manchus and Mongols, were assigned lands and lived separately from the 
general Chinese population.  
96 The share of ethnic minorities in China’s 1953 census was 6.06 percent (Nai-ruenn Chen 1967, p. 126). 
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total marital fertility and other vital rates are highly sensitive to critical assumptions 
required in working with the micro-data.  In the case of the banner populations, the 
data pertain only to surviving registered males, so that results depend on estimates of 
the age at which sons were registered and mortality prior to registration. Time coverage 
is also limited. Similarly, genealogies, which were maintained for ritual reasons, cover 
limited numbers, space, and time, and could suffer from various forms of selection bias.   
Scholars have used China’s demographic record to support a variety of claims, 
some mutually inconsistent.  Some accounts emphasize Malthusian pressures and 
positive (involuntary) checks (Philip Huang 1985, CAO Shuji, 2001), while others paint a 
picture of economic dynamism and population restraint (Lee and Wang 1999, 
Pomeranz 2000).   
It is easy to understand the presence of such cross-currents.  Official totals for 
certain specific years appear to provide a reasonable picture of China’s population; prior 
to 1953, even the best data probably require error margins of plus/minus ten percent.  
For other dates, larger error margins seem appropriate. Despite these substantial error 
margins, official data can provide plausible measures of overall population change over 
extended periods — the longer the better.  But with substantial error margins 
surrounding point estimates, efforts to specify rates of population growth, even over 
periods as long as a century, can hardly avoid significant error margins.   
Prior to the 1950s, we lack information that could allow the construction of 
plausible time series for crude birth rates, death rates, and population size.  Micro-data 
can help, but are themselves limited for the reasons described above.   Because 
estimates based on available data lack precision, ad hoc adjustments permit researchers 
to shape arguments to accommodate a variety of alternative stories.97  The problem is 
compounded by the lack of other consistent series that might be used in conjunction 
with the population data to sort out competing paradigms.98  At a minimum, these 
limitations suggest some prudence in making larger claims about China’s demographic 
regime. 
                                                      
97 Timothy Brook makes a similar point in the context of discussion the Yuan and Ming (2010, p. 45). 
98 Long-run wage series for England, for example, are now being used with annual population figures to 
try to sort alternative models of demographic change. See for example Ronald Lee and Michael Anderson 
(2002). 
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Despite these uncertainties, there is a core of information about which we can 
offer considerable confidence.  Over a period spanning a half a millennium, China’s 
population grew from approximately 65 million in 1400 to approximately 400 million in 
1850 and 500 million around 1930, implying annual growth averaging approximately 
0.4 percent per annum.  Rates of growth were lower or negative during periods of 
succession, major rebellion, and famine, and higher in interludes of recovery and, in all 
likelihood, during the 16th and 18th centuries, which qualitative accounts identify as 
periods of stability and commercial expansion.  Within this framework, we also 
recognize substantial heterogeneity across regions and time periods, particularly during 
episodes of large-scale migration.  Complex interactions between economic, social and 
political forces were acting to shaping demographic behavior, possibly, as G. William 
Skinner’s (1977a,b) work anticipates, in ways that were not synchronic across regions.  
Despite recent contributions to this field, we are still not able to produce a coherent 
reconstruction of household behavior patterns or of the processes that drove the 
trajectory of China’s enormous demographic aggregate.99 
Agriculture.  As late as 1933, following several decades of substantial growth in 
industry and services, agriculture’s share in China’s GDP exceeded 60 percent, mostly 
from crops rather than animal husbandry or aquaculture (Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia 
Yeh 1965, p. 66).   For the Ming-Qing era, farming in all likelihood contributed at least 
two-thirds of aggregate output.  Output and productivity in agriculture must therefore 
occupy the center of efforts to appraise long-run economic change prior to 1949, 
including developments in the prewar decades of the 20th century.  
Efforts to study trends in agricultural production depend on quantitative 
information that is largely absent for imperial China.  There are no comprehensive data 
on cultivated or sown area or for crop yields.100  What we do have is data collected by 
the Chinese bureaucracy on cultivated land, which have some of the same 
                                                      
99 The recently published six volume of population history of China written by the historical demographers 
based at Fudan University mark an important contribution. These massive six volumes authored by GE 
Jianxiong (vol.1), DONG Guodong (vol.2), WU Songdi (vol.3), CAO Shuji (vols. 4 and 5) and HOU 
Yangfang (vol.6) aimed to build up aggregate figures from meticulously researched regional or county 
figures. While their population figures for national aggregate will need further scrutiny by future 
researchers, their long-span regional level population data represents major new contribution.  
100 Data on sown area are preferred because of the growing role of multiple cropping.  Efforts by China’s 
Ministry of Commerce to tabulate cropping area in the early Republican years produced estimates for 
1914-1918 (in volumes titled Nongshang tongjibiao [Statistical Tables of Agriculture and Industry]) that 
are filled with inconsistencies and appear virtually unusable.   
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shortcomings as the population figures, compounded by the lack of uniform measures 
of land.101  In light of these constraints, Dwight Perkins (1969) focuses on a researchable 
question: assuming that per capita grain consumption remained constant and that 80 
percent of acreage was devoted to grain, how important were the intensive (yields) and 
extensive (increases in acreage) margins to the rise in output that accommodated the 
massive increase in Chinese population over 600 years from 1368 to 1968?  
Information on the Chinese diet and the dominant role of grains in calorie intake (with 
meat and dairy products occupying only a minor position in the traditional diet) helps to 
fix reasonable bounds on per capita grain consumption.  Limited international trade in 
grain permits a focus on domestic supply.   
Table A-2 reproduces Perkins’ estimates for select years, to which we have added 
actual PRC data for 1977 and 2005.  Perkins emphasizes the dangers of pursuing such 
calculations for short periods during which large error margins for changes in 
population or land can produce serious distortions.  Over a longer period, his procedure 
for approximating increases in grain yields, and deriving an approximate balance 
between output growth from higher yields and enlarged acreage seems credible, 
particularly since the robustness of conclusions to alternative assumptions is easy to 
check.   
Efforts to discern trends in regional output or for individual crops are, if anything, 
more difficult.  Cotton, which figures prominently in the historiography, offers a good 
example.  Domestic cotton output is a critical component in efforts to appraise the 
impact of China’s 19th-century opening-up on the handicraft textile sector.  Cotton 
production is also used to estimate the level and trend of cotton textile consumption, 
an important indicator of living standards.   
Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), for example, argues that in the late 18th century per 
capita consumption was similar in China and Europe. Lacking contemporaneous 
estimates of Chinese cotton production, he turns to estimates for 1870 and 1900 by 
                                                      
101 Franklin L. Ho, a prominent prewar economist, offers the following comment on land records: research 
in Kaoyang [now called Gaoyang, in the North China province of Hebei] reveals the existence of two sets 
of assessment books – the open book used by hsien [county] magistrates and an “entirely different” 
record kept in secret “by the village elder as the basis for levies on the village in case of emergency. . . . 
Every village [that we investigated] was. . . found to have two such sets [of land records]” (Ho 1967, pp. 
109-110; see also Ray Huang 1974, p. 41 and Madeleine Zelin 1984, p. 240 on Ming and Qing official 
land records).   
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Richard Kraus (1968/1980), arguing that cotton acreage and yields were the same in 
the late 18th century as they were a century later.  Pomeranz errs in converting Kraus’ 
output of 11.1 and 9.1 million piculs in 1870 and 1900, respectively, into pounds, 
arriving at a figures of 1.85 billion and 1.5 billion pounds rather than 1.43 billion and 
1.21 billion, which inflate his estimates by nearly a quarter.  But more important, Kraus’ 
estimates of cotton production in 1870 and 1900 are themselves conjectures based on 
the assumption that per capita cotton consumption remained constant between 1870 
and the 1930s. This assumption is controversial:  Albert Feuerwerker analyzes the 
implications of alternative cotton output estimates (1970, pp. 363-371) and Thomas 
Rawski finds that “per capita consumption of cotton cloth during the 1920s and 1930s 
was approximately 50 percent higher than during 1871/80” (1989, p. 289), which 
would imply substantial increases in per capita cotton production (ibid., p. 93).  Thus 
Pomeranz’ conclusion that “Chinese textile consumption stacked up quite well against 
that of Europe in the mid- to late eighteenth century” (2000, p. 142) rests on two 
hazardous assumptions: that cotton production in the late 18th century was as high as it 
was a century later; and further, that consumption patterns remained static over the 
half-century spanning the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Tirthankar Roy notes that 
Pomeranz’ estimates imply that China’s per capita consumption of cotton cloth “was 
five times that in India [around 1750], whereas the two regions had similar GDP per 
head in the early nineteenth century” (forthcoming, p. 26).  
National Income.  Efforts to compile systematic and detailed national income 
accounts prior to 1949 at either the national (Liu and Yeh 1965, T. Rawski 1989) or 
regional (Kang Chao 1982, Debin Ma 2008) level focus on the early twentieth century.   
Efforts to develop national accounts prior to 1900 include the China segments of 
global studies by the late Angus Maddison, lightly documented (by 20th century 
standards) impressions relating to the 19th century from Chung-li Chang (Zhang Zhongli 
1962) and Albert Feuerwerker (1980) and for the Ming period by GUAN Hanhui Guan 
and LI Daokui (2010).  LI Bozhong (2010) has contributed an ambitious study, modeled 
after the influential 20th-century study by Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh (1965), that 
sets out to construct regional income accounts for a two-county slice of the prosperous 
and highly commercialized Yangzi delta area during  the 1820s. 
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With the exception of Li Bozhong (2010), these studies suffer from a common 
problem: inability to provide convincing information about the level or growth of either 
aggregate or per capita output of farm products, especially food grains.  Without solid 
estimates of grain output to form the basis of value-added estimates for the primary 
sector, it is nearly impossible to construct even approximate long-run estimates of 
national income.  The substantial error margins attached to historical population figures 
compound the difficulties when converting estimated aggregates into per capita 
magnitudes.  If we apply independent error margins of 10 percent to figures for output 
and population (assuming independence may not totally realistic given that population 
figures often enter directly or indirectly into the output estimates), per capita output at 
any specific date is subject to an error margin of roughly 20 percent.  These 
considerations lead to the unwelcome conclusion that, given our current state of 
knowledge, we face extreme uncertainty about the direction and magnitude of change 
in aggregate and per capita output in China’s pre-20th century economy.   
We see the late Angus Maddison’s estimates (Table 1), with their unrivaled 
chronological sweep, as a form of narrative interpretation, a perspective that we hope 
Maddison himself would have appreciated.  His synthetic work builds on the findings of 
qualitative scholarship and therefore must reflect the limitations of such research.   In 
the case of the “Song peak” hypothesis discussed above, these weaknesses appear to 
be substantial.  In the absence of new work to solidify the ambitious claims of Song 
specialists, Maddison’s assignment of higher per capita incomes to Song than to Ming 
or Qing is nothing more than a minimally supported conjecture.  
Li Bozhong’s (2010) effort to develop comprehensive accounts for two counties in 
the 1820s has the merit of focusing on China’s best documented region.  It also avoids 
the complications associated with estimating time trends.  While a full evaluation must 
await careful scrutiny of Li’s extensive documentation, the crucial measurement of 
aggregate and per capita agricultural output appears problematic.  Weather, in the 
form of an 1822 drought and “unprecedented” floods in 1823 and 1833, is the chief 
culprit (Li 2010, p. 37).  The 1823 flood reportedly reduced average crop yields for rice, 
the mainstay of this region’s agriculture, by over 40 percent during the ensuing decade 
(p. 395).  With few local price quotations available for the 1820s (other than for the 
flood years, which the author discards as atypical), rice prices are based on local data 
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for the 1830s (p. 329) and data from major regional markets that show no flood-
induced peaks (p. 335).  Population data come from 1816 – before the onslaught of 
bad weather (p. 43).  With population, rice prices, and rice yields based on information 
for different dates and localities, and without information showing the impact of floods 
on population or labor force, the author’s estimates of overall or per capita output and 
labor productivity in the largest sector of the local economy, either in physical or 
monetary terms, will of necessity require large error margins. 
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Map 1. Chinese Territory under Ming (shaded) and Qing 
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Tab le  2
Tax revenues in  China,  108 5‐1 776
(r ice  in  shi )
Per c apita  
land ta x
Per capita 
indirec t 
tax es
Total taxes Per c apita  
tax  burden
Index
(1085=100)
Song 
(1085 )
0.26 0 .54 72 ,102,000 0 .8 100
Ming 
(1407 )
0 .54-0.76 0.02 -0 .03 47 ,657,000 0 .56-0.79 70-98
Ming 
(1577 )
0.21 0 .03 42 ,185,000 0.24 30
Q ing 
(1685 )
0.18 0 .04 38 ,044,444 0.24 30
Q ing 
(1776 )
0.09 0 .03 36 ,620,000 0.12 15
Sou rc e: data  c om piled by  Profe ssor  Guanglin L iu
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Table 3. Qing Central Government Annual Revenue in International Comparison 
A. Aggregate Revenue(tons of silver) 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch  R* 
1650-
99 940 248  851 243 239  
1700-
49 1304 294 155 932 312 632 310 
1750-
99 1229 263 492 1612 618 1370 350 
1800-
49 1367     6156  
1850-
99 
2651     10941  
 
B. International Comparison of per capita Tax Revenue (grams of silver) 
 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch R* 
1650-
99 7.0  11.8   46.0  35.8  45.1   
1700-
49 7.2  15.5  6.4  46.6  41.6  93.5  161.1  
1750-
99 4.2  12.9  21 66.4  63.1  158.4  170.7  
1800-
49 3.4      303.8   
1850-
99 
7.0     344.1  
 
 
C. Per Capita Revenue in Expressed in Days’ Wages for Unskilled 
Urban Workers 
 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch R* 
1650-
99  1.7  8.0 7.7 4.2 13.6 
1700-
49 2.26 2.6 6.4 6.7 4.6 8.9 24.1 
1750-
99 1.32 2.0 8.3 11.4 10.0 12.6 22.8 
1800-
49 1.23     17.2  
1850-
99 1.99     19.4  
 
Source: see Debin Ma 2011a, with thanks to Kivanc Karaman, Sevket Pamuk, Peter Lindert and Steve 
Nafziger for sharing datasets.    
 
*Dutch Republic 
Conversion notes: one Chinese silver tael = 37 grams of silver.  
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For per capita revenue in days of urban unskilled wages, 1650-59, 1700-09 figures are used to represent 
1650-99, 1700-49 respectively. Average of 1750-50 and 1780-89 are used to represent 1750-99 for all 
other countries except China. See http://:www.ata.boun.edu.tr/sevketpamuk/JEH2010articledatabase. 
Nominal wages for China and England are for Beijing and London drawn from Robert C. Allen et al 2010.  
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Year Regime
Official Ho Perkins
1393 Ming 60.5 65a 65‐80
1600 Ming ≈150 120‐200
1650 Qing 100‐150
1700 Qing ≈150
1750 Qing 179.5 200‐250
1779 Qing 275.0 275
1794 Qing 313.3 313
1820 Qing 353.4
1850 Qing 429.9 430 410 (±25)
1873 Qing 350 (±25)
1893 Qing 385 (±25)
1913 Republic 430 (±25)
1933 Republic 500 (±25)
1953 PRC 582.6 583 (±15)
1982 PRC 1016.5
1990 PRC 1143.3
2000 PRC 1267.4
Sources:  
Ping‐ti Ho (1959, pp. 264, 270, 278, 281‐282); Dwight Perkins  
     (1969, pp. 207, 212, 216); Yearbook (2009, pp. 89‐90).
PRC figures are for census years.
a Reference is to the "late 14th century."
Population totals (millions)
Table A‐1
Chinese Population Totals, 1393‐2000
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Grain
Population Sown to Total Per capita Yield
Year (million) Total Grain Grain (mill. ton) (kg) (ton/mu)
Perkins estimates
1400 72 370 296 21 285 0.07
1600 160 500 400 46 285 0.11
1770 270 950 760 77 285 0.10
1873 350 1210 968 100 285 0.10
1893 385 1240 992 110 285 0.11
1913 430 1360 1088 123 285 0.11
1933 500 1470 1176 143 285 0.12
1957 647 1678 1342 184 235 0.14
PRC official figures
1957 646 1677 2004 195 302 0.10
1977 950 1488 1806 283 298 0.16
2005 1308 1950 1565 484 370 0.31
Notes: italics  indicate assumed figures.  Perkins assumes per capita grain output of 
  570 catties (=285 kg) and also that 80% of cultivated land is devoted to grain.
 We omit Perkins' error margins and take the midpoint of his population
  ranges for 1400 and 1600.  
15 mu (or mou ) = 1 hectare. Output figures are in metric tons.
Sources: Dwight Perkins (1969, pp. 16‐17); Compendium (2010, pp. 6, 36, 37).
Crop Area (million mu)
Cultivated Area
Grain Output
Table A‐2
Long‐term Trends in Cropping Area, Grain Output, Yield, and Availability, 1400‐2005
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